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5LGI Policy Fellowship Program
Each year LGI selects talented professionals to
participate in its one-year multinational fellowship
program. Fellows work in small teams under the
guidance of a well-respected mentor to produce
analytical studies on a given topic. The mentors help
build the capacity of the LGI policy analysts and
experts. The studies, such as this publication, present
policy options and alternatives and are geared towards
the policy-making community in fellows’ respective
countries. Once the studies have been published, LGI
determines the steps it can take to support the proposed
recommendations.
The primary goal of the LGI Policy Fellowship
program is to support policy research aimed at stimu-
lating innovative and practical policy recommendations
related to various areas of governance and the provi-
sion of public services. Fellows are encouraged to ini-
tiate research and to work on policy conclusions with
national and local government officials and advisers.
Each year broad topics are identified for candidates
from different country groups.
Fellows are generally governmental officials, civil
servants, members of advocacy groups or professional
associations, policy researchers and policy advisers.
Fellows join teams of 5-7 members each, which are
then supervised by expert mentors.  Fellows are en-
couraged to support each other’s work with their ex-
pertise and comments within their teams. LGI encour-
ages teams of fellows to develop joint or comparable
research agendas.
The four fellowship topics for 2002-2003 are: the
digital divide and e-democracy in Eastern Europe and
Central Asia; housing the poor in major urban cen-
ters; decentralization and transformation of the gover-
nance of education; and administrative remedies for
abuses at the local level.
Scott Abrams
Project Manager LGI / OSI
ascott@osieurope.org
July, 2003
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Water Management in the Southern Caucasus
and Central Asia: The Past and the Present
S a r a h  O ’ H a r a
INTRODUCTION
Water is a key resource for the countries of the Southern
Caucasus and Central Asia (SCCA), contributing
significantly to the agricultural sector, the export
economy and energy production. During the Soviet
period, the region’s water resources, like other natural
resources, were managed with the aim of ensuring that
centrally determined output targets were achieved.
Until the 1980s, when the Republics were given a
greater say in how their water was managed, all
developments were orchestrated by Moscow, which
allocated funds for these activities. The situation
changed following the collapse of the Soviet Union;
overnight, the fledging and often fragile governments
of the eight newly independent SCCA states inherited
the responsibility for the management and maintenance
of the vast, highly complex and extremely bureaucratic
water resources sector.
Unprepared—and in some cases unwilling—for
independence, the SCCA Republics have faced con-
siderable economic, social and political upheavals in
the post-Soviet era. Four of the countries, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Tajikistan became embroiled
in civil and interstate conflict, prompting vast out-
migration from the region and bringing widespread
poverty to those left behind. The remaining countries,
all in Central Asia, while maintaining stability saw their
economies decline dramatically. The combination of
civil unrest and economic crisis has had enormous
implications for the water sector. Loss of personnel,
budget slashes and in some cases open hostilities be-
tween the different states has had an immense impact
on water management.  There has been a significant
decline in data collection; even when data is collected,
little information is exchanged with neighboring coun-
tries. In some countries maintenance programs have
come to a halt, while in others they are operating at a
minimal level. As a result, irrigation and drainage sys-
tems are rapidly degrading, and in some areas, they are
no longer functional. Domestic water supplies have
deteriorated rapidly as equipment has failed and re-
pairs have become impossible. Many settlements are
now without a central water supply, while others often
find that their water is cut-off and the quality of water
is poor—and deteriorating.
Ironically, as the management and maintenance
of the water sector has declined, the demands on it
have increased. Agriculture, which has been and con-
tinues to be the mainstay of most of SCCA econo-
mies, is almost entirely dependent on irrigation. More-
over, for many, the produce of small garden plots has
become essential to food security and in some SCCA
countries more than 80% of the population relies on
their garden plots for virtually all their food. The needs
of the individual, however, are often in competition
with the needs of the state, while the needs of the state
are often in competition with those of neighboring
states. Although such competition existed during the
Soviet period, decisions on prioritizing needs were
made by Moscow; today, this is the responsibility of
independent national governments.
The situation has been further complicated by the
fact that many Soviet-built water management facili-
ties are multipurpose in nature. Reservoirs not only
regulate flows and store water for domestic, industrial
and agricultural purposes, but can also be used to pro-
duce hydroelectric power (HEP) and to provide flood
protection. In addition, they often served more than
one Republic and were built with little regard for nat-
ural boundaries or national borders. The decentraliza-
tion of water management in the SCCA region, which
occurred by default following the collapse of the
Soviet Union, therefore had huge implications for the
14 L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  A N D  P U B L I C  S E R V I C E  R E F O R M  I N I T I A T I V E
D R O P  BY  D R O P :  W AT E R  M A N A G E M E N T  I N  T H E  S O U T H E R N  C AU C A S U S  A N D  C E N T R A L  A S I A
region as a whole.  Decisions made at the national
level can have immense implications for neighboring
countries and have caused tension between the various
states sharing rivers and lakes. For example, Kyrgysz-
tan’s decision to operate the Toktogul reservoir on a
winter HEP regime has caused tensions with its down-
stream neighbors of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, which
want the reservoir to be operated on a summer irriga-
tion regime.1 Despite the immense social, political and
economic upheavals of the post independence period,
SCCA countries are beginning to recognize the need
for improved and better-integrated water management
strategies. Significantly, officials are increasingly aware
of the benefits of shared ideas and experiences and the
need to rebuild links with organizations in neighbor-
ing states. With this in mind, the Local Government
and Public Service Reform Initiative (LGI) network
program of the Open Society Institute sponsored this
particular fellowship in 2001-2002. Entitled “Decen-
tralization of Water Management: Public Service Re-
form in Central Asia and the Caucasus,” the purpose
of the program was to compare regional experiences
and to adopt relevant management and financing per-
spectives of water management in a changed—and
changing—political and economic environment.  The
project was designed to research one or more of the
following issues:
• The role of the local administration in water
management;
• The delegation of responsibility for service delivery;
• The economic aspects of reforming of water
management: water pricing application of and
market tools in the management; and
• Public participation in water management (Water
Users Association and its applicability for the FSU
countries).
In this endeavor, LGI included fellows from
throughout the region.  Mentored by Mr. Iskandar
Abdullaev (Uzbekistan) of the International Water
Management Institute for Central Asia and the Cau-
casus, the following fellows participated in the project:
Lilit Melikyan (Armenia), Aydin Aslanov (Azerbaijan),
Lada Zimina (Kazakhstan), Ahmat Madeyuev (Kyr-
gyzstan), and Anvar Buzurokov (Tajikistan).  Fellows
carried out their research for ten months in 2001-2002
in their home countries and met periodically to com-
pare their findings and methodologies. At the end of
the fellowship, participants reported on their activities
and findings in relation to their home country. This
publication includes two of these reports: Lilit Me-
likyan’s study on the economic and social aspects of
reforming water resources management in Armenia;
and Lada Zimina’s paper on the development of water
management in Southern Kazakhstan. These two re-
ports not only highlight country specific issues, but
also provide important  insight as to the major water
management issues for the SCCA region as a whole.
Moreover, while there is a growing body of literature
on water management issues in the SCCA region, rel-
atively few in-depth analyses of specific issues are avail-
able.  As such, publication of the findings from Arme-
nia and Kazakhstan by researchers from the region rep-
resents an important contribution to our understand-
ing of current water reforms and their wider implica-
tion. To view the reports on the countries not repre-
sented in this publication, please visit LGI’s web site
at http://lgi.osi.hu.
In her detailed overview of the situation in Arme-
nia, Lilit Melikyan analyzes the economic aspects in
the reform of water resource management in Armenia,
focusing on economic tools (such as water tariffs), reg-
ulatory reform and the potential impact of such re-
forms on poor and vulnerable households. She argues
that while reforms are essential to prevent further ero-
sion and the possible collapse of the water manage-
ment sector, tariff increases and the imposition of a
strict payment discipline could damage low-income
households and agricultural farms. Thus, it is essential
that reforms are carefully designed, that appropriate
strategic investments in infrastructure are secured, and
that any changes are accompanied by measures to re-
duce the negative social impact on the poor.
Lada Zimina’s paper describes the current state of
water management reforms in Kazakhstan and focuses
on a case study of the Makhtaaral rayon of Southern
Kazakhstan.  She argues that the Government of Ka-
zakhstan must undertake a comprehensive reform of
irrigation water management, and that the current strat-
egy for irrigation management transfer should involve
legislative reform, redistribution of responsibilities
among the state water management bodies, and the
empowerment of farmers and WUAs. The steps nec-
essary for successful transfer include: adoption of a new
Water Code; reorganization of the governmental wa-
15
ter management institutional makeup; clarification of
irrigation infrastructure ownership issues; and increased
government and international donor investment.
CASE STUDIES IN CONTEXT:
WATER RESOURCES OF THE SOUTHERN
CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA
The Southern Caucasus
The Southern Caucasus encompasses a wide range of
ecological environments, from cool, humid conditions
in the mountains of Georgia to the arid/semi-arid
dryland scrub of Azerbaijan. Precipitation varies
enormously across the region, with considerably higher
levels in the highlands than the low-lying valleys. The
climate is markedly seasonal, with most precipitation
falling as snow in the winter months. The region
contains dense network of rivers and streams, many of
which flow into the region two main rivers the Kura
and the Araks (Figure 1). The largest river in the
southern Caucasus is the Kura, which rises in the Pontic
mountains of northeastern Turkey and flows through
Georgia and Azerbaijan before discharging in to the
Caspian Sea. Its main tributary is the Araks, which
also originates in Turkey.  The Araks flows to the east,
and for much of its length forms a border river between
Turkey and Armenia before continuing along the shared
border of Iran and Azerbaijan. The rivers are largely
fed by snowmelt; consequently, peak discharge occurs
during late April–June, at which time 58–65% of the
annual flow occurs. Approximately 60% of the
discharge is via the Kura River, with the remaining
40% attributed to the Araks.  Huge inter-annual
Figure 1
The Kura-Araks Drainage Basin
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variations in discharge occur; while the mean discharge
of the Kura-Araks Basin is an estimated 32 km3 per
year, in low snowfall years water availability can drop
significantly.
Unlike the Kura and the Araks, with only two
major reservoirs on the main system, many of the riv-
ers’ tributaries are heavily regulated. There is a total of
130 reservoirs throughout the Southern Caucasus, stor-
ing water for irrigation, industrial and domestic use. A
number of larger storage facilities are also used for the
production of HEP.
The Kura-Araks Basin is shared by five states, the
three countries of the Southern Caucasus; Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Georgia, as well as Turkey and Iran.
Significantly, Armenia lies entirely within this basin
(Table 1.). During the Soviet period, the USSR signed
number of transboundary agreements with Turkey and
Iran pertaining to the Kura and Araks rivers. In 1927,
for example, Turkey and the USSR signed the “Treaty
on the Beneficial Uses of Boundary Waters,” in which
they agreed to share water on a fifty-fifty basis and or-
ganize a Joint Boundary Water Commission to con-
trol the use of the frontier water (however, this lacked
a legal basis). The USSR also signed an agreement with
Iran in 1957, which covered the joint utilization of
the frontier parts of the river Araks for irrigation and
power. Under the agreement, the two states were allo-
cated 50% of all potential water and power resources
on the shared portions of the river.
In terms of absolute water availability, Georgia is
endowed with the greatest water wealth and only ex-
periences water shortages in summer or exceptionally
dry years. Although water distribution is rather un-
even, it is estimated that, on a per capita basis, Geor-
gians have more than four times the amount of water
available to Armenia and Azerbaijan.2 Armenia experi-
ences water shortages on a regular basis, but has signif-
icant groundwater reserves of a relatively high quality
which are extremely important—particularly as a source
of drinking water. At the downstream end of the sys-
tem, Azerbaijan not only has the highest negative wa-
ter balance, but also experiences problems with water
quality. Furthermore, its groundwater resources are
limited.  Hence, the country is the most vulnerable in
terms of absolute quantity and quality of accessible
water.
Central Asia
With the exception of Kazakhstan, the Central Asian
Republics (CARs) lie almost entirely within the Aral
Sea Basin, a large internal drainage system with its
terminus at the Aral Sea (Figure 2). The region is
dominated by low-lying deserts, flanked by extensive
mountain ranges to the south and southeast and has a
marked continental climate with long hot summers and
cool moist winters. Annual precipitation is generally
less than 200 mm in the desert lowlands, reaching a
maximum of 800–1600 mm in the high mountain
areas of the Pamirs and the Tien Shan. Evaporation
varies accordingly, from over 2250 mm in the most
arid region, to less than 500 mm in the mountainous
zones. Thus, while the deserts experience a significant
moisture deficit, the highland regions have a surplus
of moisture and form the flow generation zone for
Central Asia’s main rivers.
Draining an area of 534,939 km2 the Amudarya is
Central Asia’s largest river in terms of discharge. The
river rises as the Pamir in Tajikistan and the Ba-
khandarya in Afghanistan which join to form the
Pyandzh at the Tajik-Afghan border. At Termez, in
Table 1
Background Details for the Kura-Araks Basin
% of Country % of Total Basin Area [km2] Population [millions]
Armenia 100.0 15.35 29,741 3.0
Azerbaijan 79.8 30.87 57,800 6.8
Georgia 52.4 18.53 34,700 3.0
Turkey and Iran — 35.25 66,000 —
Total — — 188,241 c. 20.0
Source: Israfilov, 2002; Mott MacDonald, 2003.
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Uzbekistan, the Pyandzh is joined by the Sukhandarya
to form the Amudarya proper. From its headwaters,
the Amudarya flows around 2500 km across Tajiki-
stan, Uzbekistan (where it forms the border with Af-
ghanistan) and Turkmenistan and finally back into
Uzbekistan before discharging into the southern Aral
Sea. The river displays two close—but distinct—peaks
in discharge: the first, in April–May, is associated with
snowmelt; the second, in June–July, occurs during the
period of maximum glacial melt. Discharge is thus
closely related to the amount of snowfall and summer
temperatures, with mean annual flow varying from 46.9
to 108.4 km3 per year, with an average of 78.5 cubic
kilometers.3  A large number of structures are used to
control flows in the Amudarya basin, particularly on
some of the smaller tributaries. The largest is the Nurek
Dam located on the Vakhsh River in Tajikistan. The
Nurek is a multi-purpose facility used for irrigation
water storage, flow regulation, flood control and HEP.
Significantly, the largest river in the upper Amudarya
Basin, the Pyandzh, is entirely unregulated, as is the
Amudarya proper from Temez to the Tyuyamuyun
Reservoir at the head of the Amudarya delta.
Central Asia’s second major river, the Syrdarya, rises
in the mountains of Kyrgyzstan. It has two main trib-
utaries: the Naryn, which is fed by over 700 glaciers
high in the Tien Shan; and the Karadarya, which sourc-
es in the Fergansky and Alaysky Mountains. The two
rivers merge in eastern Uzbekistan to form the Syrd-
arya; from there, the river flows into Tajikistan before
re-entering Uzbekistan and finally flowing in to Kaza-
khstan where it discharges into the northern Aral Sea.
The Syrdarya drains a catchment of 782,617 square
kilometers.  Although similar in length, its discharge is
approximately half that of the Amudarya—ranging
from 21.4 to 54.1 km3 per year (37.2 km3 on average).4
Figure 2
The Major Rivers of the Aral Sea Basin, Central Asia
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The period of maximum discharge occurs in June–
July. The Syrdarya river is regulated through the Naryn-
Syrdarya Reservoir Cascade, which incorporates five
major reservoirs: Toktogul (Kyrgyzstan), Charvak
(Uzbekistan), Andijan (Uzbekistan), Kairakum (Tajiki-
stan) and Shardara (Kazakhstan). The largest structure
in terms of storage volume is the Toktogul Reservoir in
Kyrgyzstan, which regulates the Naryn River.
The Amudarya and Syrdarya account for nearly
90% of the usable water in of the Aral Sea Basin, which
on average is approximately 125 km3 per year. The
remaining ten percent is derived from the region’s
numerous smaller rivers and streams such as the Mur-
gap, Tejen and Zarafshen Rivers (Figure 2.). Tajikistan
forms the main flow generation zone for the Amudarya,
and is by far the most important source of water in the
Aral Sea Basin—accounting for over 55% of the re-
gion’s water resources. A further 25% (approximately)
of the basin’s flows are generated on the territory of
Kyrgyzstan. Consequently, these two countries account
for more than 80% of all water available for use in
Central Asia (Table 2).
WATER USE IN THE SOUTHERN
CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA
The main user of water in the Kura-Araks Basin is
agriculture, which accounts for over 55% of water use
in the basin. An additional 30% of water is used in
industry, with the remainder used for domestic
purposes. In terms of overall use, Azerbaijan is by far
the greatest consumer of water in the region, accounting
for 75% of consumption in the Kura-Araks basin.
Georgia consumes the least amount, using some six to
seven percent of available water resources (Figure 3).
Water use in the CARs is considerably greater than
in the Southern Caucasus. Uzbekistan, the single larg-
est user, consumes almost ten times the amount of water
as Azerbaijan. The vast majority (90–96%) of water is
used by the agricultural sector, with most of the CARs
using less than two percent of their available water re-
source for domestic purpose (Figure 4).
PRE-SOVIET WATER MANAGEMENT
Central Asia and the Caucasus have a long history of
agriculture and settlement, boasting some of the oldest
known sites of irrigation in the world. In Central Asia,
for example, the earliest know sites of irrigation date
back some 7000-8000 years. By 2000 years ago, large
tracts of land were irrigated in the region’s better-
watered locales. Our understanding of how the region’s
earliest irrigation networks were managed is extremely
limited, although it is likely that sophisticated
organizational structures were in place at a very early
stage. What we do know is that traditional systems
were generally localized and often dependent on a single
water supply that was not only limited, but also
fluctuated considerably from year to year. As a result,
water management required considerable skill. The
Table 2
Flow Generation and Population Figures for the Aral Sea Basin
Country Amudarya Basin Syrdarya Basin Aral Sea Basin
Flow generation [km3/year] Flow generation [km3/year] Population
Afghanistan 6.18 0 —
Kazakhstan* 0 4.5 2.6
Kyrgyzstan 1.9 27.4 2.2
Tajikistan 62.9 1.1 6.1
Turkmenistan** 2.78 0 5.4
Uzbekistan 4.7 4.14 24.3
* Data only for the two southern provinces.
** Includes flows from Iran.
Source: WARMAP, 1996; GEF Reports, 2002.
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Figure 3
Water Use by Sector in the Southern Caucasus
Source: Mott MacDonald, 2003.
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Water Use by Sector in Central Asia
Source: FAO (1997).
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individual who was responsible for the highly important
and often contentious decisions on water allocation
and distribution was one of the most senior officials in
the central government.
One of the most detailed descriptions of traditional
water management in Central Asia is provided by Von
Middendorf (1882), who gives an excellent overview
of how water was managed in the Kokand (Qoqand)
Khanate of the Fergana Valley shortly after Tsarist forces
had annexed the region.5   He noted that, as with other
Central Asian Khanates, the Khan acted as the steward
of water rights for Allah, which meant that the state
effectively retained the right of ownership. The mirab
bashi was the most senior water official and was re-
sponsible for water allocation and distribution. He was
elected by the water user communities and paid in kind
(usually by a proportion of the grain harvest) by the
deqhans.6 This payment, known as Kipsen, was never a
consistent percentage of the crop, as the farmer paid
depending on how satisfied he was with the job that
the mirab bashi was doing. Thus, the mirab bashi was
both elected and sanctioned by water users. Local
mirabs were responsible for secondary canals and, ac-
cording to Von Middendorf, “knew his district in
minute detail.”7  In many cases, the mirab was assisted
by the Ariq amin, who was responsible for smaller wa-
ter supply canals know as ariqs. Like the mirab bashi,
mirabs were also elected and paid by the deqhans. The
construction and maintenance of the irrigation system
as well as the distribution of water at the village level
was the responsibility of the ketman, essentially a
water user association comprising of three to four vil-
lages. Each village elected an elder (aqsaqal), who made
decisions based on discussions with other village el-
ders. Ketman were further divided into smaller units,
known as a top, which consisted of a few streets or a
family unit (Figure 5).
When it was necessary to undertake construction
work, the mirab bashi and mirabs would conscript
water users. Villages at the head of a planned new ariq,
which would receive more and fresher water, were ex-
pected to contribute more to the project in terms of
time and resources. If a major project was proposed,
however, it was necessary to call in help from other
Figure 5
The Traditional Water Management Structure in the Kokand Khanate of the Ferghana Valley during the 1880s
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communities. While the construction of new canals
and other irrigation infrastructure was a one-off job,
maintaining the system and keeping the ariq and drains
free of silt and vegetation was a continual undertak-
ing.  It was obligatory for all water users to take part in
the annual maintenance of the network. Hashar, as it
was known, was the most important affair in the vil-
lage administration and individuals who refused to take
part in it were fined or denied access to communally
allocated land and water.
People were even assigned communal lands based
on contributions of labor to hashar. It was, according
to Von Middendorf, a “tax which was understood, and
developed within local conditions; the population has
become accustomed to its fulfillment since childhood.”
Thus, in effect, hashar was a system which linked ben-
efits to duty.
MODERNIZATION: THE SOVIET PERIOD
Following the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution and
subsequent emergence of the Soviet Union, the
management of water was taken out of the hands of
the elders and councils with whom it had traditionally
resided and was developed as common resource for
the benefit of all. There emerged instead several
government bodies which were responsible for the
development of a regional water management strategy
that would allow centrally determined production
targets to be met.  Foremost among these agencies were
the Ministry for Land Reclamation and Water
Resources, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry
of Energy. Soviet planners based in Moscow developed
comprehensive plans aimed at maximizing output,
which were then passed down to republican level
organizations to implement. For much of the Soviet
period, the plans appeared to work. Output from
agriculture rose substantially and the landscape of the
SCCA region was transformed by large-scale water
diversion and irrigation schemes that took water from
areas of surplus to those of deficit. Vast tracts of the
desert steppe were transformed, and by the 1980s the
Soviet Union (specifically the Republics of Uzbekistan
and Turkmenistan), ranked among the most important
cotton growing areas of the world. But the cost of
making the deserts bloom was immense. Huge amounts
of water were wasted, through evaporation, seepage
from unlined canals, and wasteful irrigation practices.
The net result was a huge increase in the amount of
water used, widespread water logging of fields and
consequently secondary salinization of the soils,8 and
most significantly the dramatic decline of Aral Sea.9
By the 1970s, the Soviet authorities were waking up to
the fact that water was being managed in a wasteful
and unsustainable manner, and that Republics on the
lower reaches of the region’s major rivers were receiving
insufficient water.10 The situation was especially prob-
lematic in Central Asia. In the mid-1980s, the Soviet
authorities established two river basin authorities
(BVOs), one for the Amudarya and the other for the
Syrdarya. The aim of the BVOs was to improve the
management of water resources within the two basins,
mainly to ensure that centrally determined production
targets were met, but also to increase flows to the Aral
Sea. Although the measures introduced by the Soviet
administration may have improved water management
in Central Asia and the SCCA region as a whole, the
collapse of the Soviet Union brought a halt to plans
aimed at improving the management and use of water.
Thus, at independence, the countries of the SCCA
inherited a system already in crisis.
COLLAPSE AND REFORM:
THE POST-SOVIET PERIOD
Independence had enormous implications for water
management in the SCCA region, although these have
differed in the two major sub-regions and for each of
the eight countries. In some countries, there have been
few changes in water management, while elsewhere,
significant efforts to reorganize and redefine the way
in which water is managed are underway.
The Southern Caucasus
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
Southern Caucasus descended into chaos as age-old
conflicts re-emerged and threatened to engulf the
region. By early 1992, Armenia and Azerbaijan were
at war: Armenian-backed Karabakh militiamen had
effectively taken control of the largely Armenian
autonomous oblast of Nagorno-Karakakh in Azer-
baijan. Although a cease-fire was brokered in 1994,
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periodic outbreaks of violence continue and a final
peace settlement has yet to be agreed. Similar ethnic
related conflicts flared up elsewhere in the Southern
Caucasus and the region has suffered widespread civil
unrest with outbreaks of violence—most notably
between Georgia and South Ossetia, and Georgia and
Abkhazia. The current status of these conflicts varies,
but as yet there has not been a single peace agreement
between any of the warring factions and the situation
throughout large parts of the Caucasus remains
extremely tense.
The highly volatile situation throughout the South-
ern Caucasus has had immense implications for water
management at both the regional and national level.
At independence, for example, over 40 river segments
and tributaries in the region became transboundary,
either by crossing a border, being a border river or end-
ing up as a major tributary at a border.11 Thus, the
three former Soviet Republics of the Southern Cauca-
sus have failed to develop a legal basis for the manage-
ment of the water resources that they share. Indeed,
how these rivers are managed has barely been discussed.
Although Georgia and Azerbaijan have signed a num-
ber of agreements and memorandums, and have made
provisions to share data, the lack of equipment and
funds to undertake systematic monitoring of water
availability and quality means that little data exchange
has occurred.  There are, however, various issues that
need to be addressed. Officials in Azerbaijan, for ex-
ample, frequently voice their concerns about the quan-
tity and quality of the water they received from the
upstream countries, and complain that discharges from
industrial complexes are polluting the region’s water
bodies.12 Although the marked decline in industrial
output has resulted in a significant decrease in pollu-
tion, the virtual collapse of the sewage and wastewater
treatment system throughout the region has increased
the amount of organic waste in the rivers.  In Armenia,
for example, sewage treatment has dropped dramati-
cally: whereas in 1990, over 500 million cubic meters
(MCM) of sewage was collected and approximately
315 MCM were purified by 1999, this had fallen to
160 MCM and approximately 105 MCM respective-
ly.13 The main rivers are thus heavily polluted with
municipal, industrial and medical waste, and concen-
trations of heavy metals, phenols and nitrogen are con-
siderably higher than the national and international
standards. Given that Azerbaijan is largely dependent
on these surface water bodies for drinking water, it is
not surprising that Azeri water officials are concerned
about water quality. It is thus significant that only
Azerbaijan has signed the UN Convention on the Pro-
tection and Use of Transboundary Water Courses and
International Lakes.14
As in the Soviet period, water management is spread
amongst a range of institutions and agencies. The highly
Table 3
Where responsibilities lies for elements of water management in Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia.
Water Management Issue Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia
Ownership of Water State State/Municipality/Private State
River Basin Management Ministry of Natural Protection — Ministry of Environment
Water management legislation Ministry of Natural Protection Ministry of Justice; Ministry of Environment
Ministry of Ecology
Water quality monitoring Ministry of Natural Protection; Ministry of Health; Hyrdromet,
Ministry of Health JSC AzerEnergy; Ministry of Health
Ministry of Ecology
Water quantity monitoring Committee for Water Ministry of Ecology; Hydromet
Resources; JSC AzerEnergy;
Ministry of Natural Protection Committee of Amelioration
Monitoring of water use Committee for water resources Committee of Amelioration Department of Amelioration
(irrigation); (irrigation)
Ministry of Energy (HEP);
Users
Source: Mott MacDonald, 2003.
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fragmented nature of water resource management
means that conflicts of interests are inevitable.  More-
over, there are considerable differences in the water
management structures between the three countries,
which makes the management of transboundary water
resources more difficult. For example, reservoir man-
agement is the responsibility of the user in Georgia
and Azerbaijan, but of the Committee of Water Re-
sources in Armenia—with seven separate agencies re-
sponsible for water quality (Table 3).
Central Asia
The Central Asia Republics took a somewhat different
approach to water management following indepen-
dence. From the outset, the need for regional
cooperation was recognized by the emerging Central
Asian leadership, and the Water Resource Ministers
from all five countries met in September 1991—before
the dissolution of the Soviet Union—and announced
that from hence forth “joint water resources manage-
ment would be established on the basis of equity and
mutual benefit.”15 The interstate Almaty Agreement
on Water Resources, signed in February 1992 by all
the CARs, established joint ownership and manage-
ment of the region’s water resources—along with the
retention of sovereign control over crops, industrial
goods and electric power obtained from them. The
agreement further reiterated the need for cooperation,
stating that “only unification and joint coordination
of action” would help improve economic and environ-
mental conditions in the region. Furthermore, member
states agreed to adhere to existing Soviet determined
water allocations, to refrain from projects infringing
on other states and to the free exchange of information.
The agreement provided for the establishment of the
Interstate Commission for Water Management (ICWM),
which meets five times a year and is responsible for
allocating water resources based on the 1992 treaty—
although actual allocations are implemented by the
Syrdarya and Amudarya River Basin Authorities
(BVOs).
A number of subsequent agreements have been
signed by the five CARs, including the 1993 Agree-
ment on Joint Actions to Solve the Aral Sea Crisis’
(adopted on the March 26, 1993 Heads of State Meet-
ing in Kyzyl Orda). A framework for the management
of Central Asia’s water emerged from these agreements.
This framework consisted of environmental and water
management agencies, headed by the Interstate Coun-
cil for the Aral Sea (ICAS), and financial organizations,
such as the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea
(IFAS). At the Heads of State/ICAS meeting of Febru-
ary 27, 1997, ICAS and IFAS merged into a new IFAS,
with President Karimov of Uzbekistan elected as the
first president on a two-year rotating term.16  The cur-
rent president of IFAS is President Rahmonov of Taji-
kistan. The Central Asian Presidents have reiterated
their commitment to cooperative water management
via the IFAS, other regional organizations and regional
summits.
The Almaty agreement signifies that the lion’s share
of Central Asia’s water is allocated to the three down-
stream countries of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and
Kazakhstan, which together receive 86% of withdraw-
als from the Amudarya and 89.6% from the Syrdarya
(Table 4). Uzbekistan is by far the single biggest user,
with access to just over 52% of the flows of the Syrd-
arya and 43% of the flow of the Amudarya. At the
Table 4
Water Allocations from the Amudarya and Syrdarya as Agreed at the April 6, 1992 Meeting of the ICWC
Percent of Flows of the Syrdarya Percent of Flows of the Amudarya
Kazakstan 38.1 0
Turkmenistan 0 43.0
Uzbekistan 51.7 43.0
Tajikistan 9.2 13.6
Kyrgyzstan 1.0 0.4
Total 100.0 100.0
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other end of the spectrum, Kyrgyzstan is allocated less
than ten percent of the basin’s water resources. Signif-
icantly, the Almaty agreement makes no provision for
Afghanistan, despite the fact that around six percent
of flows within the Aral Sea Basin are generated on
Afghan territory.
Despite considerable talk of cooperation and the
need for a unified approach to water management in
reality the situation has been very different, and many
of the issues that have proved problematic in the South-
ern Caucasus have also emerged in Central Asia. Lack
of funds, loss of key personnel, poor maintenance, and
a failure to exchange information by institutions both
within and between countries have had a deleterious
impact on the water management sector. The BVOs,
for example, are interstate organizations, both based
in Uzbekistan.  They do not, however, rotate the man-
agement of the BVOs between the five states, nor do
they employ specialists from other states.17 Thus while
the BVOs are a central component of the overall water
management system, they have no real power and are
not  recognized by individual state legislatures and thus
have no real authority. They are chronically under fund-
ed because the countries are unable or unwilling to
fulfil their financial commitments to them. Thus, while
on paper the BVOs have considerable power in prac-
tice, they are incapable of genuine basin wide manage-
ment. Organizations responsible for water management
within the Republics are equally strapped for cash and
officials throughout the region constantly bemoan the
fact that they are unable to fulfil their commitments
because of the lack of resources and personnel.18  Since
1991, for example, there has been a dramatic decline
in the number of people employed in the water man-
agement sector because of financial constraints and
changing social and political conditions within the
Republics.
It is not only a question of managing the system,
but maintaining it as well. The maintenance require-
ments are enormous and even at the best of times would
be a huge financial undertaking for the Republics. The
virtual collapse of the region’s economy, however, has
made it an almost impossible task.  Dams and reser-
voirs are in urgent need of repair, irrigation canals are
silting up, much of the drainage system is so choked
with weeds that it no longer works and equipment for
maintaining the system is largely defunct.19 Kyrgyzstan,
for example, has been very vocal on this point and it
resents the fact that waters generated on its territory
and stored in reservoirs—waters for which it is  re-
sponsible—benefit the downstream countries of
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. It has repeatedly argued
that the downstream countries should be partly respon-
sible for maintenance costs and have gone as far as stat-
ing that water is a commodity for which Uzbekistan
and Kazakhstan should pay. After a decade of wran-
gling, during which time Kyrgyzstan has repeatedly cut
flows to the downstream countries, there is some indi-
cation that the three countries are beginning to find
solutions to the issue of shared responsibility. Kyr-
gyzstan and Kazakhstan, for example have recently
signed agreements on the joint usage of facilities on
the rivers Chu and Talas.20 Under the agreement, Ka-
zakhstan will participate in the exploitation, repair, and
reconstruction of the dams, channels and pumping
plants in return for water free of charge. Such an agree-
ment could provide the basis for agreements on other
shared rivers and facilities that benefit more than one
country, and thus represents an important step for-
ward in water relations in the region as a whole.
There are a number of other factors that compli-
cate water management at the regional level. A major
issue is the fact that most of the water storage facilities
in the region are located in the upstream states. These
facilities, like those of the Southern Caucasus, are
multipurpose.  This has resulted in intense competi-
tion for water between the upstream states who want
to use their resources to generate much needed HEP,
particularly during the winter months, and the down-
stream users who want water to be released in the sum-
mer for irrigation purposes. Although the CARs, and
especially those that share the Syrdarya basin, have been
relatively successful in negotiating agreements on how
the system should be managed, the situation is likely
to be complicated by changing land and agricultural
policies and increasing demand for water.  This is ex-
acerbated by population growth and changes in the
climate which are expected to result in a significant
decrease in total water availability.21 As a result, the
management of the region’s unevenly distributed wa-
ter resources will become even more complex. It is
therefore essential that the CARs develop water man-
agement strategies that are able to cope with this in-
creased complexity while at the same remain sensitive
to the needs of both the local and regional population.
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DECENTRALIZED WATER MANAGEMENT
IN ARMENIA AND KAZAKHSTAN
Irrigation Sector
Given that the agricultural sector is the main user of
water in the SCCA region it is not surprising that most
attention has focused on this sector. Many observers,
for example, have noted that the often massive water
diversion and irrigation schemes built during the Soviet
period are highly inflexible, difficult and expensive to
manage and extremely wasteful of water. However,
large-scale irrigation schemes elsewhere have experi-
enced similar problems and in recent years much
attention has focused on how the efficiency (both in
terms of water use and cost) of such schemes can be
improved. The transfer of irrigation schemes from
government control to the user is increasingly viewed
as an important step forward. It is argued that by
making water users responsible for the irrigation system,
at least at the local level, improvements may result.
Irrigation transfer also has the benefit of reduce
pressures on thinly stretched government finances and
may be central to ensuring the long-term sustainability
of irrigation systems.22 Significantly, decentralized
water services should allow for better assessment of user
charges, which in turn should create incentives for
efficient water use as well as finance improved service
delivery.23  Moreover, by bringing management issues
closer to the beneficiary population, greater flexibility
in the system can be achieved, thereby creating con-
ditions that are more in keeping with the requirements
of the user at the local level. It is thus unsurprising that
irrigation management transfer in the SCCA region is
viewed as a major component for the restructuring of
the water sector.  Significantly, irrigation transfer
schemes that have been successful have often been
tailor-made in that the organizational structures have
been set up to suit a particular scheme rather than “a
one-set of rules suits all” approach. Moreover, they have
been established following participation from a range
of stakeholders, have benefited from appropriate
financing both during and after implementation, have
included appropriate training and have been established
taking into account cultural and historical context
factors. It is thus unsurprising that irrigation manage-
ment transfer in the SCCA region is viewed as a major
component of the restructuring of the water sector and
has been forcefully promoted in protects funded by
major international donors. Interestingly, the
traditional form of water management in the region
has many similarities to the new forms of management
being promoted by such agencies.
Decentralization in itself, however, does not nec-
essarily result in improvements and there are many
examples where irrigation management transfer (IMT)
has failed.24 Reasons cited for such failures include a
reluctance of the national administration to the trans-
fer of power, unclear ownership of infrastructure, poor
training, transferring poorly designed irrigation
schemes that are difficult and costly to manage and a
failure to take into account historical, cultural and so-
cials issues. Many of these and related issues are high-
lighted by Lada Zimina in her critique of water man-
agement in southern Kazakhstan. Irrigation Manage-
ment Transfer via the establishment of WUOs began
in 1993 but as Zimina highlights such organizations
were not established in a considered way following dis-
cussions with potential users and beneficiaries but in
essence forced on the population by a government
unsure what to do with its new found role of water
manager. The failure of many of these organizations
was, she argues, due to a combination of inconsistent
policies at the national level, the lack of a coherent and
robust legal framework, the failure of the authorities
to engage with water uses to determine their real needs
and requirements, a lack of education and training and
a chronic lack of funding.  In sum, Kazakhstan, while
quick to embrace the idea of decentralization of irriga-
tion water management, failed to ensure that the nec-
essary pre-requisites were in place. Moreover, unless
appropriate reforms are introduced the chances of suc-
cessful transfer of irrigation management are minimal.
Irrigation Management Transfer in Armenia be-
gan in 1996, and there are currently 600 WUO in the
country. Like Kazakhstan, the majority of water user
groups were imposed from above and suffered many
of the same problems–poor legislation, lack of finance
and lack of training. Here, too few WUOs have sur-
vived and the Government of Armenia recognizing the
importance of this sector has put in place significant
reforms aimed at supporting irrigation management
transfer. Although it is still too early to assess how suc-
cessful these changes will be, the very fact that the prob-
lems have been recognized and reforms put in place to
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try an address them is a promising start. But, as Me-
likyan stresses, it is essential that reforms are imple-
mented in such away that the poorer sectors of society
are not disadvantaged and that Armenia takes this op-
portunity to instigate policies that will serve as the foun-
dations for future sustainable economic growth.
Municipal Water Sector
Like the irrigation sector there has been a marked
decline in water provision at the municipal level
throughout the SCCA region as a whole. However,
the nature and scale of these changes as well as the
responses to them have varied significantly. Recent
reforms in Armenia have shifted the burden of
responsibility away from the central government.
Communities, for example, are now responsible for
providing drinking water and wastewater services
within a given geographical area, setting tariffs for
municipal water and wastewater and increasing user
involvement in decision making processes. All
households are to be metered either on a communal or
individual basis and customers are responsible for
installing a meter although the more vulnerable sectors
of society will be provided with them. New legislation
that has been passed in recent years represents a
fundamental shift in the way municipal water is
managed and has the potential to bring marked
improvements in service provision. But the challenges
for the various organizations responsible for municipal
water supply are immense. A huge investment in
infrastructure is needed, water quality must be
improved, a significant reduction in losses from the
system are needed and most significantly the population
remains to be convinced that they should pay for
municipal supply, particularly given the current poor
level of provision. The issues highlighted as problematic
by Melikyan regarding Armenia are virtually identical
to those highlighted by a recent survey of rural and
urban water supply in Central Kazakhstan,25 where it
was found that most individuals were reluctant to pay
more for water and felt that they were in fact charged
too much for this service. This study, however, revealed
that people who did not have access to a central water
system were prepared to pay as they are already paying
for water in other ways, either because they have to
bore wells themselves, which can be expensive, or they
have to buy water from water sellers. As Melikyan
points out, the challenges of decentralizing municipal
water supplies are very different from those experienced
in the decentralization of irrigation water supply.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The countries of the SCCA region experienced a
prolonged period of political, social and economic
upheaval following independence. In some respects the
collapse of the Soviet Union could not have come at a
worse time. Occurring as it did, just at the point when
Soviet officials were beginning to recognize the
importance of a basin wide and an integrated approach
to water management, independence meant that the
region lost funding aimed at improving water use.
Moreover, the emergence of eight independent states,
each with their own agendas for reform and develop-
ment precluded efforts to manage water in an integrated
way. In other respects, however, the virtual collapse of
the water management system has allowed for a much
needed reappraisal of the water sector. It has precipi-
tated a wide ranging evaluation and review of institu-
tional arrangements and management procedures
resulting in the development of a more comprehensive
and holistic picture of the needs and requirements for
sustainable water management. Importantly, it should
be remembered that the region has a long history of
irrigation and water management and there is much
evidence to suggest that traditional systems were
extremely well managed, successful and sustainable over
the long term.26
Although the SCCA states have a shared history in
terms of water management and many of the prob-
lems they currently face are common to them all, their
experiences and expectations since independence have
differed. Programs such as the LGI fellowship provide
an important means by which the “new” regional ex-
perts in the field of water management can come to-
gether and share information, ideas and lessons learned.
Such information is essential if the countries of the
SCCA region are to improve water management at both
the regional and local level.  Given that improved wa-
ter management will be a key component of the re-
gion’s future economic development, programs pro-
moting cooperation rather than confrontation are in-
valuable.
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AMD Armenian Dram
AWSC Armenian Water and Sewerage Company
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
DIMA Drainage and irrigation Management
Agencies
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development
EU European Union
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations
FDI Foreign direct investment
FSU Former Soviet Union
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GNP Gross National Product
GoA Government of Armenia
HIES Household Income and Expenditure
Survey
IDA International Development Association
IDP Irrigation Development Project
IFAD International Fund for Agriculture Deve-
lopment
IFI International Financial Institution
IWRM Integrated Water Resources Management
JSC Joint Stock Company
CURRENCY AND EQUIVALENT UNITS
Currency Unit = Armenian Drams (Dram, AMD)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Dram/USD 500 536 540 555 580
NGO Non-governmental organization
OME Operation and Maintenance Enterprise
PCE Monthly Per Capita Expenditure
PFBP Poverty Family Benefit Program
RSSC Regional Social Security Centre
SME Small and medium size enterprise
SCWR State Committee of Water Resources
SIF Social Investment Fund
USA United States of America
USAID United States Agency for International
Development
USSR Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic
USD United States Dollars ($)
VAT Value added tax
WBI World Bank Institute
WDI Water Development Institute
WRC Water Resources Council
WRMB Water Resources Management Board
WS&S Water Supply and Sanitation
WUCCs Water User Consumer Cooperatives
WUAs Water Users Associations
WUFs Water Users Federations
WWTP Waste Water Treatment Plant
WTO World Trade Organization
YWSC Yerevan Water and Sewerage Company
WEIGHTS AND MEASURES
BCM Billion Cubic Meter
G gram
g/l gram per liter
GWh Gigawatt hour
ha Hectare
km2 square kilometer
KWh Kilowatt hour
l liter
lcd liters per capita per day
m meter
m3 cubic meter
m3/sec cubic meter per second
masl meters above sea level
MCM Million Cubic Meter
mm millimeter
MW megawatt
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The aim of this research is to investigate the economic
aspects in the reform of water resource management
(WRM) in Armenia, focusing on: economic tools (such
as water tariffs, fees for water use and fines for ecological
damage, tradable water rights, and state subsidies);
regulatory reform; and the potential impact of WRM
reform on poor and vulnerable households (as well as
ways to mitigate possible negative results of reform).
Because of the complexity of water management, we
review Armenia’s economic history in order to draw a
framework for the analysis ahead.  This demonstrates
that society must apply different value judgements for
different categories of water users, ensuring access to
water for all.
Armenia—a small, mountainous, semi-arid coun-
try—is historically not water stressed. However, with
significant seasonal and annual variability in river run-
off and risk of droughts with low overall river flow, and
flooding in the spring, it is water-scarce, particularly in
densely populated areas.  Many factors are behind the
current crisis in the country’s water resources, including:
• The overall economic situation.  Despite the steady
growth of the economy since 1994 (with an average
GDP growth rate of 5.9%), per capita GDP was
683 USD in 2001 and 740 USD per capita in 2002
with 50.9% of the population living below the
poverty line.1 As a result, the population relies
increasingly on natural resources, including water,
for both agriculture and electricity generation.
• Ongoing massive price distortions and direct state
control over resource allocation decisions inherited
from the central planning framework continue to
bog down public service management.
• Heavy dependence on energy imports crippled by
utilities.  This results from increased market prices
for energy inputs (in accordance with world prices
in the mid-1990s), delays in adjusting consumer
prices to reflect hyperinflation, and failures to cover
internal costs such as current maintenance and
capital repayment.
The state of the water sector currently could be de-
scribed as a low-level equilibrium trap, with decreasing
service quality and revenue, and increasing operating
expenses (partly due to increasing water losses in aging
and poorly maintained distribution systems). For ex-
ample:
• according to GoA estimates, several hundred mil-
lion USD in investments are needed to rehabilitate
the water infrastructure;2
• low collection rates predominate; and
• GoA budget subsidies to utilities have increased
substantially in the last few years, reaching two
percent of the GDP.
Thus, reforming water sector management is an
essential task at hand.  Failure to carry out reforms
effectively and efficiently will lead the sector closer to
collapse, and the interests and needs of consumers will
continue to be neglected. At the same time, however,
tariff increases and the imposition of a strict payment
discipline—one of the main components of the reform
program—could damage low-income households and
agricultural farms. As such, it appears as though GoA
has a window of opportunity to contribute to the foun-
dation for sustainable economic growth with WRM
reform, provided that: (a) reforms are carefully designed;
(b) parallel reform measures are in place; (c) strategic
investments in infrastructure are secured; and (d) reforms
are accompanied by measures to reduce the negative
social impact on poor (while maintaining cost-recovery
efforts). Moreover, reforms must be politically deliver-
able. Achieving this is the key policy issue under anal-
ysis in this paper.
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Since the late 1990s, much has been achieved by
GoA on its way of reforming water sector, including:
• a study on Integrated Water Resources Manage-
ment Planning (IWRMP, 1999);
• the separation of regulatory, standard setting and
operational functions into independent roles  with
the adoption of a program for the reform of the
water management system (2001);
• the adoption of a reform program to improve the
financial sustainability of the companies responsible
for the provision of drinking water supply/waste-
water and irrigation/drainage services (05/2001);
• the passing of a New Water Code (2002), and laws
on Water User Federations, Condominium Asso-
ciations, and Management of Multi-apartment
buildings; and
• the formation of a Water Resource Management
Board and a National Council on WRM, chaired
by the Prime-Minister, and so on.
The current GoA WRM reform program includes:
• achieving an integrated approach to WRM;
• transferring the operation of main water operators
on a commercial basis;
• incorporating participatory water management
practices;
• engaging in financial reform (gradually removing
state budget subsidies by 2007);
• continuing capital investments in the infrastructure
(mainly with long-term loans on favorable terms)
to ensure sustainable operation of the system;
• initiating a wide scale program on the sustainable
use of water resources, including a water preserva-
tion program;
• adopting a gradual approach to private sector
participation in WRM;
• introducing tradability of water rights and water
markets;
· gradually shifting (within eight to ten years) to
water-scheme based  management; and
• increasing the involvement and strengthening the
capacity of marz (administrative regions) and com-
munity levels in formulating and implementation
of WRM strategies in view of decentralization and
the devolution of responsibilities.
We review separately municipal and irrigation sec-
tors, describing the situation, government reform agen-
da, and potential impacts on the poor and possible
ways to mitigate these impacts.  In particular, we de-
scribe the institutional framework and government
agenda for development for both the municipal and
irrigation sectors. We show that while in the irrigation
sector, enabling legislation to ensure the sustainable
operation of water user groups supports a tendency
toward an increase in participatory irrigation manage-
ment, for the municipal water sector, there are many
more problematic issues to resolve. In particular, the
role of local self-government bodies in ensuring mu-
nicipal water supply is unclear. Currently, these bod-
ies are essentially excluded from the process, while at
the same time, according to the Law on Self-Government,
they are ultimately responsible water management.
We contend that it is essential that any govern-
ment reform program—and especially one of such
scale—should be proceeded by an ex ante analysis of
the potential outcomes and impact, short-and long term
gains and losses, and welfare distribution effects. We
show that, surprisingly, the approaches taken in regard
to municipal and irrigation sector reforms widely differ.
Finally, we argue for strengthened fiscal decentral-
ization (and, hence, financially stronger local commu-
nities) as a critical prerequisite for a successful water
sector reform program. Additionally, we demonstrate
the drawbacks in the current fiscal legislation, and the
need for revision.
Throughout the paper we identify further research
needs, namely:
• a conceptual base for the regulatory (price and
quality) framework of water sector;
• (for municipal water) an analysis of consumption
patterns once water meters are widely installed to
suggest an optimal water tariff (which necessitates
a social assessment of population ability and wil-
lingness to pay); and
• (for irrigation) further research (involving surveys)
into the impacts of economic and social reforms
to determine the efficiency of the proposed social
assistance to poor and vulnerable households (tak-
ing into account the regional variations among
rural households).
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1. INTRODUCTION
Water sector reform holds a prominent position on
the agenda of the Government of Armenia (GoA), and
increasingly so. Many factors fuel interest in water
management, including the financial crisis of water
utilities, poor reliability and quality of delivery, de-
graded infrastructure (with the cost of repairs and
upgrades estimated in hundreds of millions of USD),
and the heavy burden of water subsidies on the state
budget. At the same time, however, tariff increases—
central to the reform program—could be detrimental
to low income households and agricultural farms,
increasing regional inequalities and even decreasing
economic activity in some parts of the country.  Thus,
any reform program must be designed in a way to
effectively reform water utilities, while mitigating the
negative impact on the poor.
The aim of this research is to investigate the eco-
nomic and social aspects in the reform of water re-
source management (WRM) in Armenia. We address:
• economic tools, such as water tariffs, fees for water
use, fines for ecological damage, tradable water
rights, and state subsidies, all of which signal to
users that water has an economic value and
encourage a change in users’ behavior;
• regulatory reform, as economic tools work efficiently
when strong and appropriate for a particular setting
regulatory and institutional base is present; and
• the potential impact of the WRM reform on poor
households, and ways to mitigate the most negative
impacts.
In analyzing the economic aspects of water sector
reform in Armenia, we concentrate on: (a) municipal
and irrigation water (vs. water for industrial use); and
(b) decentralization efforts at the community level
(rather than the central government level). After de-
scribing the municipal and irrigation water sectors in
Chapter 2, we proceed in Chapter 3 to outline the main
components of the Government Reform Program in
WRM. In Chapter 4, we provide a brief update on the
poverty situation in the country.  Chapter 5 serves as
an introduction to the basic economic concepts which
frame the analysis throughout the rest of the paper.
Chapter 6 presents the main focus of the paper: policy
options for tariff and billing reform in both municipal
and irrigation water sectors, including an analytical
rationale for the argument that a consensus must met
between the need for rather drastic economic measures
and possible negative social consequences of reform.
We offer suggestions in response to the latter.  Finally,
we conclude with a summary and policy-related re-
commendations.
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE
WATER SECTOR IN ARMENIA
2.1 Background
Armenia, home to around three million people, is a
mountainous, semi-arid country—75% of its 29,800
km2 land area reaches 1500 m above sea level. While
historically not water stressed, Armenia, with total water
use at 3.9 BCM and 2,800 m3 per capita (1988 data),
it is water-scarce, particularly in densely populated areas
such as Yerevan and in the south and northwest of the
country. Across the country, there is significant seasonal
and annual variability in river run-off, risk of droughts
with low overall river flow, and flooding in spring.
Hydropower accounts for 23% of electricity genera-
tion.  Due to the huge withdrawal of water between
1947–1967 and 1992–1995 (the latter due to an energy
crisis), Lake Sevan, the major natural multipurpose
reservoir in the country, is a major environmental
disaster. These basic parameters shape water resource
use, which plays a key role in the economic develop-
ment of Armenia. Figure 1 illustrates the decline in
water use during the last decade.3
In addition, despite the steady growth of the econ-
omy since 1994 (with an average GDP growth rate
5.9%) per capita GDP is only 706.3 USD; 50.9% of
the population lives below the poverty line.4  Citizens
rely increasingly on natural resources, including wa-
ter, for both agriculture and electricity generation.
Meanwhile, ongoing massive price distortions and di-
rect state control over resource allocation decisions in-
herited from the central planning framework continue
to bog down public service management. Likewise,
heavy dependence on energy imports and the high costs
of managing an inefficient utility sector negatively im-
pact the economy. This is exacerbated by increased mar-
ket prices for energy inputs (in accordance with world
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prices in the mid-1990s), delays in adjusting consum-
er prices to reflect hyperinflation, and failures to cover
internal costs such as current maintenance and capital
repayment.  All this has brought water utilities sector
close to collapse, with decreasing service quality and
revenue, and increasing operating expenses (partly due
to increasing water losses in aging and poorly main-
tained distribution systems). For example:
• According to GoA estimates, several hundred
million USD in investments are needed to rehabili-
tate the water infrastructure.5
• Collection rates are very low: 20% for Yerevan
Water and Sewerage Company (YWSC), 50% for
Armenian Water and Sewerage Company (AWSC),
and between 35–50% for Irrigation JSC.6 Water
billings hover around  0.9% of the GDP, and col-
lections—not more than 0.2%.7
· GoA budget subsidies to utilities have increased
substantially in the last few years, reaching two
percent of the GDP. In 2001, budget subsidizing
amounted to 4.7 million AMD or 8.1 million USD
at the current exchange rate. Around 12% of this
amount was allocated to municipal water systems,
with the remaining 88.1% to irrigation. Even in
the presence of four to five billion AMD annual
subsidies, arrears are accumulated according to sala-
ries, social security payments, payments for elect-
ricity and other supplies (17.2 billion AMD) as well
as arrears towards the state budget (24.4. billion
AMD). This total exceeds the annual planned
revenues of the utility companies 2.9 times, and
factual revenues—11.9 times.8
In contrast to the energy sector, where reforms had
a significant effect in the mid-1990s, major reforms in
the water sector started much later, toward the end of
the decade. There are indeed a few objective reasons
behind this: potential high political costs of tariff in-
creases and stringent payment discipline; high marginal
cost of rehabilitating water networks; and concern over
the potential heavy impact of the water sector reform
program on living standards of the population, (in-
creasingly so if coupled with the energy sector reform).
It is, however, also true that necessary care was not
taken in reforming the water sector institutions to meet
the requirements of the emerging market oriented en-
vironment.  For example, the transformation of water
operators into joint stock companies took the form of
a mere formal exercise.
Providing more detailed arguments about the need
to reform the water sector and a background for the
justifications of policy alternatives requires an exami-
nation of municipal and irrigation water sectors and
their key institutional characteristics.
Figure 1
Historical Trends of Water Withdrawal
Source: WB “Armenia: Towards Integrated Water Resource Management,” ECSSD Environmentally and Socially
Sustainable Development, Working Paper No. 35, 2002, p.6.
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2.2 Description of the Sectors
2.2.1 Municipal Water Sector
The municipal water sector is the second largest water
user after irrigation, covering the demands of house-
holds, institutions, commercial enterprises and in some
cases industries. Approximately 80% of the population
has access to piped water supply networks; the rest
receive water from an irrigation company or from local,
and often unprotected, water sources (such as private
or public wells, springs, open sources). Indoor water
taps are available to 71% of the population (87% urban,
47% rural). With input prices nearing international
levels, including those for energy, chlorine, and spare
parts, service providers find it difficult to pay increased
operation and maintenance costs. Energy, in particular,
presents a heavy financial burden on water suppliers,
causing frequent service interruption to conserve energy
consumption and when electricity supply is shutoff due
to non-payment.9 The system is characterized by:
• decline in industrial and commercial activity, dete-
rioration of infrastructure, and significant reduc-
tion of allocations from the state since indepen-
dence; and
• low revenues, due to tariffs below maintenance
costs and non-payment by consumers, which are
insufficient to maintain the system adequately.
Infrastructure and investment needs. Supply net-
works are in a state of extreme disrepair, requiring major
capital investment estimated at 600 million USD—of
which 150 million USD has been designated for pri-
ority needs (independent experts suggest an estimate
of one billion USD in overall investment needs).
Around 55% of the existing pipelines were built more
than 20 years ago. Under the WB funded Municipal
Development Project, 35 supply network systems were
selected for upgrading—15 for the first stage (40 mil-
lion USD) and 20 for the next (48 million USD). The
overall amount of 88 million USD is—again, accord-
ing to expert estimates—just a portion of the overall
need for AWSC (350-400 million USD). Ten million
USD will be added to the previous five million USD
under the Capital Investment Program for the reha-
bilitation of the most destitute networks.
Water quality. The quality of municipal water has
deteriorated in the last decade, often failing to meet
hygienic standards.  This stems from: (a) an insuffi-
cient amount of chlorine used due to increased cost of
operating the chlorination systems, and (b) the poor
condition of the networks, resulting in intrusion of
raw wastewater into the pipelines. Particularly poor is
the quality of water supplied by systems managed by
local communities: 60% of the 883 rural systems do
not have any facility for disinfection. Poor water qual-
ity leads to the increase of water-borne diseases.10
Production and consumption levels. Although Ar-
menia’s water resource balance has improved since the
1980s, drinking water supply to consumers has deteri-
orated. Since the metering of water flows is practically
non-existent, average production and consumption
levels are not known with accuracy. The theoretical
norms assume 250 lcd of drinking water use by con-
sumers in Yerevan and 200 lcd nation-wide (net of leak-
age prior to delivery).  Despite this high figure, con-
sumers suffer from limited and irregular water service—
sometimes a few hours a day. Only 20% of consumers
are supplied water more than 12 hours a day on aver-
age (eight hours per day in urban areas, 14 in rural
areas). Only 50% of the population received water ev-
ery day during the past year, with the rest experiencing
waiting periods up to 40 days. Meanwhile, evidence
indicates that water consumption is much lower than
theoretical norms—ranging from 40 to 180 lcd, far
lower than billing. Due to low water pressure higher
floors of apartment buildings have especially poor and
irregular service (with interruptions in water supply
often lasting a few days).11
Water wastage. The economic costs of a deficient
water supply can be enormous. Unmetered household
water use is inevitably wasteful, as a result of intermit-
tent supply and zero marginal cost. Unaccounted-for
water, prevalent in all stages of the hydrological cycle,
could represent between 55–65% of the total water
supplied—mostly due to the poor condition of the in-
frastructure.12
Willingness to pay and affordability. Opinions about
the affordability of current tariffs by the population at
large vary. Some consider tariffs to be affordable, since
there are large unofficial transfers from abroad and
GDP figures are underestimated, while others are not
convinced.  Overall, however, the current system is
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perceived by consumers as unfair.  That is, most feel
obliged to pay for something they have not received.
We examine the burden of current tariffs on different
social groups in Section 6.  At present, regular payers
comprise three times less than the national percent of
non-poor in terms of shares; meanwhile, with respect
to paying and not paying for water, the poor and non-
poor do not differ qualitatively.  This suggests that
Armenian society “refuses” to carry the current “burden”
of water payment due to more than mere “heaviness”
or insolvency. In addition to widespread poverty, 20–
50% of the low collection rate could be explained by:
• the resistance to accept water as an ordinary com-
modity;
• a deeply rooted atmosphere of social mistrust;
• the absence of mechanisms linking the amount and
quality of delivered water and price;13 and
• the lack of adequate technical capacities to combat
non-payments.
2.2.2 Irrigation Water Sector
Infrastructure. Eight major and a large number of small-
er conveyance systems are served by about 21,300 km
of main, branch and secondary canals, 75% of which
are lined with concrete or consist of pipes built in the
Soviet era.14 The conveyance systems no longer fit the
current needs for two reasons:
• A reliance on mechanical irrigation with pumping
stations to consume 600–800 million KW/h of
energy per year. Irrigation schemes that depend on
pumping account for about 42% of the total
equipped area. The share of electricity in the total
costs of irrigation is about 70%, which without
state subsidy becomes unprofitable. The energy
shortage and sharp increases in its prices have created
serious difficulties in using mechanical irrigation,
making about 10%–15% of the total area econo-
mically impractical.
• The design for extensive farming to serve farms of
50–400 ha, from a single head gate or canal outlet
with no consideration of costs. With a lengthy and
unwieldy canal network and large pumping stations,
the system has deteriorated due to lack of mainten-
ance and excess leakage. Now, it is uneconomical,
incurs high trans-mission losses (800 million m3),
and in turn causes damage to the environment.
With an average farms size as small as 1.37 ha, no
formal network of autho-rity to implement on-farm
infrastructure has formed and the result is an
uncoordinated installation of earthen delivery
ditches.15 Water delivery units are too large to be
operated efficiently or to support the formation of
water users groups and do not account for private
farm infrastructure. In many areas, secondary and
tertiary canals need to be installed to deliver water
to groups of farms with earth ditches or directly to
individual farm plots.16
While much has been done through WB and IFAD
financing, further heavy investment is required. Inde-
pendent experts estimate need to be around one billion
USD. For now, a brief inventory of projects completed,
underway or committed includes the following:17
• the WB funded Irrigation Rehabilitation Project
(55 million USD, completed in 2001), rehabili-
tated 92.6 km of primary and 163.3 km of inter-
farm channels, water metering points, 236 deep
wells, water reservoirs, pumping stations, 391 km
farm irrigation channels in 93 commu-nities on
26,720 hectares of land;
• the WB funded Dam Safety Project invested 30.3
million USD in the sector;
• IFAD provided 6.3 million USD for irrigation
system rehabilitation and water management,
covering 310 km of farm irrigation systems in
54 communities on 19,800 hectares of land; and
• several credit projects will further support the
rehabilitation of the irrigation systems, including
the new 64 million USD WB funded Irrigation
Development Project, 31 million USD of which
is already approved (see Section 6).
These investments will indeed improve the situa-
tion in irrigation, but still represent only a fraction of
the efforts needed.
Irrigation water supply. The main water resource
for irrigation is surface water, including a share of wa-
ter from border rivers, amounting to 7.4 billion cubic
meters; the underground flow is 0.6 billion cubic
meters. During the growing season, only 15–20% of
the water resources can be used, the rest flows out of
the country. Thus, one task for rehabilitating the sec-
tor is to re-distribute river flows from water-abundant
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regions to water-shortage areas. Most of the cropped
area depends on water from irrigation schemes, and
nearly 80% of total crop production is produced with
irrigation. About 60% of farmers have access to irriga-
tion, covering about 0.7 hectare of their holding. Fol-
lowing land privatization, and the accompanying wide-
spread deterioration of irrigation infrastructure, po-
tentially irrigated area declined from 340,000 ha to
275,000 ha between 1988 and 1998—of which some
222,000 hectares were managed by the Operation and
Maintenance Enterprises (OME) of Irrigation JSC
(Vorogum), and the remaining 51,000 hectares (most-
ly small schemes) were operated and maintained by
the private sector. Some 18,000 km of tertiary canals are
operated by communities or by water users associations.
Area actually irrigated accounted for only for 187,000
ha in 1998—thus the utilization ratio was around 70%.
About 90,000 ha were not irrigated because of a com-
bination of factors, mentioned above.18
Benefits and efficiency of irrigation. There are sig-
nificant benefits of irrigation in Armenia, which are
clearly observed in the financial performance of farms.
The 1998 Survey of Family Farms19 reveals that farms
with irrigation generated net returns of about 370 USD
per ha compared to 40 USD for farms without irriga-
tion Irrigated farms were able to irrigate only half of
their land: the other half was under rain fed agricul-
ture. In 1998, the difference in productivity between
irrigated and rain fed agriculture was about 330 USD
per hectare. The difference in productivity has almost
doubled during the past few years as a result of higher
yields obtained in vegetables and fruits, and a slightly
increasing preference for vegetables, potatoes, and
fruits. While the current weighted average return to
water in the irrigation sector has been estimated at about
eleven US cents per m3 of water at the farm gate, this
figure substantially varies across the four zones:
• valley zones, where no cropping is possible without
irrigation;
• pre-mountainous zones, where low-yield wheat and
alfalfa can be grown under rain-fed conditions;
• mountain zones, similar to the previous but with
lower yields; and
• sub-tropical zones, where no rain-fed cropping is
possible, but where optimum conditions exist for
growing high value crops (such as fruits and wine
grapes) with supplementary irrigation.
The availability and efficiency of irrigation between
marzes varies significantly as well:20
• Armavir, Vayots Dzor, Ararat and Kotayk marzes
contain the best water resources. The cropping mix
in the main irrigated areas is changing rapidly,
affecting the overall demand on water and the
return per m3 of water. Low value water uses (i.e.,
fodder) is declining, and high value uses (vegetable
and potato) are increasing.
• The current average overall irrigation efficiency
from the source to field countrywide is about 48%.
This indicator is higher in places where some
improvements in irrigation efficiency have been
achieved as a result of programs to rehabilitate water
conveyance infrastructure. (The high rate of water
loss generally results from the deterioration of water
conveyance infrastructure.)
3. REFORMS IN THE WATER SECTOR:
AN OVERVIEW OF MAIN COMPONENTS
Armenia embarked on large-scale water sector reforms
in 1999, when GoA, with WB support, launched the
Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM)
Planning Study.  IWRM serves to develop a compre-
hensive policy framework to ensure a sustainable ma-
nagement and use of water resources, taking into
account economic, financial, environmental, social and
institutional considerations. The reform program
encompasses the following main components:21
• transfer of the operation of the main water opera-
tors on commercial basis;
• wide application of participatory water manage-
ment practices;
• financial reforms in the sector involving the gradual
removal of state budget subsidies;
• continued capital investments in the infrastructure
(mainly with long-term loans on favorable terms)
to ensure sustainable operation of the system; and
• a shift to sustainable use of water resources, includ-
ing a water preservation program.
Below follows a brief description of these main
reform components.
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3.1 Regulatory Reform
Separation of regulatory, standard setting and opera-
tional functions into independent roles began with GoA
Decree No.92 (02/2001), which provided a basis for a
program for the reform of the water management
system. The decree stipulated:
• A State Committee of Water Resources (SCWR) under
GoA. SCWR took over responsibilities for the
financial and operational tasks related to providing
commercially-oriented water services (e.g. bulk water
supply, sanitation, irrigation, drainage), gradually
devolving responsibilities for service delivery to
water user groups, and applying integrated planning
to maximize the use of the resources at the macro
(national) and micro (sectoral) levels. The com-
panies which fall under the control of SCWR (with
a few other agencies) are described in Figure 2.
(see Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 for details).
• An independent body to deal with water pricing.
Until its establishment, SCWR has been charged
with this function.22
• A Water Resource Management Board, established
in GoA Decree No.82 (01/2002) under the
auspices of the Ministry of Nature Protection.
• A National Water Resource Council (created in
autumn 2002).
In addition, the following bodies have parts to play
in WRM:
• the Cabinet (overall water policy);
• the Ministry of Agriculture (irrigation and drainage
policies, norms for crops, records on irrigation
lands and inventory of irrigation systems; regula-
tions with regards to land contamination);
• the Ministry of Energy (water releases from Lake
Sevan);
• the Ministry of Health (quality standards for
drinking water, other health related issues);
• the Ministry of Urban Development (water supply
design standards);
• the Ministry of Economy and Finance (responsible
for public finance matters);
• the Ministry of Nature Protection (formally in
charge of the overall management of water re-
sources, including the development of a National
Water Program, environmental policies, proposing
water extraction fees and pollution charges, main-
taining of the Water Cadaster, and monitoring of
water flow and water balance);
Figure 2
Schematic Chart of the Main WRM Agencies in Armenia
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• marz administrations (territorial administrative
divisions of the country);23 and
• local government units/municipalities and com-
munities (hamaink).
The role of local government is examined in detail
throughout the text.
The Water Code of 1992 was replaced  in 2002,
entailing numerous significant improvements:
• regulating the state’s management and control of
water use, water consumer rights and duties, water
protection, and prevention of water deterioration;
• requiring permits to use water and discharge pol-
lution;
• stipulating that water user fees are charged to water
utilities, industry, agriculture and irrigation water
users;
• describing the main functions in integrated water
resources management and the institutional ar-
rangements (partly it stated, de facto, the import-
ance of some institutions which were established
after the Water Code 1992 by GoA decrees);
• proposing that tariffs should be realistic, justified
and fair, allowing for (a) provider companies to
receive realistic revenues to maintain the financial
integrity and covering all the expenses, and (b) pre-
servation of resources, quality of services, produc-
tivity, management (without actually defining
tariffs as such);
• maintaining that water is a finite and vulnerable
resource, with an economic as well as social and
environmental value;
• asserting that sustainable management of water
resources is in the interest of society and requires a
balance between present and future users;
• recognizing the priority of water requirements for
basic human needs, while affirming that it has an
economic value;
• acknowledging the intersectoral nature of water,
the role of the state in water resources management,
the importance of all stakeholder participation, and
the role of the private sector and cost recovery in
efficient water use;
• stipulating the introduction of a number of new
concepts, like water rights and water markets; and
· stating that GoA will continue to promote par-
ticipatory management both in municipal and
irrigation water sectors (see relevant sections), by
empowering water users groups to increase their
influence in the decision-making process.
3.1.1 Institutional Reforms
in the Municipal Water Sector
There are two major wholesale providers for drinking
water:
1) YWSC24 serves Yerevan and surrounding commu-
nities with more than one million inhabitants.
Currently an international operator (Italian “Acer
& Company Armenian Utility SCARL”) is
implementing a management contract with YWSC
worth of 35.5 million USD (with IDA funding).25
Responsibilities include: providing overall utility
management and advice; directing operations; and
planning investment allocations and overseeing
their implementation. On November 11, 2001 a
Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the
WB, GoA and international operators, whereby
the scope of responsibilities was clarified from 2002
to 2005.
2) AWSC serves about 43 cities and 290 villages
elsewhere, or a total of approximately 1.4 million
users.26 GoA’s efforts to seek private sector partici-
pation in the operation, management and usage of
credit funds for its water supply and wastewater
services outside Yerevan are already underway.
Additionally, it intends to transform the 46 district
branches of AWSC into legally independent entities
that can jointly or independently contract with the
private sector through, for example, manage-ment
contracts, franchises, and concessions. Studies into
the feasibility of this program are in progress.
GoA Decree No. 149 (03/1999A) recently estab-
lished a third operator, Nor Akunq (New Source), to
operate in 12 cities and villages with a total popula-
tion of 100,000 in Armavir marz. Supported by the
German KfW, Nor Akunq is planned to replicate the
model used in two marzes, Lori and Shirak. Nor Akunq
JSC is a shareholding company with a share distribu-
tion of the following structure: Government (34%);
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six municipalities (46%); and villages (20%). The foun-
dation capital is ten million AMD.27
Communities are (or will be) responsible for:
• providing drinking water and wastewater services
within specified geographic boundaries, making use
of  internal (inter-community) water canals (to
which they have rights). At the moment, 44 of the
48 urban or semi-urban communities (cities) and
more than 300 of the 950 villages have transferred
their O&M to YWSC and AWSC (GoA decree
No. 149, 03/1999). This is intended to hold until
the branches of AWSC are separated as legally
independent entities, after which, it is assumed,
they will take over the O&M.
• defining retail prices for municipal water and waste-
water. Currently, this is not the case, as the cont-
racts (mentioned above) are in force: AWSC and
YWSC establish retail tariffs, but are subject to
approval by local avagani (elected bodies at muni-
cipalities). It is envisioned that this function will
be transferred to condominiums—the role of which
is supposed to increase significantly.
• organizing water users groups and mobilizing con-
dominiums.28
Recently, with the initiation of several important
measures, GoA gave new life to the reforms. In partic-
ular, GoA Decree No 55 (01/2002), supported by two
new laws, On the Management of Multi-Apartment
Buildings and On Condominiums, stipulate:
• a shift to charging for municipal water as of January
2003, based on metering household  consumption.
For multi-apartment buildings, meters will be in-
stalled by the operator of the main pipeline supp-
lying the building.  Then, households with meters
installed will pay according to the metered con-
sumption. As far as the remaining cost is concerned,
households without meters in a particular building
will need to divide usage and costs among them-
selves. Meters are to be purchased by the house-
holds themselves and only the poor and vulnerable
households are assisted (this process is now under-
way). The Government has clarified the details for
such assistance:
— Households receiving Poverty Family Benefit
will be provided with meters, with a repayment
period of five years. It is possible that meters
will be supplied free of charge (depending on
donor financing).
— Vulnerable households not included in the
Poverty Family Benefit Program will receive
meters if they pay 50% of the cost as an advance
payment and the remaining 50% over the two
upcoming years.
This scheme started to operate on June 10, 2003.
• A law from November 2002 stipulated a partial
write-off of the arrears accumulated by the popula-
tion, provided that households sign contracts with
the water operator. The process started in January
2003 and finished on June 10, 2003. Through a
massive PR campaign, citizens were informed that,
according to the Law mentioned, arrears will not
be forgiven and will be subject to collection in full
—by court order, if necessary—if the contract
signing deadline of mid-April 2003 passes without
action.  The contract oblige households to pay for
water regularly according to according to their own
consumption (if they have installed individual
meters) or by sharing the remaining costs according
meters on the main pipelines supplying the buil-
dings (as described above). Importantly, the cont-
racts between the water operators and households
have a number of deficiencies, including:
• stipulating that the water company is obligated to
supply water according to an agreed regime, though
no regime exists in writing (one would imagine
that an attachment to the contracts would stipulate
a defined time-period);
• describing actions that need to be taken in case of
an unsatisfactory service, yet criteria for service
quality is not defined; and
• the viability of the enforceability of the contracts
that are now being signed between water companies
and households.
The central problem behind the contracts men-
tioned above is ultimately more fundamental and mul-
tifaceted.
• While (a) the Law on Local Self Government
stipulates that ensuring drink water for the popula-
tion is the responsibility of local self-government
bodies, and (b) the key GoA Decrees (No. 92 and
440) underline the role of communities, reforms
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have not progressed as planned.  In light of the
transfer of internal water canals to water operators,
the latter (and not the local government bodies, as
one would expect) are now actively involved in
mobilizing condominiums. Local self-government
bodies are essentially excluded from the picture.
Only when neither condominiums nor other forms
of management of multi-apartment buildings
(licensed or entrusted management)29 are present
should local self-government bodies (as specified
by the Law on the Management of Multi-Apartment
Buildings), temporarily manage the water supply
(see below) until effective management is organized.
• Condominiums (as well as licensed or entrusted
management bodies of multi-apartment buildings)
are charged with collecting water user fees (and
repair and maintenance of intra-building pipelines
—see below), and taking over the responsibility
for managing municipal water use within apartment
buildings. From this arises a critical problem. The
operator, as a result of the management transfer
contract between with local self-government bodies,
has taken over the O&M of internal pipelines only
up to the entry point into the building. Intra-
building pipelines are, according to the Civil Code
from 1999, under a shared ownership of the
households. Thus, in case of a problem with intra-
building pipelines (such as insufficient water pres-
sure, or motor installation inside a building), a
household faces a dilemma linked to legislative/
regulatory flux. Water operators sign (or will sign)
contracts with condominiums (or licensed or en-
trusted management). At present, a form of contract
between operators and condominiums is already
being signed in a number of communities. This
process is proceeding with difficulties, however,
because of problems with the contracts—largely
resembling those listed above (the contracts specify
that condominiums hold responsibility for the
maintenance of intra-building pipelines, while the
financial and technical base for these are not clear).30
Again, no role is stipulated for the local government
bodies—or, at least, their role (or lack thereof ) has
been left unclear.
• The issue of the condominiums requires special
emphasis. Presently, they exist almost exclusively in
Yerevan, and until very recently were not involved
in water provision or wastewater services.31 More-
over, after the “give-away” privatization of apart-
ments to individual tenants (established in the 1996
law), and despite massive donor assistance, the
experience with condominiums has generally proved
unsuccessful. Coverage of the privatized stock is
estimated at around 40–45%, with only about five
percent of the condominium associations deemed
able to undertake major investments. Many objective
(like the inadequate legislative base32) and subjective
reasons underlie this.  While the most recent law
on condominiums offers numerous improvements
beyond its 1996 predecessor (e.g. it allows for the
built up of cash reserve funds to be used as equity
fund for investments, collateral), some problems
remain.  Namely, membership in the condominium
association is voluntary, while the Law on Manage-
ment of Multi-Story Buildings specifies that all the
households are obliged to pay the dues according
to the list of the priority services (to be developed).
A natural question follows concerning the feas-
ibility and operational efficiency of the coexistence
of parallel payment schemes for members and non-
members of condominiums, as well as details which
define responsibilities.
GoA now places major emphasis on condomini-
ums, which are intended to become the main vehicle
between municipal water operators and households. A
grant largely covered by from the Government of Ja-
pan worth 2.9 million USD now aims at covering a
program for strengthening condominiums.  Yet, is such
a program capable of strengthening condominiums to
the extent that they can fulfill their intended role? At
the moment, opinions differ. In our view, there is good
chance it might be, since significant assistance will be
rendered to condominiums and they will have more
responsibilities to perform, thus encouraging their
growth and development. The problems, discussed
above, add certain pessimism to this conclusion, how-
ever, keeping in mind that condominiums are almost
non-existent outside Yerevan. Thus, from careful anal-
ysis of the failures of the present condominium projects,
as well as the ineffectual application of the Law on the
Management of multi-apartment buildings, other op-
tions that could ensure water delivery to households
deserve closer attention. In this regard, we support
development of the Nor Akunq model, which brings
together the interests of the government, utility opera-
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tors and local communities. While it is too early to
judge, Nor Akunq appears to be a viable option in
cases which employ local water operators (see Section
3.5).  Furthermore, as intra-building pipelines are un-
der the joint ownership of two or more households,
contractual arrangements must be development (along
with the law on the management of multi-apartment
buildings). While such a contract could indeed involve
condominiums, it also might be formulated as a con-
tract of an entrusted management, thereby securing
the involvement of local self-government bodies.
3.1.2 Institutional Reforms in Irrigation
Lessons learned from the international experience
underscore the importance of institutional structures
as a prerequisite for achieving efficiency and sustain-
ability in irrigation. Until 1999–2000, the institutional
framework of irrigation was characterized by weak
public sector agencies with inadequate resources, failing
to manage effectively the irrigation system, as well as
water users with no capability and legal authority to
influence the actions of public agencies, resigning
themselves to accept whatever public agencies managed
to deliver in an atmosphere of mistrust.
As a result of regulatory reform (since 2001), the
overall coordinating role of irrigation was transferred
from the Ministry of Agriculture to SCWR, which now
controls the two main irrigation organizations, name-
ly “Irrigation” (Vorogum-Jrar) and “Drainage”. Irriga-
tion JSC was formed recently through the merger of
the former Irrigation, Jrambar (responsible for the main
water reservoirs), and Jrar (responsible for keeping
records on water deals). Irrigation JSC is now respon-
sible for water trading and for the delivery of water to
the second and third-tier agricultural users. The third
tier apparently disappeared once newly-created water-
user groups subsumed all responsibilities—including
the maintenance of lower level irrigation channels.
Experience in many countries has also demonstrat-
ed that, under improved institutional circumstances,
the Participatory Irrigation Management approach can
enhance the efficiency and sustainability of irrigation
systems. Since 1996, GoA has promoted participatory
irrigation management in order to enhance account-
ability and reliability of services by encouraging the
establishment of water users groups—which now num-
ber 600. Until very recently, two types of groups exist-
ed: Water Users Consumer Cooperatives (created along
with hydrological borders and village basins33) and
Water Users Associations (based on rural communi-
ties). These water users groups served to:
• operate and maintain lower level irrigation channels
and collect irrigation services fees for operation and
maintenance (O&M) of both lower level and
higher level system facilities; and
• support and advise the related government agencies
in the preparation and implementation of water
resource management plans for their respective
areas, operational management of the supply of
water resources in the concerned areas, and moni-
toring of water use by different user groups.
The experience worldwide has demonstrated that
in order for water user groups to be successful:
• they must be truly elective;
• O&M responsibilities should be clearly allocated
between the Government and water users;
• the legal framework should provide full protection
of the right of water users to organize into auto-
nomous, self-managing water user groups, fully
accountable to their members, with full authority
to act on behalf of the membership vis-a-vis the
Government; and
• relations with all stakeholders should be based
strictly on contractual and transparent relations,
thus allowing water user groups to exercise the
rights to distribute water as agreed and punish for
violations, define their own budgets and mem-
bership fees, hire and fire personnel, define the
scope of maintenance jobs and implementation
schemes,  and so on.
The majority of water user groups in Armenia were
mostly imposed without consideration of any of the
following factors:
• many of were formed quickly, under Government
pressure or directly by it, without active involve-
ment on the part of farmers themselves;
• farmers receive little or no technical or financial
support, meanwhile managing the existing tertiary
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irrigation systems that are in a state of disrepair
and often not functional;
• often the village councils/heads select group leaders
rather than the farmers themselves;
• many groups do not succeed in collecting member-
ship fees and payments for water;
• contractual relations with the water suppliers lack
strict enforcement, resulting, at times, in corrupt
behavior on behalf of the water user group leaders;
and
• the nonexistence of proper legislation to govern
the operations of water user groups (including a
system of appeals for farmers).
As a result, the experience to date with water user
groups in Armenia has been mixed, with only one-
fourth proving successful (around 110 out of 455).
Meanwhile, water user groups are seen as panacea for
improving water efficiency; the arguments for owner-
ship by farmers of the water resources cannot be dis-
puted. Also, the fraction of existing water users groups
which are strong demonstrates that there is indeed a
potential for water users to successfully operate and
maintain the tertiary level of the irrigation system.
Realizing that the situation with water user groups
needs reform, GoA adopted (06/2002) the Law on
Water User Federations (WUF). According to this law,
all existing water user groups need to reregister to ob-
tain legal status; to do so, they must meet certain crite-
ria. For example, they will need to have a substantial
base.  The experience thus far, that is, has indicated
that small-base water user groups experience many more
difficulties in trying to achieve financial sustainability.
As well, such arrangements allow much room for cor-
ruptive practices.34
GoA realizes the need to create conditions to en-
able water user groups to become independent and ef-
fective partners in the management of the irrigation
system at all levels, through:
• ensuring a reliable water source at their outlet, a
fair price (seen against the benefits they could
achieve) and technical assistance in drawing up
their water use plans; and
• increasing empowerment of water user groups to
acquire a sense of ownership, modifying groups’
responsibility in the management of tertiary rehabi-
litation activities, contracting out rehabilitation
works, and determining priorities to be undertaken
in conformity with the resources available to them
from their membership and from Government
grants.
GoA plans to assist water user groups to acquire
the capacity (technical and human) to take over full
responsibility for O&M beyond the tertiary canals, and
to participate more effectively in the management of
the irrigation and drainage system.  This might involve
providing a high and sustainable level of institutional
support aimed at both confidence-building and skill-
development among water users. With WB support,
GoA will pilot sub-scheme-based WUFs which will
gain full responsibility for O&M of sub-schemes or
entire schemes; this represents an intermediate step
toward the over-all establishment of scheme-based
unions of WUFs. To that end, qualifying WUFs will
be given partial grants to acquire O&M equipment
and to finance construction works to be performed
under contract by private contractors. They will fur-
thermore receive technical assistance and construction
materials necessary for carrying out eligible tertiary (and
possibly secondary) canal rehabilitation “in-house”
through the mobilization of their own labor force.
As in the case of the municipal water sector, GoA
recently gave new life to irrigation reforms by a pass-
ing a law in late 2002, which stipulated a partial write-
off of the arrears accumulated by the farmers, provid-
ed that they pay the remaining costs, and contracts on
water supply are signed. As opposed to the municipal
water sector, in the case of irrigation, contracts are
signed mostly between Irrigation JSC and the WUFs—
if they exist—or between Irrigation JSC and individu-
al farmers if the latter are not mature. Also, naturally,
in contrast to the municipal water sector, this process
is not linked to the installation of meters; problems
will be addressed in greater detail in Section 6.3.2.
3.2 Financial Reform
GoA Decree No.440 (05/2001) laid the groundwork
for a comprehensive reform program to improve the
financial sustainability of the companies responsible
for the provision of drinking water supply and waste-
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water, as well as irrigation and drainage services. Im-
plementation of the program was the responsibility of
SCWR. Ultimately, the decree serves to introduce a
commercial base for the operations of all water supply
companies from 2001 to 2008. The final goal is to
eliminate budget subsidies (covering both the subsidies
for O&M and capital expenses), which is necessary to
continue to undertake capital investments—estimated
for the first five years at 200 million USD. It is
stipulated that to achieve this, it is necessary to review
and modernize the existing legal and normative fields
regulating WRM, while implementing significant tariff,
institutional and administrative reforms.
The program also envisages restructuring arrears
accumulated by water operators through: reschedul-
ing (beyond 2006); partial write-offs; buying off bank
credits by the budget and reformulating these credits
as GoA shareholdings; and canceling cross-indebted-
ness of water utilities to energy companies and ulti-
mately to the state budget (the main idea being that
debts to energy companies are not passed all the way
to consumers). Priority is given to paying off the debts
in salary (889.8 million AMD) to water companies’
employees.35
Through these reforms, GoA expects to achieve
the following (Table 1).
• increase the volume of supplied
irrigation water by 32.3%, possibly
increasing irrigatable land by
19.0 thousand ha. The surface of
self-flow irrigatable land will increase
by 36 thousand ha;
• increase tariffs 2.4. times and collection
rates 2.2 times, (increasing revenues
7.4 times).
• decrease water losses by 7.6%, with
water savings reaching 35 million m3;
• decrease energy costs by 31.2%; and
• finish 2005 with a profit of
178.million AMD.
3.3 Private Sector Participation in WRM
GoA has taken a gradual, moderate view on private
sector participation in WRM, seeing privatization as a
final solution in, perhaps, ten years time. Initial steps
include transforming Irrigation JSC, YWSC and
AWSC into full commercial entities, achieving cost-
recovery at a minimum in the coming three to five
years, and introducing management changes using
contracts, concessions, and so on. This is a positive
sign, in line with lessons learned elsewhere in the
international community. Economists tend to agree
that competitive market pressures—and, for the case
of natural monopolies like the water sector, an effective
regulatory framework—are far more important than
ownership types.  There are numerous examples of both
public and market failures in history to support this.
Success or failure in privatizing WRM depends more
on the quality and commitment of the implementing
agencies, the accompanying environment and timing
than on the nature of turnover itself. The most difficult
issue is measuring the marginal benefits and costs of
privatization. If a decision is made to privatize, the
chosen route should optimize economic returns to
water only after ensuring that basic needs are satisfied,
and fit the concrete case. Complex institutional
• ensure 24-hours service;
• decrease losses by 55% from 71.7%,
saving around 165 million m3;
• increase collection rates by about 62%,
(increasing revenues 3.3 times).
• decrease energy costs by about 25%;
and
• increase O&M company around
1,200 million AMD.
• reduce drinking water losses by 24.3%,
saving 17.1 m3 water;
• increase drinking water tariffs by
29.1% and increase  collections rates
2.6 times are (increasing utility
revenues 3.3. times);
• decrease costs of electrical energy
by 36.3%; and
• achieve282 million AMD in profits
by 2005.
Table 1
Water Sector Reform Targets
Irrigation Sector Municipal Sector
YWSC AWSC
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arrangements must be in place before a decision on
turnover is implemented.  This is perhaps most impor-
tant if a transition from a centralized bureaucracy to a
market-based economy involves fragmented WRM
divided among different agencies with overlapping
functions, an inadequate legal base with weak mecha-
nisms for dispute resolution, and insufficient involve-
ment of communities in the process of planning re-
source allocation. In such an environment (which is
the case in Armenia), while necessary components of
sustainable, productive water resource management are
still evolving, more extreme variants of privatization such
as unregulated market allocations are likely to do more
harm than good. Necessary preconditions for the intro-
duction of market forces into water allocation include:36
• well-defined entitlements of all users under all levels
of resource availability (including various social and
environmental uses) and infrastructure in place to
deliver the defined entitlements;
• effective recourse available to those who do not
receive their entitlements as well as to third parties
affected by changes in use;
• the possibility to measure reallocations of water
and third-party impacts (in quality, quantity, time,
and place);
• effective legal procedures ensuring that users pay
for the water consumed combined with measures
(e.g. some degree of subsidy) to ensure that the
poor are not priced out of the market;
• subjecting large-scale water transfers with and bet-
ween sectors to approval and relevant charges by
regulatory agencies;
• analysis of transaction costs, prior to making
changes in the design, construction, or manage-
ment of water systems;
• laws assigning rights, operations, enforcement; and
• physical infrastructure and management systems
capable of allocating water in accordance with water
markets.
While privatization may be a promising develop-
ment, these preconditions are essential to its success.
Meanwhile, efficient use of water will be better served
by the widespread introduction of the necessary un-
derpinnings and prerequisites to good water manage-
ment (improved legislation, assigned water rights, de-
livery of a defined service). Only then will the pursuit
of market forces in the allocation of water entail sig-
nificant benefits.37
3.4 Water Rights, Water Markets
and Water Planning
Effective water pricing depends on secure and effective
property rights to water. A water right, that is, is a
legal guarantee (individual or collective), given for the
extraction of surface water or groundwater. It defines:
the quantity of water to be extracted or transported;
the source; the use; and the timeframe during which
water can be extracted or transported. Any individual
or group extracting or transporting a quantity that
exceeds the legally predefined amount must apply to
obtain a water right. A system of water rights is efficient
if it defines clearly all the above. In many developing
and transition countries, water rights are insecure and
ineffective.38  In such cases (or when regulations are not
observed), there is no immediate scope for improving
water distribution through pricing; in irrigation, for
example, problems would involve farmers taking water
at will, manipulating gate settings, not paying assessed
charges and so on. Hence, attention should first be
given to clarifying and enforcing water rights and the
rules of water distribution, including introducing the
notion of “tradable water rights” which allow formal
transfer of water entitlements among users in line with
the “efficient markets” paradigm.  This paradigm
acknowledges the economic value of water and sectoral
differences among water users; thus, GoA is to allocate
water in a way to maximize its overall economic value.39
Developing a comprehensive water rights system
is crucial in Armenia—until very recently water rights
(called water permits) were not transferable, and only
with the adoption of the New Water Code did the sit-
uation change. Water permits (rights) are now trad-
able.40 This is, however, only a first step; much has yet
to change. For example:
• water permits are perceived mostly as a means to
protect the environment, rather than a means to
regulate water use ubiquitously;
• as water permits originally were instituted to regu-
late water withdrawals, they are silent in terms of
consumptive use and return flows, which limit the
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capacity of the system to be used as a tool to make
decisions on water allocation;
• consistency with water quality norms and with the
“assigned” functions of rivers and lakes is not always
ensured when issuing a water permit; and
• aggregate information on water use permits, known
as the Water Cadaster  (under the Ministry of
Nature Protection), is incomplete and must be
improved and expanded to include secondary users,
pollution discharge permits and information on
water sources in order to become an effective tool
to administer resource use.
Water markets, already thriving in most irrigation
systems worldwide, are yet another mechanism to be
developed. They most commonly operate locally (but
also in larger transfers, within or among sectors, pro-
vided that suitable regulation is in place), and involve
trading water for similar uses.  This includes, for ex-
ample, the sale or exchange of irrigation “turns” in a
rotational system, or the sale of water by the owner of
a tube well to nearby farmers. While water markets
can function in the absence of formal water rights, trad-
able water rights require a much more specific defini-
tion of the entitlement. It also must be recognized that
there are significant costs associated with water mar-
kets in terms of transaction costs and physical system
costs.41  The new Water Code is unclear about the pros-
pects for developing water markets; as such, Armenia
should first ensure that the necessary prerequisites are
in place (clear juridical base, regulatory framework,
transparency in operations, and so on) and that, for
the purpose of regulation, economic rather than finan-
cial valuation of water projects serves as the basis for
public intervention (i.e. looking at the benefit for so-
ciety as a whole). Needless to say, this all should be
clearly defined in the Water Code.
3.5 Next Key Steps
in GOA Reform Agenda
The next key steps in the GoA reform agenda and
WRM will be described in the relevant sections. Some
general notes on both programs deserve attention.
• Recognizing that an unclear separation of functions
over the integrated WRM has resulted from the
creation of quite a number of new institutions in a
short time frame (a situation that can create power-
ful vested interests for and against change),  GoA,
along with strengthening the policy functions of
new and existing public institutions, will continue
the improvement of the institutional framework
for IWRM. As envisioned by the new Water Code,
more institutions will be created, including the
Dispute Resolution Committee (more to be dis-
cussed in relevant sections).
• In the coming eight years, GoA intends to shift
gradually to water-basin (scheme) based  manage-
ment42 by (a) separating the branches of Irrigation
JSC and AWSC accordingly; and (b) developing
(unions of) scheme-based Water User Federations
(see Irrigation Sector Reform) in order to give users
greater responsibility in the management of the
irrigation system below the primary outlet and to
progressively commercialize the sector. GoA plans
to establish Local Water Authorities under the
authority of the WRM Board, charged with the
operational management of primary water bodies.
These are envisioned to cooperate closely with
Water Users Federations and other stakeholders in
a particular water-basin.
• A consensus must be reached regarding options for
managing of Armenia’s water resources over the
longer term—thus far, there is only an agreement
between different stakeholders to adopt some
strategic guidelines.
• The Armenian WRM system lacks a regular
exercise for water resource planning (the Integrated
WRM Planning study was the only one in the past
ten years). Allocation of water from existing
reservoirs is based on obsolete norms set by the
Ministry of Agriculture, without consultation with
stakeholders regularly in the allocation process.
There is an urgent need to improve the current
system so that proper and informed decisions on
water allocation can be made and an effective
regulatory and administrative framework for WRM
established.
• The involvement and capacity of marz and
community levels in formulating and implemen-
tation of WRM strategies in view of decentraliza-
tion and the devolution of responsibilities must be
increased and strengthened.
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Questions remain which are relevant to designing
a complete picture of future regulatory regimes for the
water sector. Although GoA Decree No.440 has stat-
ed that the coming eight years will bring about a grad-
ual shift to water-basin (scheme) based management
via separating the branches of Irrigation JSC and AWSC
and establishing Local Water Authorities under the
authority of the WRM Board, charged with the oper-
ational management of primary water bodies, this plan
looks rather vague.  Moreover, on close examination,
it appears unfounded, not based on solid research into
its feasibility and creditworthiness, and lacking seri-
ous research into possible alternatives. The questions
left to consider include:
1) For municipal water:
• Which is more reasonable: a national regulator
for the water sector, or a multi-sector regulator,
covering energy, water and telecommunica-
tions? Should the regulation be conducted by
a central government agency, national econo-
mic regulatory agency or local governments?
• Should regulation be done through contracts
(management or concession) or by a regulator
(through a license)?
• Can AWSC and YWSC be merged or must
AWSC be split into regionally-based, small but
viable companies?
All answers have both advantages and disadvan-
tages. For example, having a multi-sector regulator
could save resources due to the advantages of resource
sharing, but might lose on non-specialization. Regula-
tion by local governments has the advantage of taking
into account local knowledge and interests, but does
not allow for a systemic set of national standards or
methods for pricing.  Splitting AWSC would allow for
using benchmark competition methods, but this is valu-
able only if there is significant room for the applica-
tion of these methods, or if the advantages of cost-
subsidization across the regions within one company
do not outweigh the disadvantages.
The ECA suggests a mixed strategy:43
• establish an independent regulatory agency;
• allow for the existence of both local and multi-
area water companies;
• permit local governments to contract with local
water operators, specifying one of the following:
(a) no role for the national regulatory agency; (b)
full regulation of prices and service standards; (c)
regulation of prices but not service standards;
• encourage the national regulator to approve all
contracts between local governments and water
operators; and
• push the national regulator to regulate prices
charged by large or multi-area utilities to local
governments. Local governments may delegate full
responsibility to AWSC or YWSC (as an obligatory
procedure for smaller communities).
2) For irrigation:
• Should the operations of WUFs be overseen
at a central level? If so, should the oversight
body be an economic regulator or a public
body, such as a Ministry?
• Should a central or a national regulatory autho-
rity regulate the primary irrigation infrastruc-
ture?
Indeed, both for municipal water and irrigation,
in-depth research is needed to finalize the recommen-
dations. Follow-up research is proposed by the author
of this paper. Additionally, in the spring of 2003, a
WB sponsored project (through Public-Private Infra-
structure Facility) has commenced with the aim of ad-
dressing these issues and legislative needs.
4. THE NEED FOR PRO-POOR POLICIES
IN WATER SECTOR REFORMS
Numerous social problems need to be addressed while
designing and implementing reform programs in the
water sector. Water sector tariff reform has already
resulted in a rapid increase in real water prices,
outpacing the growth of real wages by a factor of almost
seven.  This places a huge burden on household
budgets, adding to real electricity prices which already
outpace increases in real wages.44 If the poor are unable
to maintain (or gain) access to the public service
network, and per unit costs of substitute services are
higher than those from the network, then social policy
must effectively protect the poor from tariff increases.
Table 2 (below) shows that widespread poverty and
extreme inequality remain major issues for Armenia.
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In turn, WRM reform (like any other reform program)
should be designed in a way sensitive to the needs and
abilities of the poor.
5. WATER AS AN ECONOMIC GOOD:
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
Reforming utilities presents a challenging task to any
country, involving numerous conflicting interests.
Parsing out this predicament requires an understanding
of economic fundamentals.
What is water? An economic good, or a basic human
need to be largely exempted from the competitive mar-
ket pricing and allocation? To date, there is no widely
accepted agreement on how water should be treated,
although the view of water as an economic good in-
creasingly gains acceptance.  Partly, this results from
growing appreciation of the scarcity of water problem,
and the role of water pricing as a means to ensure its
efficient allocation.45  Even the most radical support-
ers of this point of view, however, accept that there is
still a role for water as a basic need, a merit good, or a
social, economic, financial, and environmental re-
source, thus complicating price determination. The
pursuit of economic approaches in the absence of such
important preconditions as well defined water rights,
mechanisms to ensure access of water for poor, and so
on may have unpredictable—and possibly negative—
effects, linking water supply and poverty, water-born
diseases and mortality.
The two schools agree that effective distribution
and management of water comprises the main con-
cept. Disagreements, however, also exist among the
proponents of water as an economic good.  Specifical-
ly, advocates debate whether water is a private good,
that can be left entirely to market forces, or a public
good, which requires some amount of extra-market
management to effectively and efficiently serve social
objectives.  The latter involves, for example, making
water available at reasonable levels to everyone, or sub-
sidizing irrigation to reduce food costs to poor people.
Following Perry et al.46 we propose that water is both a
public and a private good (Figure 3).47
Table 2
Results of Household Living Standards Survey (HIES) 2001
RoA Rural Urban Yerevan Other cities
Non-poor 49.1 49.9 48.7 53.5 44.3
Poor 35.0 38.9 33.1 29.8 36.2
Extremely poor 15.9 11.1 18.2 16.7 19.5
Table 3
Poverty Indicators
1996 1999 2001
Ratio of poor population (% in the overall population) 54.73 55.05 50.9
Ratio of extremely poor population (5 in the overal population) 27.67 22.91 15.9
Severety of poverty 11.1 9.0 15.0
Depth of poverty 21.5 19.0 6.1
Income based Gini coefficient 0.653 0.570 0.538
Expenditure based Gini coefficient 0.602 0.372 0.377
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Water has an economic value to users who are will-
ing to pay for it; consumers will use water so long as
the benefits from the use of an additional cubic meter
exceed the costs so incurred—the optimal consump-
tion is X. If a consumer is charged P’, he/she will con-
sume X’. The increase in costs (the area under the cost
curve) exceeds the increase in benefits (the area under
the benefit curve). The loss of net benefits is called
“dead-weight loss” (ABC). For society, the welfare is
maximized when: (a) water is priced at its marginal
cost; and (b) water is used until the marginal cost is
equal to the marginal benefit. Even with the same ba-
sic need for or value of water, the rich will get more
and the poor less. Thus, the people between X* and X1
are priced out of the market for water—in terms of
marginal reductions in the amount they can afford.
Hence, the higher the price, the greater the incidence
of poverty in X.
Countering social demand by reducing water avail-
ability from X1 to X* through competitive prices would
pose a loss for society. There is a slight disagreement
whether a social society should:
• ensure that reasonable levels of water for basic
human needs are met by the wealthy subsidizing
water (see Figure 3: shifting the supply curve down
to where it intersects the demand curve at P1, X1);
or
• switch governing value judgements once the margin
of basic needs has been satisfied (lower on the mar-
ginal utility curve), i.e. not assist individuals or
Figure 3
Water as an Economic Good
Source: Adapted from Briscoe, J., 1996.
families in the acquisition of goods beyond this
level.
These options imply, at least to some degree, that
water is a social good; society as a whole will benefit if it
is made available to certain groups or for certain pur-
poses below the market price. Almost all proponents
of both views share this view. Disagreements usually
concern: (a) the extent to which social societies can
achieve these goals and (b) types and levels of govern-
ment involvement and intervention to correct for pub-
lic or private failures. In post-Communist countries,
including Armenia, the argument around water as a
private or public good is perhaps more severe than in
other countries.  During Soviet rule, citizens grew ac-
custom to free water, paid for by the State. Changing
this understanding of public utilities requires devotion,
involving altering core values, mentality and behavior.
Partially, this perception affects the low compliance
with payment discipline in all the segments of water use,
to be described later in the text.  Furthermore, water is
also a merit good: access to clean water has health benefits
(reduced incapacity for work; reduced medical costs)
that generally compensate for providing the water.
In summary, depending on the quantities supplied
to individuals, water can be either a basic human need,
a merit good, public good or an ordinary private good.
Even this brief introduction into economic concepts
shows that policy formulation for water requires a so-
phisticated form of management, with multi-objective
decision making, recognizing the relevance and impor-
tance of various values and facts over different condi-
tions of time and place. This is particularly relevant
when water allocation and management are passed from
a centralized bureaucracy to local entities, such as in
transition countries like Armenia.
Further discussion requires a theoretical under-
standing of tariffs.  Setting appropriate tariffs is a com-
plex task—both from the perspective of estimating the
financial needs of utility enterprises and from the per-
spective of assuring customers that the prices they pay
for services are reasonable. A part of the problem is
that water utilities are, essentially, monopolies which
prevent setting tariffs through competitive tender. Tar-
iffs should encourage consumers to use services effi-
ciently. Tariffs should also be set at a level that requires
providers to seek the most efficient means of produc-
ing and delivering services. However, tariffs must be
C
BA
P’
P
X X’
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set in a way that the poor are not priced out of the
market. To ensure that tariffs are politically acceptable,
citizens must participate in the tariff setting process
and authorities and utility companies must fully dis-
close financial information to the public. Since tariff
setting is a challenging task, it is useful to look at water
pricing theory and what it implies in terms of water
tariffs.  Economic theory holds that:
• Water tariffs should be based on the following main
principles:
— Economic Efficiency: (a) marginal cost should
be more then zero in order to reflect the re-
source scarcity; (b) prices should reflect mar-
ginal costs; (c) tariffs should include economic
rent,48 implying that: tariffs based on uniform
fixed payments are not acceptable and water
bills should be based on the water actually
consumed;
— Social justice : while pricing should be based
on the actual consumption levels, sufficient
quantity of water should be available on very
low prices (or subsidized), through (a) adopting
increasing block tariffs; or (b) assisting the poor
with cash transfers in case of uniform prices;
— Ecological preservation: applying a unit for
pollution with a fine linked to it; and
— Cost-recovery.
• Water tariffs should include:
— Resource fee: to reflect the alternative value of
water or economic rent, implying that it should
be used for every m3 of water received by the
consumer or every m3 water extracted;49 and
— Expenses: usually water provision deals with two
types of expenses:
– overall expenses, equal to the sum of fixed
expenses (e.g. providing water meters, bills’
collection, administration, etc) and variable
expenses; and
– wastewater cleaning expenses or ecological
fees.
• In sum:
To reflect the principle of social justice:
• the fixed amount could be designed in two possible
ways: (a) equally for all users (among the same
group of category/households); or (b) depending
on the income/wealth (value for property; produc-
tion volume; square meters of house); and
• the variable amount could be designed in two pos-
sible ways: (a) equally for all users; or (b) designed
as block tariff (very low price for the first block
and increased for the second block).
6. POLICY OPTIONS IN WATER TARIFF
AND BILLING REFORM: BALANCING
ECONOMIC NEED AND NEGATIVE
IMPACT ON THE POOR
6.1 Theoretical Rationale
Increasing cost recovery of the water sector through
increased tariffs comprises the cornerstone of GoA’s
economic reform program.50 Understanding the logic
behind the tariff policy of GoA requires an overview
of the tariff structure in Armenia now.
• Resource fees are reflected in GoA Decree No 864
(12/1988), requiring commercial water users to pay
an extraction fee (or water resources tax) equivalent
to 0.2 US cents per m3 for the use of surface or
groundwater for any commercial purpose, as well
as a special fee for the use of Lake Sevan’s waters.
In addition, water users must pay a fee for the dis-
charge of wastewater. At present, agricultural water
users are exempted from the extraction fee.  If  they
use water from Lake Sevan, however, they must
pay a fee of 0.4 US cents per cubic meter.51 These
fees are too low to encourage reduction of con-
sumption or the preservation of water resources.
As well, they hardly reflect the value of water use.
• Ecological fees and fines. Based on 13 criteria, these
fees are currently paid only by industrial users and
wastewater companies—estimated per ton of
pollution above the established limit.  The system
has numerous drawbacks driven by the low level
of fines, poor financial situation of inspectorates
(both central and local), and the lack of metering,
as a result of which fees are most often based on
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   +  R
cm  
x  Q
cm  
 +   P
cm  
x  Q
cm 
  +  V
cm  
x  Q
cm➛ ➛
Resource
fee
Variable
amount
Ecological
fee
➛Fixed
amount
53
E C O N O M I C  A N D  S O C I A L  A S P E C T S  O F  R E F O R M I N G  W AT E R  R E S O U R C E  M A N A G E M E N T:  C A S E  O F  A R M E N I A
reports by theoretical calculations of the enterprises
themselves. Moreover, pollution is calculated at the
end of every year; if a company pollutes more in
one quarter, and less in another, it might not pay
at all. Thus, the system does not encourage environ-
mental protection.
• Capital and operational expenses. Tariffs do not fully
include capital expenses, and in case of irrigation—
around 50% of operational expenses.
It could be concluded that for both municipal and
irrigation water, the tariff structure is far from being
an instrument of affecting demand and inducing effi-
ciency. Perhaps this poses the next task to confront, as
addressed below. A more immediate task concerns the
design of tariffs and a billing/collection system in a
way that achieves cost recovery. This involves gradual-
ly improving the tariff structure in accordance with
the Water Tariff Policy outlined in GoA Decree No.440
to cover the following expenses at full: operational ex-
ploitation and preservation; depreciation; servicing
loans; insurance; ecological norms; unavoidable losses
due to technical and commercial reasons; and minimum
profit. The key question concerns the pace of such a
reform. GoA Tariff Policy proposes achieving full cost
recovery by 2005; in our view, this appears too drastic,
and a more gradual process and longer time frame are
recommended  (as outlined in the following sections).
6.2 Municipal Water Tariff
and Billing Reform
6.2.1 Current Municipal Water Tariff
Armenia has adopted a volumetric pricing system for
municipal water.
• Wholesale tariffs in municipal water are: 30 AMD
per m3 for drinking water (including VAT) and 7.46
AMD for wastewater (including VAT) per cubic
meter.  This equals approximately 5.3 US cents for
drinking water and 1.3 US cents for wastewater.52
• Retail tariffs differ from community to community.
In Ashtarak, for example, retail price for water is
60 AMD (10.6 cents) per m3 for drinking water
and 20 AMD (3.6 cents) per m3 for wastewater.
Retail prices in any given location differ also by
consumer type (population, industry, budgetary
and commercial entities) according to meter
presence. In case of meter presence, the specified
prices apply. When no meters are present, prices
are set assuming normative consumption. Due to
the fact that currently (and until the institutional
changes are operational) operators deliver water to
consumers, there remains one fixed price—the
retail price.  This ranges between 50–60 ARD per
cubic meter, set at 56 ARD (0.098 USD) per m3)
in Yerevan.53  As described in Chapter 2, prices for
water are based on assumed per capita daily
consumption of 250 lcd (or 0.25 m3 per capita per
day) in Yerevan and 200 lcd (0.2 m3 per capita per
day) in other urban areas—though the volume
actually consumed by the population is a fraction
of this. It should also be remembered that despite
a large increase during the last decade, the utility
water prices for domestic consumers are still a
fraction (around 50–60%) of the O&M.54
6.2.2 Affordability of Higher Taxes
There have been a number of studies which have exa-
mined the feasibility of introducing higher tariffs in
municipal water. We should mention only a few and
only the most important results:
1) WB funded “Utility Pricing and the Poor” (2001) :
Studying the demand for better water service using
a multivariate response model revealed that almost
all respondents choose the hypothetical improved
system at a price of 0.5. AMD per ten liters (50
ARD per m3)—close to the current tariff—con-
suming about 130 liters per household daily.
Almost none choose it at 25 ARD per ten liters. At
five ARD per ten liters (or about one USD per
m3), price suddenly becomes the most important
consideration in selecting the improved system
(consuming around 40 liters per household daily),
as well as the determinant for the decision on the
quantity to be consumed (see Box 1.).
2) KfW funded MACS: GmbH initially proposed
adopting a block tariff structure—a mechanism
used worldwide to regulate natural monopolies,
water utilities in particular.55 As described in
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Chapter 5, in international practice, often block
tariff most effectively achieves several simultaneous
tasks. In the absence of trustworthy data on
monthly quantitative consumption, KfW experts
made their own estimates based on a small scale
survey in Armavir (see Box 2.). KfW experts
contend that the pattern revealed suggests a cascade
tariff structure in order to curb excessive water
consumption. A tariff structure is proposed with:
• a flat rate  for the first five cubic meters;
• a low-end (seven percent of average domestic
consumption)—five to ten m3 (around 70 ARD
per m3), covering only the operating costs;
• a normal tariff (52% of average domestic
consumption)—ten to 20 m3 (around 100 ARD
per m3), covering full O&M costs;56
• an average tariff (nine percent of average do-
mestic consumption)—20 to 25  m3 (around
300 AMD for m3);
• a high-end (27% of average domestic con-
sumption)—above 25 m3 (more than 500
AMD for m3), above the full costs to compen-
sate for the financial losses at the low-end side);
and
• and an additional five percent consumed by
industry, commercial and public consumers.
At least two more studies recommended a two part
block tariff for Armenia, introducing a “lifeline” tariff
to assure the necessary consumption of water at an
affordable.57 GoA, however, does not support black
tariffs; Nor Akunq has also abandoned the idea. (Pres-
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ently, a uniform of 100 AMD per cubic meter in un-
der consideration.) In our view, a block tariff structure
will be increasingly more relevant as reforms advance
(starting with the introduction of a lifeline tariff, per-
haps).  Thus, this approach deserves further attention
(see Section 6.2.5).
To summarize, almost all previous studies conclud-
ed that GoA should not raise tariffs at this stage; rath-
er, it should try to increase collections first, to start
with the non-paying households with reliable service
(20 to 25%). It should proceed with capturing the
demand for improved service by increased reliability
of service and meter-based billing. This has been ad-
vised in consideration of economics (see above), the
poor, and public health.
6.2.3 GoA Plans for Municipal Water Tariffs
To some degree, GoA policy concurs with the above
recommendations: from 2001 to 2005, no tariff in-
crease is envisioned for Yerevan.  Meanwhile, a special
emphasis is placed on increased collections—with the
following exceptions:
• GoA plans to increase average tariffs outside Yere-
van much sooner; and
• tariff raises begin only after increases service reli-
ability. It is also recognized, however, that increased
collections are necessary to finance (along with
credits) the costs of rehabilitating the network.58
It should also be noted that while there was no
tariff increase for Yerevan since January 1998—one year
55
earlier for AWSC—as domestic water tariffs have al-
ready increased by almost 100% since 1995 (while the
non-domestic tariffs have actually decreased by 36%).
Table 4. indicates that:
• until 2005, no tariff increase is planned for Yerevan
(the focus is rather on increased collection of water
bills);
• for territories outside Yerevan, an increase in average
tariffs is planned (Table 4 displays averages),
meaning that current tariffs will not be increased
everywhere; and
• there is a tendency to differentiate between “outside
Yerevan tariffs” and “Yerevan tariffs” to diminish
by 2005.
GoA plans  to introduce zone tariffs for municipal
use gradually (we shall return to this issue later in the
text). The increase by 2005 of the water tariff up to 65
AMD per m3 would represent a 16% increase com-
pared to current the tariff in Yerevan, and 23% increase
compared to the current average tariff across Armenia.
By 2007, the tariff may reach 75 AMD per m3 or higher.
Partially, the rationale for not drastically increas-
ing water tariffs now (apart from the social consider-
ations) is as follows:
• The current tariff, if high collections rate were
assured, should cover a large fraction of the O&M
costs of water utility—approximately 14–20 US
cents per cubic meter (around 100 AMD).59 The
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Table 4
GoA Scenario (Tariffs and Collection Rates) for Municipal Water and Wastewater
Tariff Years
AMD per m3/Collection rate [%] 2000 factual 2001 factual 2002 2003 2004 2005
Yerevan, including 56 56 56 56 56 65
Drinking water 46 46 46 46 46 55
Wastewater 10 10 10 10 10 10
Collection rate 18.7 26.7 40.7 62.6 85.1 88
1999 factual 2000 factual 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Nationwide, including 49.52 53.3 53.7 53.7 65.7 65.7 65.7
Drinking water 38.4 42.6 42.6 42.6 55 55 55
Wastewater 11.12 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7
Collection rate 30 30.6 40 54 66 72 82
Source: GoA Decree No.440 and 690 (a).
same is true in regard to GoA subsidies. The overall
amount of subsidies today is  around 560 million
AMD, or one million USD (almost twice as much
if accounted for accumulated debt). According to
our estimates, if the share of drinking water pay-
ments were only five percent higher (and, indeed,
if high collection rates were assured), then this sector
of the system would need no subsidies. Since the
amount of subsidy accounts for only four percent
of the arrears of the population and legal entities to
the system (without Yerevan), and if only the latter
(again, without Yerevan) paid their debts, then this
amount could be reduced by over 60% (indeed, these
are very rough calculations, and very conditional).
• According to “Utility Pricing and the Poor,”
revenue is maximized at a price of five ARD per
ten liters (one USD per m3) with about 100,000
ARD (180 USD) a month collected from the rural
community and about 160 thousand ARD a
month (290 USD) from the urban community.
But at this price, only about 40% of rural
households and 65% in the urban community
would purchase water from the improved system.
At prices above five ARD, total revenue from the
improved system and the number of households
using the system both decrease. At prices below
five ARD, the number of households benefiting
from the improved system increases—but revenue
decreases. Because price enters in linear form, the
price elasticity of demand is not constant over the
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function. Thus, no one price appears to solve all
problems.
6.2.4 Impact of Planned Tariff and Billing
Reforms in Municipal Water on the Poor
“Utility Pricing and the Poor,” the first study of its
kind, concluded that:
• if fully enforced, the burden of existing tariffs
would be almost three times higher for the poor
(8% of monthly expenditure) than the non-poor
(3% of monthly expenditure); and
• the quantity consumed is negatively correlated with
price, and positively correlated with income and
household size.
As household incomes and the composition of ex-
penditures have changed in recent years, HIES 2001
serves as a more pertinent source of information. In
particular, the 2001 study offers new insights into the
possible impacts on current tariff levels if a stringent
collection discipline is introduced. Current norms
imply that monthly payments for water in the absence
of meters are (or are to be) for each household: (a) in
Yerevan 420 AMD (about 72 US cents); (b) 325–340
AMD (around 58 US cents) nationwide. These amounts
account for 1.5–1.8% of the average RA salary, 8.5–
10.6% of an average monthly pension, and 4.2–5.3%
of the family allowance assigned to vulnerable house-
holds.  If fully enforced, tariffs could represent approx-
imately 2.6 USD per month per household or around
5% of current average monthly expenditure. These
estimates, as well as the fact that almost 51% of the
population lives below the poverty level,60 indicate that
households must pay for water.  Yet many households
will find it hard to regularly pay a water fee. This is
likely to exacerbate the poverty picture in the country
by increasing the number of very poor—and possibly
driving many on the edge into poverty. While the sit-
uation will be qualitatively the same both for urban
and rural areas, some groups or regions will be partic-
ularly affected, such as provinces with large refugee pop-
ulations.
Thus, reforms in the water sector, if not mitigat-
ed, will have an even more negative impact on the poor
and vulnerable. A UNDP Report (2001), “Humani-
tarian Assistance and Community Development
needs,” concludes that about 17.3% of Armenia’s pop-
ulation belongs to one of the seven vulnerable groups
(internally displaced people, refugees, single elderly,
disabled, large families, families of perished soldiers,
and orphans). The bulk of the vulnerable are large fam-
ilies, refugees and the disabled: 45.25%, 16.7% and
16.15% respectively. The report establishes that these
groups lack adequate access to water. In “Poverty of
Vulnerable Groups in Armenia” (1999),61 the UNDP
offers the following conclusions:
• 71% of local households have indoor taps in their
dwellings, while the corresponding figure for
refugee households is 52% (and much worse for
refugees in temporary shelters); and
• in villages where refugees live, the water supply infra-
structure is worse (by 1.5 to 2.5 times) than other
villages surveyed.  Seventy percent of their dwellings,
that is, lack water taps, or the outdoor tap is located
at a significant distance from their homes.
In conclusion, vulnerable populations deserve close
attention in terms of mitigating the negative impact of
water sector reform.
6.2.5 Municipal Water Tariff and Billing Reform:
Conclusions and Recommendations
While recognizing that the reforms in municipal water
sector are necessary—including gradual tariff increases
and stringent rules in collecting bills—we assert that
reforms must be designed in consideration of possible
poverty and social impacts.
Tariffs. Numerous conclusions and recommenda-
tions can be made with respect to municipal water tariffs.
• Increasing water tariffs should be frozen until 2005
not only in Yerevan, but also across the country.
Better service might entice consumer to pay
earlier—yet this might entail negative psychological
effects. If tariff increase is indeed implemented
nationwide, it should be accompanied by clear
signals that those who pay more get better and more
reliable service.
• We agree with some of the above-mentioned studies
that a lifeline tariff for the minimum consumption
is worth particular attention.
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• In regard to zone tariffs, it is too early to make com-
ments, as GoA design plans are still in the process
of elaboration. It is important that the principles
of social justice are respected in any design.
• We encourage public reporting of existing tariffs
for communal services enterprises, as well as in-
formed public participation in the tariff setting
process.
• Ideally, tariffs should be adjusted for service quality.
Residential customers who do not receive 24-hour
water services should not pay the same as customers
who do receive full service.
• Indeed, a more representative sample of households
must be surveyed beyond Armavir (by KfW)—
preferably after meter-based billing is underway—
with the aim to analyze consumption behavior and
preferences, and to design an optimal water tariff.
This is particularly important if a block tariff is
introduced. However, the findings of the KfW
study (above) are worth attention. We understand
the difficulty of introducing a block tariff nation-
wide (especially now), when no reliable informa-
tion is available concerning patterns of consump-
tion and what they might be when meter-based
collection is introduced widely.  This system does
have advantages:
— It allows the poor to pay below the costs, while
the rich/high consumers pay above the costs.
This generates incentives to save water—an
important issue for a country where water re-
sources are not abundant.
— It considers the needs of the poor more effec-
tively than a contrived “poverty” list (which
always risks “exclusion” and missing those near
the edge).
Impact on the poor. Perhaps inevitably, the vul-
nerable will find themselves in a particularly difficult
situation with the imposition of stringent tariff and
billing regimes. After the installation of meters, house-
holds will pay not by the above-mentioned norms, but
for actually consumed amounts. To some extent, this
will mitigate the negative impact on the poor. Howev-
er, consumption will likely decrease. Unfortunately,
there is no reliable information concerning the actual
deviation of these two values, thereby preventing a
comprehensive evaluation of both the further limita-
tions of consumption amounts considering the eco-
nomic effects on the affecting the poor and vulnerable
households), and the consequences, (especially in
healthcare). Most probably, the future increases in tar-
iffs, coupled with the likely reduction in consumption
levels, will lead to the outcomes described above.  This
presents an important subject for continued research.
Social assistance for the poor. It is somewhat ar-
tificial to separate municipal water from other com-
munal services.  Thus, we suggest providing assistance
to poor households in the form of an entire commu-
nal services basket.62  Offering low income families with
assistance for paying for basic services—water and waste
water treatment (and presumably for the entire com-
munal services including also electricity, gas, and
heat)—would improve the compliance rate in pay-
ments and the quality of communal services. GoA does
not yet have a concrete program for mitigating the
impact of reforms in municipal water sector on the
poor except for in the bordering and mountainous re-
gions, where the Government plans to implement a
system of supporting transfers to community budgets
aimed at smoothing their socio-economic development.
Basically, the following alternatives to assist the poor
in coping with municipal water (communal) charges
include:
1) The Russian and Ukrainian example: administer a
separate housing allowance program through mu-
nicipalities as a cash transfer program or a voucher
scheme. In August 1997, Charentsavan City Mu-
nicipality (the only in Armenia) implemented a
Housing Allowance Program, in line with the
Russian model: municipality officials claim that
the introduction of this system has resulted in the
increased collection of bills.
2) Incorporate water utility allowance (or perhaps a
housing allowance) in the basic Poverty Family Benefit
Program (PFBP) formula and administer it through
Regional Social Security Centers.63 This alternative
establishes a central role for the Ministry of Social
Security. Duebel and Freinkman (1999), who
suggest this approach, argue that Armenia does not
necessarily  need a separate housing allowance
program: “…in the long run, Armenia could follow
the Western European model-permanent subsidiza-
tion of current housing costs of low income
households transfer.”
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3) The Central European model: providing subsidies
indirectly to condominiums with a matching
principle.  Duebel and Freinkman (1999) suggest
testing this method in Armenia with respect to
housing allowances.64 Condominium members pay
a certain portion of costs through either condomi-
nium fees or rents. Poor households (e.g. recipients
of Poverty Family Benefit), unable to afford
increases in condominium fees, might be eligible
for additional income support within the PBFP—
a combination of the matching grant system for
condominium associations with targeted income
support for the most affected residents.
The ultimate choice (be it a cash transfer program
or a voucher scheme) concerns whether the program is
administered by local communities (hamainqs) or
through Regional Social Security Centers. Arguments
over the mechanisms of assisting the poor in affording
the increasing utility and housing bills in Armenia con-
tinue. The WB favors the latter, (possibly) incorporat-
ing assistance (if any) into the basic poverty benefit
formula.  Key arguments for this administration strat-
egy include (a) the small size of the country and the
expensiveness of administering the assistance schemes
in hamainqs, and (b) uneven financial condition of
municipalities. (In fact, one of the SAC IV conditions
prevents Armenia from starting any new separate so-
cial assistance program.) Here, we choose not to rec-
ommend any concrete mechanism; this would entail a
detailed discussion of the pros and cons of the alterna-
tives (which is not exactly the task at hand). We rather
offer a few general recommendations:
• Design a housing rather than water-fees only assistance
program. Perhaps, in the first stage of the program
implementation, benefits will include only water
supply and housing maintenance, such basic needs,
accessible to all citizens. This can later be extended
to heating and electricity, using acquired expe-
rience.
• Involve hamainqs as much as possible. In the case of
water supply, this would be particularly useful as
water delivery varies considerably from place to
place.
• Design and implement a program for effective moni-
toring of the social security system designed for low
income families.
Installation of meters. As mentioned in Section
3.1.2, recent GoA decrees stipulate that as of 2003,
charging for municipal water will begin only on the
basis of metering of household water consumption.  For
multi-story buildings, meters will be installed by the
operator on the main pipeline supplying the building,
after which households with meters will pay according
to the metered consumption. Households without
meters in a particular building will need to divide the
remaining costs among themselves. Surveys indicate
that the population almost unanimously prefers the
initial cost of installing water meters to be financed by
the water utility for all households, amortized (at least)
for five years in the price of water. This approach falls
in keeping with the successful introduction of meter-
based billing in other countries.
GoA Decree 690a (05/2002) supports this by con-
tending that (a) the GoA budget lacks the resources to
purchase and install meters for all, and (b) operators
(international, in particular) do not find it to be an
attractive option, given the overall high uncertainty
with respect to its outcome. We, however, disagree.
The total price of a water meter amounts to on average
30 USD, including the installation cost. This exceeds
the value of the minimal consumer and food baskets
1.5 and 2.4 times, respectively, and hints that GoA’s
proposal is a rather heavy burden not only for the
poor, but also for average households. Those on the
edge of poverty will suffer most, since they differ only
slightly from the poor, yet are not recipients of family
allowances; with monthly increasing 2.5 times, their
financial situation will significantly decline. We add
that to according the WB Poverty Assessment for
Armenia, citizens residing in apartments are found
more likely to cross below the poverty line, with a
relative poverty risk of 18% on average. Such cases
constitute 46.9% percent of the poor. This strength-
ens, in our view, the arguments above.  Thus, we pro-
pose that:
• GoA must provide at least those in the PFBP with
meters free of charge,65 and
• GoA (with donor support, perhaps) or water
companies should initially finance apartment water
meters for all households by installment payments
spread over several years. This will mitigate the
burden on the poor as well as have a positive
psychological effect, since it will (a) signal the
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government’s goodwill, and (b) eliminate the
negative consequences of sharing costs in multi-
story buildings among those who will not have
meters.
The issue of sanctions. There are several laws and
regulations (which we chose not to address in great
detail in this study) as well as technical problems that
make it difficult for water companies to stop services
for non-payment. Meanwhile, contracts between wa-
ter operators and condominiums currently specify that
in the case of non-payment by households, and pro-
vided that it is technically feasible to do so, water sup-
ply is to be limited to one hour a day. The question,
therefore, is whether or not water should be stopped
completely in case of non-payment.66 GoA plans and
documents provide no clear response to this. In our
view, cutting the water supply entirely is unacceptable.
Yet we contend that GoA should be forthright in its
policies to eliminate cases when decisions on non-pay-
ment are left to a particular “entity”. The development
of a system of sanctions for Armenia should begin with
an analysis of the differences in compliance rates among
communities.  Such an analysis might  insight into the
various approaches to collecting bad debts—with an
emphasis on identifying “best practices”. In any case,
such a decision must be linked to a program of target-
ed assistance that protects the poor from the full im-
pacts of a tariff and billing reform.
The role of local self-government bodies. As described
in Section 3.1.2, in the current circumstances, local
self-government bodies are essentially excluded from
the process of municipal water supply (except for cer-
tain and temporary administrative functions), while at
the same time, according to the Law on Local Self
Government, ensuring such a supply is their responsi-
bility. This situation must find its regulatory solution;
we promote more and active involvement, starting with
the role of local municipalities in the overall regulato-
ry regime of water sector in Armenia. Hopefully, this
question will be resolved when a water regulator is es-
tablished and the concept of a regulatory regime is de-
veloped.
Collections: the role of condominiums. We ar-
gue that in addition to a careful analysis as to why con-
dominiums have not proven successfully even after
modification, and what the Law on the Management
of multi-apartment buildings requires to work effec-
tively, other alternative options that could ensure wa-
ter delivery to households deserve a closer attention.
In this regard, we support the Nor Akunq model.
While it is to early to judge, Nor Akunq can likely
provide numerous insights into effective management.
It seems to be a viable option for the Armenian con-
text, as it brings together the interests of the govern-
ment, utility operators and local communities. How-
ever, it is a viable option only when local water opera-
tor are efficient to maintain (for more on this, see Sec-
tion 3.5) and when a well-functioning contracts among
operators exist.  This indeed might involve condomin-
iums, but could also include a contract of an entrusted
management, thus securing the close involvement of
local self-government bodies.
6.3 Irrigation Water Tariff
and Billing Reform
6.3.1 Theoretical Rationale
There is little disagreement over whether or not to
charge for irrigation water. Experiences worldwide
indicate that without charges (or with a mere symbolic
charge), a “vicious downward spiral of performance”
unfolds.  If public subsidy is not forth-coming, that is,
productivity falls, and the scope for charging is reduced
by the low quality of the service. Three common reasons
for recommending economically justified water charges
are:67
• Recovering the cost of providing the service.  This
requires a politically sensitive choice as to the extent
of cost recovery: full recovery of capital and O&M
costs at realistic interest rates, or partial recovery
at subsidized rates. The assessed total cost of water
supply (and drainage) services must then be
distributed among various beneficiaries—farmers,
villages, flood control downstream, and sometimes
hydropower. This is a complex task, especially
given that the costs of O&M vary over time,
requiring political debate and decisions, planning,
predictions, and financial management if a
reasonably uniform pattern of charging is to be
maintained.
• Providing an incentive for the efficient use of scarce
water resources, implying that the price of water
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must be directly related to the volume delivered.
As will be discussed, this is a complicated task.
• Providing potential resources for further invest-
ment for the benefit of the society. In this capacity,
water prices act as benefit taxes on those receiving
water services.68
However, the task of achieving increased tariffs to
cover the costs of system operation, and for pricing
mechanisms to play a prominent role in encouraging
more efficient resource use is not easy to implement,
since:
• water is a complicated natural, economic and
political resource, and farmers are often an
important political constituency who strongly resist
increases in the price of irrigation services; and
• tariffs and pricing mechanisms should take into
account the need to mitigate negative impacts on
poor rural households.
6.3.2 Current Irrigation Water Tariffs
Armenia has adopted a volumetric pricing system in
irrigation, with both benefits and costs.
• Benefits: Volumetric pricing is the most forthright
way to link water use benefits with costs and the
value of services provided. By setting volumetric
prices equal to opportunity costs, water is efficiently
allocated, static allocative efficiency gains are
reaped, and deadweight losses and losses associated
with rent-seeking are avoided.
• Costs: Particularly in developing countries like
Armenia, costs are numerous, including heavy
capital, administrative, and institutional costs
associated with volumetric metering, billing, and
collections of water charges at the farm level, where
operations must permit differentiated deliveries.69
As in many developing countries, the facilities
(meters) required for measured and controlled deliv-
ery of irrigation are rarely in place: they are expensive
and in many cases do not satisfy the technological re-
quirements of the existing irrigation infrastructure. The
dilemma at hand concerns whether or not it is feasible
to have a working infrastructure—meters for each farm-
er. Putting a working infrastructure in place requires
massive investments in any country, and particularly
so in Armenia, as the average farm size is very small.
Perry,70 in reference to Iran, argues that even if provid-
ing such infrastructure was feasible, it would not in-
volve effectively reconstructing the system, as the in-
ternational experience indicates.71 To avoid the “small
farm” problem (above) in some countries, water is de-
livered to an intermediate point—a farmer organiza-
tion, a village—on the basis of volumetric pricing; from
this point, farmers are allowed to distribute the water
“internally.” This is often the case for Armenia, but
not officially; while within a water user group, water is
paid for per ha and according to the crop type, the
paperwork is completed in terms of the volumetric
principle. Perry72 contends that even when the proce-
dure is official, the actual interface between “supply”
and “demand” is devolved. Water companies and the
overall management task of delivering differentiated
supplies to individual farms remains, along with the
required regulatory framework, the need to measure
and bill, and so on.  Hence, the direct link between
service and payment is lost, and the efficiency incen-
tive that pricing is designed to produce is neutralized.
In Armenia, this is particularly prevalent, as the
solution “found” is unofficial, leading to corruption.
A natural question follows: what are the alternative
mechanisms?73 In general, there are many ways to price
irrigation water, the costs and benefits of which must
be considered (though, to date, have not been in Ar-
menia).74 Perry proposes that for countries with an
underdeveloped irrigation infrastructure, the best op-
tion is physical rationing water—in the form of uni-
form allocations per hectare.75 This is also the opinion
expressed during many of the interviews with special-
ists of the field in Armenia, though most advocate a
slightly modified version, whereby allocations differ
according to cropping mix. Interestingly, this now
occurs in Armenia de facto in the face of non-function-
ing meters (allocations are calculated according to ex-
isting estimates on the need for irrigation, depending
on the type of commodity).
Thus, might it be worthwhile to integrate practice
with formal, legal measures? The essence of the argu-
ment is that, if water supplied is a proper measure of
service in domestic and industrial uses, then in irriga-
tion, and especially as the water resource itself sub-
sides, consumption is the appropriate unit for water
accounting (yet, this is exceptionally difficult to mea-
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sure). The proposed alternative approach to irrigation,
water pricing (assigning volumes to specific uses), ef-
fectively rations water where demand exceeds supply.
This approach entails many advantages: simplicity and
transparency; the potential to tailor allocations specif-
ically to hydrological situations (such as rising or fall-
ing groundwater conditions); the reallocation of water
from upstream areas to downstream areas; and politi-
cal ease in explaining “below-value” water charges.76
Important to note, a strong argument in favor of con-
tinued efforts to pursue an efficient system of volu-
metric pricing for irrigation results from the occur-
rence of significant (30–40%) water losses; in such cir-
cumstances, the described alternative system brings its
own problems, by disadvantaging the end-users.
Finally, it is clear that a comprehensive and honest
analysis is required of all the possible mechanisms and
their combinations. While we refrain from making
specific policy recommendations here, we do promote
installing a system of efficient cost-recovery. Section
6.3.5 continues with a few additional recommendations.
6.3.3 GoA Plans for Irrigation Water Tariff
Reform
Initially, in decision No.440, GoA proposed a policy
to ensure full cost recovery of O&M costs of irrigation
services by 2005, receiving criticism from many sides.
The initial draft of this paper was also based on that
assumption. In December 2002, a new GoA Decision
introduced modifications: achieving full cost recovery
is now scheduled by 2007 and not 2005.
By 2007, it is envisioned that the irrigation water
tariff would increase around 2.5 times. The figures
Table 5 are wholesale tariffs.
Wholesale Tariffs. As stipulated by GoA Decree
No.741 (11/1998), wholesale tariffs, according to
which irrigation water is sold by Irrigation JSC, are
defined before February 1 annually, according to the
targeted criteria (percentage of cost recovery) defined
in GoA Decree No 440.  Wholesale tariffs are adopted
by GoA decrees.  There are two types of wholesale tar-
iffs: 0.7 AMD for self flow water (in bulk) from the
source; and 1.2. AMD for water generated with me-
chanical pumping. Jrar sells water according to these
prices to O&M enterprises of Irrigation. They in turn
sell water to water user groups at an average price 4.2
AMD per cubic meter (0.7 US cents/m3). There are
different estimates on the ratio of these tariffs to real
costs, in relation to:
• production costs: if estimated at around 12.7 AMD
for m3 or  2.2 US cents per cubic meter, then the
tariff covers only 30%  (this estimate was proposed
by the WB as the economic cost of water for
2005);78 and
• financial costs: if estimated at around eight AMD
(see GoA Decree 440) or 1.3 US cents per cubic
meter, then the tariff covers around 60% of the
real cost.
Table 5 requires some explanation:
• Tariffs listed are (a) between mechanical and self-
flow; and (b) between zones. GoA Decree No 95
(02/2001) introduced two types of zonings for
irrigation water tariffs, which differ slightly from
Table 5
Irrigation Tariff Change
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
actual actual
Tariff [AMD/m3] 2.31 3.37 3.93 4.9377 5.93 7.80 8.40
(GoA Decree No.440, 2001)
Tariff [AMD/m3] 4.93/  4.20  5.20  6.20  7.50  8.80
(GoA Decree 12/2002) 4.20
Collection [%] 51.2 37.8 55 65 75 81 85
Cost [AMD/m3] 8.8 8.2 7.4 7.8 6.7 6.5 7.0
Wastage [%] 31.4 30.3 29.3 29 29 28 28
Source: GoA Decree 440 (modified by a GoA Decree from 13/11/2002)
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the average (the difference being around 20-40
luma, 0.05 US cents). GoA intends to introduce
more zoning in the tariffs according to the gradual
shift to water basin-based management. Currently
the concept is under discussion.
• Note that the planned tariff in 2007 is 8.80 AMD
and not 12.7 AMD, according to the estimate from
WB Project Appraisal Documents. This might
become reality; if the price by which water reaches
water user groups latter reaches nine to ten AMD
per cubic meter, another two to three AMD will
be added to reach the farmer.
Retail tariffs are (or are to be) defined by the wa-
ter users groups (or, in their absence, the contracted
local operator). Their margin ranges between 0.5 and
2.0 AMF per cubic meter. Hence, there are places now
where the tariff for farmers is around six AMD per
cubic meter.
Subsidies. Until full O&M cost recovery is
achieved by 2005, Irrigation will have a guaranteed
budget, consisting of the resources collected from wa-
ter users and a Government subsidy. The latter repre-
sents, essentially, the cost of running the pump sta-
tions. Once (and if) full cost recovery for O&M is
achieved in 2005, these agencies are planned to be-
come financially self-sufficient. This financial gap is
currently estimated at 9.2 million USD for 2002, 7.8
million USD for 2003, 6.1 million USD for 2004,
4.2 million USD for 2005, and 2.1 million USD for
2006. These estimates will change if the Government
cost recovery policy changes. Importantly, when speak-
ing about removing irrigation subsidies, both O&M and
capital expenditure subsidies are considered.
6.3.4 Assessing the Potential Negative Impact
of GoA Plans for Irrigation Water Tariff
Reform on the Poor
In contrast to the municipal water sector, no evaluation
of the social impact of irrigation sector reform has been
conducted;79 however, such an impact can be multifold
and significant. There are several channels by which
the elimination of irrigation subsidies may have both a
negative social and poverty impact. These include: an
impact on agricultural farms (and hence the viability
of their operations); increased unemployment in rural
areas and movement of rural households to the city
and emigration; increased polarization in rural areas
with consequent social problems; an environ-mental
impact; and an impact on the food security of the poor
part of population.80 Analyzing the whole spectrum of
these impacts warrants a multi-year project. A recent
pilot study by the Economic Research Institute81 (with
a funding from DFID) on Poverty and Social Impact
Assessment (PSIA-henceforth) of water sector reform
in Armenia provided a preliminary estimation of the
potential impact on agricultural farms.
Below, we provide a brief summary of this assess-
ment.82
Any increase in water tariffs will not be accompa-
nied by a counterbalancing and equivalent increase in
the efficiency of agriculture.  Factors behind this in-
clude: (a) farms will lack the resources to invest; (b)
the system suffers from inertia which will not allow a
sharp rise in efficiency; (c) raising efficiency has theo-
retical limits. Studies suggest that exceeding 80% effi-
ciency even in the most developed countries is unlike-
ly. Currently agriculture is operating below 40% of its
potential efficiency.83  FAO estimates for Armenia
suggest around five percent on average increase per
annum84 of the gross agricultural product, which im-
plies an even lower increase in efficiency. An attempt
is made to assess how reforms would affect the profit-
ability of farming operations in different regions,
giving broad estimates of possible farm closures asso-
ciated with this change.
Some rather strong assumptions were made. The
extent to which irrigation would decrease; the impact
of the prices of imported goods, the impact of the up-
coming zoning of tariffs (although in our view, the
introduction of zone tariffs will only partly mitigate
the negative impacts), and the. impact of different
weights of crop mixes by marzes were ignored. It was
assumed that other costs will not change fundamen-
tally. The impact of the Irrigation Development Project
is analyzed separately, in Section 6.3.5.
To evaluate the possible impact of the reforms in
marzes and to make conclusions about the impact on
various socio-economic groups, we have utilized 1995-
2000 data on ratios of total costs and irrigation costs
spent on agricultural crops, as well as profits by prov-
ince and product, provided by the Ministry of Agri-
culture (see Annex).85  The comparison reveals that in
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Shirak, Gegharkunik, Armavir and Ararat marzes ag-
riculture is profitable. In Aragatsotn, Kotaik and Sunik
marzes, the situation is comparatively worse. Market
prices for fruits, grapes and vegetables are low, and losses
are high.  Therefore, agriculture is much more vulner-
able in Tavush, Lori and Vayots-Dzor marzes.  In Lori
and Shirak only grain and fodder are profitable, while
in Vayots-Dzor, only vegetables.
Furthermore, the outcome of doubling the water
price by 2005 is considered through the analysis of
two potential scenarios.
Scenario 1.
The prices of agricultural commodities will not change
Based solely on data provided by the Ministry of
Agriculture (see Annex), potential profits/losses
P = p
 
X Output – K (costs) were calculated. The
outcome of the analysis is depicted in Table 6.
• Shirak data indicates that a higher irrigation water
price will have little impact on the profitability of
main crops, except fodder, where 42% of expenses
are irrigation costs. But if fodder is unprofitable,
livestock will be affected in turn. The same situation
occurs in Armavir and Ararat provinces, where the
costs for fodder account for 54% and 68% of total
costs, respectively. The profit generated from
fodder in Geghar-kunik province is rather low,
while irrigation costs account for 57% of the total.
Table 6
Scenario 186
Marz/ Crops Grain Crops Potatoes Vegetables Gourds Fruit Grapes Perennial
Fodder
Shirak + + + + + + x + + x + +
Gegharkuniq + + + + + + x + + x + _
Tavush + + _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ + 0
Vayots Dzor _ _ + + + _ + _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Syuniq + + + + + + + + _ _ _ _ + _
Lori + + _ + _ _ x _ _ _ _ + _
Kotaiq + _ + + + + x _ + _ _ + -
Armavir + + + + + + + + + _ + _ + _
Ararat + + + + + + + + + + + + + _
Aragatsotn + + + + ++ + + + + _ _ + +
A two-fold increase in the price of irrigation water
will endanger both fodder and livestock.
• The situation will also deteriorate in Aragatsotn,
Kotaik and Sunik provinces, as there will be no
profit from fodder.
• The poor situation in Tavush and Lori will further
deteriorate. There will be no profit from fodder,
and the only profit generated from grain will
decrease. The main source of income for Vayots-
Dzor agriculture is potatoes, vegetables and melons;
profit from the two latter crops is not high, whereas
irrigation costs account for 52% and 61%
respectively. The plots of agricultural land are not
very large, so there are no economies of scale and
the doubling of irrigation water price will cause
the situation to deteriorate.
Scenario 2.
Increase in the prices of agricultural goods.
To assume that the prices of the main agricultural
commodities will increase seems plausible, particularly
for those crops which require more watering. Table 3
lists estimates on price increases for some  agricultural
goods, showing how the increase in irrigation water
prices will force  farmers to increase the prices of their
goods. This will negatively impact the food security of
the poor. Again, Tavush, Vayots Dzor and Lori marzes
appear to be in a tentative position (see Table 6). But
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can the market bear such a price increase?  A few
observations:
• The market will be open for cheaper products from
neighboring countries, which will limit the scope
for price increases
• Farming will become more efficient, although it is
hard to calculate the extent of this improvement.
Now agriculture operates at around 40% of its
potential efficiency.87 Through increasing effici-
ency (at about 4–5% a year), five to 20% increases
in profits are possible. Realistic expectations fall at
the lower end for the following reasons: (a) this
will require significant investments, which the
farmers will not have due to decreasing profits; and
(b) costs of other inputs will rise in parallel. Indica-
tions are that even better-off farms will find it
difficult to make the investments necessary to sub-
stantially increase efficiency.
• If there is a substantial increase in the purchasing
power of the population, price increases will be
feasible, with the farmers operating within the
reasonable profit margin even to the cost of reduc-
ing the production levels. Data from 2001 HIES
indicates that 15% of farmers are currently unable
to ensure their own food security.
• Export opportunities are still limited and no major
change is likely in the near future. The main con-
straints on exports at the level of the food industry
include:88
— small export surplus for bulk products, which
does not always to respond to the needs of large
buyers (this also concerns several niche market
products, the export surplus of which  must
be developed to supply sizeable quantities);
— reliability of deliveries (in quantities, quality,
and timely delivery);
— lack of acceptable quality assurance and stan-
dards of hygiene;
— price policies and competitiveness (for bulk
products, Armenia is a “price taker” and there-
fore must  adjust to international price levels);
and
— fresh products, particularly fruit, are in high
demand in several markets, particularly the EU.
However, fragile, perishable products from
Armenia may not survive long transit times or
conditions. In addition, there is an increasing
tendency that a number of functions for fresh
products in Western European markets (e.g.
ripening, quality control, packing and re-
packaging, pre-packing and labeling) are done
by the exporter in the country of origin.
For Scenario 2, a PSIA team has utilized a simple
Cobb-Douglas production function.
Y = A Km Ln,
where Y is income, K is costs, L is work force, and
A, m, n are unknown parameters evaluated, based on
the sampling experiment data (m = 0.31; n = 0,08 and
ln A = 8.42. R2=0.35).89 The value of A depends on
the degree of mechanization in agriculture. Changing
the costs
K = K 
inputs
 + K 
labor
and keeping the labor constant expected profit/loss
could be estimated:
P = Y – K.
The outcome is presented in Table 7.
Probable Scenario
Likely, the actual outcome will fall somewhere in-
between; the prices of agricultural goods will increase,
but to a lesser extent than described above. Thus, the
overall picture will be close to the description in
Scenario 1. If we consider an optimistic scenario of
reducing poverty at the rate of three percent per year,
then from 2003 to 2007, poverty will be reduced by
15% (i.e., a 35% level). However, the portion of
extremely poor will not change significantly. Therefore,
the impacts of increasing irrigation tariff are not like
to be reduced to any great extent.
Small farms and the vulnerable rural population
will suffer most.  In poorer regions, this is likely to
lead to the closure of some farms and further out-mi-
gration.  Over the long term, some rationalization of
agriculture is probably unavoidable. The central de-
bate concerns the sequencing and the speed of change
and the measures required to make the change bear-
able. Empirical evidence and research indicates the
complicated interrelationships between policy change
and livelihoods.  It is quite clear that there is still not
enough information available on the interchange be-
tween economic and social relations.   Additionally,
making conclusions about what crops should be grown
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Table 7
Scenario 290
Marz/ Crops Grain Crops Potatoes Vegetables Gourds Fruit Grapes Perennial
Fodder
Shirak + + + + + + x + + x + +
Gegharkuniq + + + + + + x + + x + _
Tavush + _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ + _
Vayots Dzor _ _ + _ + _ + _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Syuniq + _ + + + _ + _ _ _ _ _ + _
Lori + + _ _ _ _ x _ _ _ _ + _
Kotaiq + _ + + + + x _ _ _ _ + 0
Armavir + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
Ararat + + + + + + + + + + + + + _
Aragatsotn + + + + ++ + _ + + _ _ + +
and where is difficult, because of the implications for
the sector and beyond, such as balancing trade.  For
instance, we have made some strong assumptions, not
fully allowing for the impact of different cropping
mixes91 and the decrease in irrigation.  Thus, these con-
clusions are to be treated with caution.
There are additional considerations to take into
account. Armenia possesses three categories of ecolog-
ical vulnerability: the earthquake zone, mountainous
regions and border regions.  Thus, prioritizing candi-
dates for support is exceedingly complicated, be they
vulnerable households, farms, communities or whole
villages.
As such, this level of policy-making cannot be driv-
en solely by fiscal considerations. First, if the long term
objective is economic recovery, then not enough is
known about the dynamics of the rural economy to
design and track a robust reform program which will
move from the old habits of collectivized agriculture
in an integrated system to a more flexible commercial
approach appropriate for a small conflict-affected state.
If the long-term objectives are more holistic and entail
policies for a more equitable society trading with its
near neighbors and beyond, then again not enough data
exists.  All evidence indicates that any policy on irriga-
tion has the potential to notably impact rural life and
agriculture.
Thus, to summarize, if not mitigated, doubling
irrigation tariffs by 2007 would significantly (and neg-
atively) impact society—particularly in the water-
scarce, mountainous and poor regions.  This would
ultimately result in the closure of small farms and
movement of the population from affected areas. Like-
ly, these results would hold even in an optimistic sce-
nario of reducing poverty at the rate of three percent
per year. Regardless,  small farms as well as vulnerable
rural population are at risk. Indeed, a much more de-
tailed and thorough assessment of the potential im-
pact of irrigation reform is needed to make concrete
conclusions with better grounded arguments. How-
ever, the results cited above do provide some useful
insights into possible outcomes—in terms of the mag-
nitude and side-effects of reform.
While GoA’s present program to achieve cost-re-
covery is not too drastic (prolonged from 2005 to
2007), the question remains as to whether or not it is
safe to pursue reforms as planned. To answer this, we
examine first the poverty picture in rural areas of the
country.
Often, it is argued that the rural population in
Armenia is less vulnerable than elsewhere because of
its capacity to provide for basic foodstuffs on a more
or less stable basis. However, the living standards of
the rural population appear to be correlated with their
location, particularly altitude above sea level, earth-
quake area, border regions or in regions with a low
level of economic activity. In rural communities, the
incidence of vulnerability is higher than in urban com-
munities by a factor of 2.5. According to the HIES
2001 Survey, almost 50% of the rural population is
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poor, with 11% in extreme poverty. It is expected that
the decline in irrigation does, in fact, affect these num-
bers (see Figure 4).92 A causal relationship between
poverty and irrigation has not yet been determined;
this comprises an issue worthy of future research.93
Figure 4
Irrigation Decline and Poverty Incidence
Source: WB “Armenia: Towards Integrated Water Resource Man-
agement,” ECSSD.
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Based on the assumption that there is a direct rela-
tionship, increased access to irrigation water will con-
tribute to:
• reduce poverty in rural areas. Agriculture is by far
the most important activity present in rural areas,
engaging 80% of inhabitants; about 31% of the
population live in rural areas, but even town
dwellers maintain small farms to supplement their
incomes.
• agricultural growth (accounting for 33% of GDP).94
This is not confined, however, to medium-sized
or large farms, which are a minority (as has been
the case so far).  Rather, this refers the majority of
the farms, the small included.
As earlier mentioned, there are more than 335,000
family-owned farms (currently producing about 98%
of the total agricultural product), with an average size
of 1.37 ha (consisting of three parcels of land, one irri-
gated and two not). Around 30% of farmers do not
cultivate all their land, leaving around 15% unculti-
vated.  This is due, mainly, to poor land quality, as
well as to difficulties in affording inputs, lack of water,
or distance from the farm.95
Table 8 illustrates an important possible negative
impact on the poor related to the quick removal of
irrigation subsidies. Approximately 25.6% of farmers
have no cash income; that is, they produce for their
own consumption or barter trade.96 This group will
suffer most from the removal of irrigation subsidies
and tariff increases.97 Table 8 also reveals that the in-
comes of about 72% of rural households do not ex-
ceed the 1,000 USD limit annually. In 1999, “Soci-
ometer” reported that:
• about 60% of rural households’ income was gene-
rated from farming, and lack of irrigation water is
a matter of survival for villagers; and
• 25–30% of rural households cannot not produce
sufficient agricultural output, already resulting in
high emigration, urbanization, or sale of land or
labor to more successful neighbors.
Table 8
Economic Condition of Rural Households
Cash Income level, US$ % of families
1 0 25.6
2 Under 200 11
3 Under 500 20
4 Under 1000 14
5 Under 2000 15
6 Under 3000 6
7 Over 3000 7
Source: “Water sector development program, a report”, Socio-
meter, Yerevan 1999
The conclusion that small farms will suffer the most
from tariff increases is supported by some very recent
international studies. Several of these98 conclude that
the impact of similar pricing policies may vary widely,
according to different conditions and farms. Farms with
inelastic demand curves (mostly small farms less capa-
ble of adapting by changing their crop mix, increasing
efficiency, or changing technology) will be less respon-
sive to price increases in the sense that they will suffer
most of the negative burden of augmented irrigation
tariffs. Indeed, some of the farm enlargement processes
are rational; Armenia has too many too-small farms.
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However, GoA must strive to ensure the rational pro-
portions of such a process, thus preventing further
polarization of income and social tensions. To achieve
this, along with strengthening collective operation
mechanisms in rural areas (farmers’ groups), it is im-
portant to guarantee access to irrigation water.99 A
1998/99 Household Income and Expenditure Survey
reveals that land use increases household consumption,
and even more so if land is irrigated. The Farm House-
holds Survey100 meanwhile shows that access to irriga-
tion increases productivity and profitability of all farm
crops; this is reflected in the higher equivalent con-
sumption among households with access.
Studies performed in other countries indicate that
improved irrigation access will increase crop yields and
production, and in turn result in increased farm income.
Bhattarai et al. address how this differential access to
irrigation affects income inequality and poverty status
in an irrigation system.  They argue that access to irri-
gation is a crucial instrument for reducing poverty not
so much through direct impacts of increased yield and
farm returns per se, but more through indirect impacts
associated with increased rural employment—partic-
ularly through the scale of economic multipliers oper-
ating in the economy. Thus, this research proves the
importance of pro-poor policies in irrigation—active-
ly increasing the access to irrigation water for poor farm-
ers, smallholders and end-tailers—as a way of stimu-
lating rural development and decreasing rural poverty.
It also must be considered that, as a result of join-
ing the WTO (Winter 2003), the exemption of agri-
culture from the main taxes must be eliminated by 2009.
While small farms are expected to suffer less, the over-
all impact of this provision has yet to be assessed.
The plan to achieve full cost recovery in irrigation
by the year 2007 could be justified if reform programs
are accompanied with measures that mitigate their
negative impact and ensure increased access to irriga-
tion for poor farmers and smallholders.
6.3.5 The GoA Vision to Mitigate
the Negative Impacts of Irrigation Reform
GoA often cites projects by the WB and a few other
donor agencies (in particular, the Irrigation Develop-
ment Project), as well as its own plans, as adequate
strategies for mitigating the negative poverty and social
impact of the irrigation reform program. The following
points illustrate components of this vision.
Introduction of zone tariffs. As mentioned, GoA
plans to introduce a differentiated tariff system after
2003, coinciding with a change to water basin/scheme
management. The first step is already completed: GoA
Decree No 95 from 02/2001 introduced two types of
zonings for irrigation water tariff. As with the munic-
ipal water tariff, it is too early to comment on the zone
tariff program, for the mere reason that GoA is still in
the process of developing it. Nevertheless, it is diffi-
cult to imagine that the effects of introducing zone
tariffs would be large enough to absorb the negative
poverty and social consequences of removing irriga-
tion subsidies.
Increasing efficiency in irrigation.  GoA has set
the task of increasing efficiency in irrigation as one of
its main tasks in order to reduce the negative impact of
increased water tariffs. The WB’s Irrigation Develop-
ment Project will serve one of the main vehicles for
increasing efficiency, with two main components: (a)
enlargement of the Araks River intake; and (b) a pro-
gram for pump-to-gravity irrigation conversion (where
such conversion is feasible and economical). Under the
latter component, eight of the most efficient (out of
26 assessed) irrigation systems were chosen for pump-
to-gravity conversion during 2001–2005. However,
due to severe financial constraints, the project was
divided into two parts; only three out of eight systems
will be converted initially (31 million USD), while the
remaining five must wait until additional financing is
approved (34 million USD). Forecasted project im-
pacts at farm level are:
• the average net farm income: 400–1,000 USD per
ha in the “with-project” situation, compared to
between zero  (where no rain-fed cropping is
possible) and 200 USD (where rain-fed cropping
is possible) in the “without-project” situation; and
• reduction of physical loss rates from current levels
of 50% on-farm to only ten percent, yielding net
benefits per year of roughly 80 USD per hectare.
The value of one cubic meter of water was esti-
mated at about 19 drams (0.035 USD) on average.
The Project Appraisal Document concludes by assum-
ing that eight percent of the gross farm income would
be a reasonable price for a typical farmer to pay for
water.  Analysis shows that, if water is available in time
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and in planned quantity, the “affordable” water fee
could range between ten and sixteen drams/m3 (0.018
to 0.03 USD).
The analysis by the WB Irrigation Development
Project itself (above) is convincing.  A broader view,
however, raises serious concerns.
• No decision has been made yet on how to manage
those situations where such conversion is found to be
infeasible or uneconomic.101 Even if all eight systems
are funded, it will cover 40 out of 250 million
KWT electricity supply for irrigation purposes.
• Since the project provides for the rehabilitation of
the most critical structures only, any delay in the
maintenance of the remainder of the system will
cause the whole sector to deteriorate further, thus
undermining the utility of the sections already
rehabilitated. Effective maintenance will require
institutions with technical and managerial capabi-
lities, along with adequate financial resources.
Importantly, the Irrigation Development Project
provides for restructuring and strengthening the
irrigation and drainage institutions responsible for
the O&M process from the source of water down
to farmers’ fields, as well as the adoption of arrange-
ments to give those institutions the requisite finan-
cial resources to assume their respective responsibi-
lities, and for the whole O&M system to become
financially self-sustaining by the time full cost-
recovery is achieved (2007).  However, there are
still significant risks associated with the feasibility
of the program.
• The process will take at a minimum ten years to
finish, paralleled by on-going tariff increases.
Increasing efficiency in irrigated agriculture.
Agricultural production in Armenia falls well below
its potential, resulting in low farm incomes. Yet even
drastic increases in productivity levels, which indeed
constitute a national priority (GoA is now implement-
ing a major program to achieve this), cannot counter-
balance the negative effects of rapid additions to irri-
gation tariffs.  This is because (a) farms will increas-
ingly lack the resources to make investments; (b) the
system has a certain inertia which will not allow sud-
den rise in efficiency; (c) raising efficiency has theoret-
ical limits. Based on several studies, exceeding 80%
efficiency—even in the most developed countries—
appears impossible. Currently, the agricultural sector
operates below 40% of its potential efficiency.102 FAO
estimates for Armenia suggest a five percent average
growth per annum103 of the gross agricultural product,
which implies minimal increases in efficiency.
Targeted subsidies through community budgets.
GoA Decree No. 440 lays the groundwork for plans
to allocate subsidies to water user groups and specific
rural farms/households through community budgets.
These plans are still in the early stages of design, both
in terms of amounts to be allocated, and in terms of
targeting mechanisms to be used.  For border and
mountainous regions, GoA intends to implement a
system of donations aimed at reducing national vari-
ances in socio-economic development. Indeed, this
seems to be a wise road to follow: replacing subsidies
to the irrigation system with subsidies to communities
and farmers in need. The implementation of such a
program requires, however, significant time, financial
resources, and collaborative efforts in terms of com-
munity economic development.
While the above points help to mitigate the nega-
tive poverty and social impact of irrigation sector re-
form, the extent to which GoA’s vision actually results
in real change remains unclear.  Likely, the possible
positive outcomes of these changes would hardly be
enough to overcome the significant burden reform
brings to the poor.
6.3.6 Irrigation Water Tariff Reform:
Conclusions and Recommendations
Pace of Removing Irrigation Subsidies. Our main
conclusion holds that the planned schedule of removing
irrigation subsidies could be feasible (more feasible, in
fact, than the initially planned time-frame), if it allows
the Government to implement measures that will
absorb the massive negative impact on poor, rural
households, attract resources to upgrade infrastructure
and so on.
Pricing Mechanisms. Many specialists in the field
(both internationally and locally) contend that volu-
metric pricing should not be viewed as the only alter-
native, and other options should be (re)considered—
such as the  physical rationing of water in the form of
uniform (or not) allocations per ha. Others argue that,
in the face of significant losses in the system, pursuing
efforts to establish a working system which would en-
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able volumetric pricing of irrigation water is the only
alternative. Refraining from making judgment at this
point (yet stressing the need for a comprehensive anal-
ysis), we highlight the importance of designing and
installing an efficient pricing mechanism that would
enable full cost-recovery. Also, based on successful ex-
amples from other countries, we also recommend im-
plementing a form of block tariff (but for retail tariffs)
within water user groups. In this regard, it seems justi-
fiable that landowners with significantly larger plots
pay with a different tariff than smallholders.  Relative
farm size has been found to be a valid indicator of in-
come in a number of studies, as many features charac-
teristic of farm size influence income.  For example,
van Koppen et al. underscore the necessity of moni-
toring farm size-related differences as a pre-requisite
for ensuring pro-poor irrigation management.104 In this
sense, it is critical that smallholders have an equal say
in water user group management structures.
Impact on the poor and assistance. While it does
appear that the present state of irrigation (as well as
agriculture) warrant an increase in irrigation tariffs, the
next set of questions (concerning the pace, shape, pre-
conditions and risks associated with these reforms) need
more careful analysis. At a minimum, GoA must de-
sign and implement comprehensive programs aimed
at developing not only irrigation and agriculture,105 but
also community capabilities for mitigating the nega-
tive poverty and social impact of the proposed reforms.
In particular:
1) The development of the non-farm sector in rural
areas must be pursued to absorb, to some extent,
the release of farmers from agricultural production.
For example, the growth of small-scale food pro-
cessing in rural areas should be seen as an opportu-
nity yet to be seized. In addition, the prioritizing
or sequencing of these measures must strive to avoid
any immediate major negative outcomes arising
from irrigation tariff increase.
2) Community level assistance should also target
infrastructure development.
3) Poor rural households/farmers106 require assistance
through different mechanisms, such as:
• direct subsidies through communities;
• targeted additional financial and credit inter-
ventions for irrigation equipment, such as soft-
loans for “tail-enders”;
• assistance through water users groups, such as
allowing poor farmers to contribute their labor
as membership fees or part of water use fees;
and
• additional pro-poor targeted policy interven-
tions which aid tail-end farmers
4) Participatory water management receives the maxi-
mum support of all the stakeholders. While reform-
ing water user groups, it is necessary to ensure that
the voices of tail-enders and smallholders are better-
heard. A recommended option is a “one farm, one
vote” system. For this system to be effective, major
awareness raising efforts are needed.
5) While the Government is now in the process of
partially forgiving the accumulated arrears for
irrigation bills to rural households, provided that
they pay remaining amounts, we argue that the
poor should receive a complete write-off, in addi-
tion to a specifically designed assistance program.
Along these lines, we propose launching pilot
projects in two or three key specific water resources
management areas with serious problems (i.e.,
water scarcity, drainage, water pollution).  With
assistance channeled through water user groups,
such projects would serve to develop local programs
for addressing problems arising from the increased
irrigation tariffs.  Undoubtedly, there is no “one-
size fits all” irrigation management transfer or
institutional reforming policy which can be equally
applicable to all parts of the world; specific policy
instruments depend largely upon particular con-
texts and underlying socio-political environments.
Similarly, there is no consensus yet in the irrigation
literature on how to design a water management
policy or framework which might provide increased
productivity while simultaneously enhancing the
equal distribution of irrigation-induced benefits
across locations and sectors.
Clearer system of water rights. A clear system of
water rights and water entitlements, formalized through
the introduction of legal and third party service con-
tracts and consisting of flexible provisions for seasonal
water use, plays a central role in avoiding further de-
generation. Clearly-defined, separate water entitlement
provisions for maximum and average flows (in rela-
tion to minimum flow) will reduce the uncertainty
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involved in water availability and its variable alloca-
tion to farmers’ plots. Ultimately, better enforcement
of water allocation rules and regulations (such as a wider
use of individual farmers’ incentive-based water allo-
cation rules) will contribute significantly to the suc-
cess of irrigation management reforms.
7. SUMMARY OF MAIN CONCLUSIONS
AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
However challenging, reforming the water sector is a
necessary task; ambivalence allows for further deteriora-
tion in terms of water supply and provision. At the
same time, reforms now proceed during a particularly
difficult time, socially, politically, and economically,
with widespread poverty and extreme income inequal-
ity in the country. In this sense, any changes threaten
significant risks, particularly in terms of increased po-
verty levels, emigration, social tensions, endangered
food security, environmental damage and so on. In our
view, GoA does have a window of opportunity to pro-
mote sustainable economic growth—through carefully
designed and coordinated reforms, strategic investments
in infrastructure, cost-recovery efforts—provided that
the impact on the poor is minimized.107 To achieve
WRM efficacy and efficiency, and to reduce possible
negative poverty and social effects, we propose the
following measures, listed below.
GoA must coordinate reforms in the water sector
with changes in other areas. Among the key steps which
are now in progress, planned or necessary, we specifi-
cally highlight the following:
• the Complex Program to Support the Bordering
Regions of the Republic of Armenia: 2002–2008
(which envisions a wide range of necessary actions
to support the bordering regions, including rehabi-
litating the water service infrastructure);
• projects designed to strengthen farmers’ groups pa-
rallel to land management reforms (which includes
issuing title certificates—particularly important for
the development of participatory irrigation ma-
nagement in rural areas—in order for farmer to
invest in property); and
• further reforms at the local self-government level,
fiscal decentralization in particular. In the last seve-
ral years, allocations to the communities reached
6.8% of the state budget (against the planned
8.1%). The average amount of budget allocations
to a community amounts to 21.6 million AMD
for 2000.108 Such inadequate funding fuels the
unsatisfactory performance of local governments
with respect to their mandatory and delegated
powers.109 About two-thirds of community budgets
are obtained from through taxes, duties and non-
tax fees (60–70% of the overall community budget).
Along with receiving planned allocations from the
State budget, communities must first of all increase
their own revenues by allocating a percentage of
other State taxes (profit, VAT, excise) to the commu-
nity budget.  Many other countries now practice
this strategy.  Additionally, the share of local duties
and fees must be increased and the property base
of communities enlarged, thus taking the decent-
ralization process further. Finally, targeted commu-
nity development programs need to be improved
and implemented.
Before summarizing specific recommendations and
conclusions according to municipal and irrigation sec-
tors, some general conclusions can be made.
1) Given the population’s negative attitude toward
reforms, a well-designed public awareness campaign
holds paramount importance in order to: (a) under-
line the importance of the reforms to the continued
functioning of the system; (b) promote the ideas
of fairness and transparency which should accom-
pany the reforms; and (c) explain the concept and
progress of the reforms.
2) While present GoA efforts must be commended
with respect to partially writing off accumulated
arrears for both municipal and irrigation water
(provided households repay the remaining costs),
the poor should be completely forgiven of repay-
ment.
3) More attention must be paid to the development
of water rights and water markets to eliminate the
ambiguous contractual relations now in place.
4) Better use of economic tools of analysis in decision-
making is needed for water planning and allocation.
5) As one of the key avenues in reforming WRM,
participatory water management should receive the
most attention possible to ensure that water users
control decision-making at the community level.
71
E C O N O M I C  A N D  S O C I A L  A S P E C T S  O F  R E F O R M I N G  W AT E R  R E S O U R C E  M A N A G E M E N T:  C A S E  O F  A R M E N I A
6) A system of regular monitoring of the social
situation should be established, given the country’s
widespread poverty and extreme income inequality
as well as the rapidly changing household expend-
iture structure. Such a system is now in development
as part of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Process.
One of the key tasks should be to monitor how
households cope with water sector reform.
7) More research is needed to evaluate the impacts of
different aspects of water sector reform and to
design appropriate parallel measures to mitigate
possible negative social consequences.
Municipal Water
1) The idea of a block tariff (starting with a lifeline
tariff) should not be discarded, as it: (a) allows the
poor to pay below the costs; (b) encourages the
wealthy or high consumers to save water (important
for a country where water resources are not abun-
dant); and (c) addresses the needs of the poor effec-
tively.  Assisting the vulnerable according to lists—
such as the PFBP list—risks disregarding those at-
risk. Indeed, the administration of such a program
is costly and difficult, and hardly feasible at present.
However, as reforms advance, block tariffs are
worth consideration.
2) GoA’s current plan to install individual meters, with
payments spread over several years, deserves atten-
tion.  This plan eliminates potential negative con-
sequences resulting from sharing the costs in multi-
story buildings among those with and without
meters. As well, for the extremely poor, (at least for
those included in PFBP) the meters are installed
free of charge. We also suggest waiving accumulated
arrears for this group.
3) Through a specifically designed program, poor
households should receive assistance with payments
for their water bills—or, if possible, for all commu-
nal services.
4) Currently, local governments (according to the Law
on Local Self-Government) are responsible for water
supply and provision, yet are excluded from high-
level decision making in the sector.  In response,
clarity of roles and duties is needed to involve local
governments in water management—as active
participants.  Likely, the development of a water
regulator and regulatory regime with help resolve
this dilemma.
5) In addition to a careful analysis of the successes and
failures of the condominium strategy and the Law
on the Management of multi-apartment buildings,
other alternative options for ensuring water delivery
to households deserve a closer attention. Nor Akunq
presents a viable option for the Armenian context,
as it unites interests of the government, utility
operators and local communities (see Section 3.5).
6) Research is needed in the following areas:
• analyzing consumption behavior once the water
meters are widely installed in order to suggest
an optimal water tariff; and
• assessing the populations willingness and ability
to pay utility fees in a basket, consisting of
housing and maintenance costs.
Irrigation Water
1) While irrigation development and access to irriga-
tion are highly subsidized almost everywhere in the
world (involving state coffers for major components
of construction and or service costs) prolonging
the subsidization of irrigation appears risky. GoA
should strive to remove subsidies in irrigation, which
mainly subsidize energy costs, yet continue subsidies
for the communities and farmers in need. It is a
societal responsibility  (a) to design and implement
pro-poor policies; (b) to ensure that reform efforts
mitigate potential negative impacts on the poor;
and (c) to guarantee that all groups benefit from the
reform process. Undoubtedly, designing and im-
plementing policies that ensure the above requires
time and resources; in this sense, prolonging the
achievement of full cost recovery form 2005 to
2007 is a logical decision. Even with the extension,
this timeframe is extremely tight, and will only be
feasible if GoA is able to implement measures that
absorb the massive negative impact on poor rural
households, carry out parallel reforms, and attract
resources to upgrade existing infrastructure.
2) In order to mitigate the negative poverty and social
impact of the proposed reforms, the Government
must develop comprehensive programs aimed not
only at irrigation and agriculture,110 but also at
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community needs. Moreover, the development of
the non-farm sector in rural areas must be pursued
to make irrigation sector reforms politically deliver-
able and successful. Sequencing these measures
must strive to avoid significant negative outcomes
arising from irrigation tariff increases.
3) Further programs should serve to foster the deve-
lopment of cooperative mechanisms in agriculture
(such as using agricultural machinery) and Water
User Federations. Participatory water management
must receive maximum support of stakeholders,
and the voices of all—tail-enders and small-
holders—must be heard. A recommended option
to promote participation and cooperative is a “one
farm, one vote” system, which requires major aware-
ness raising efforts.
4) A comprehensive analysis is needed to assess the
merits of the adopted policy of volumetric pricing
in irrigation. Alternatives, such as physically ration-
ing of water, or a combination of different mecha-
nisms might present a better approach.  Here, we
stress that such an analysis is critical to designing
and implementing a system of efficient cost-reco-
very. Additionally, a type of a block tariff (but for
retail tariffs) within a water user group presents a
viable option for Armenia. Because of the various
disparities in the country, it is justified to adjust
tariffs to land size and or water consumption; this
requires recognizing the needs of small-holders.
5) In terms of research, a comprehensive impact
assessment (economic and social) of the proposed
program of irrigation reform is needed in order to
determine effects on the poor and vulnerable. This
could be performed through a targeted survey,
taking into consideration the regional features of
rural households.
6) To design an effective for Armenia assistance pro-
gram for poor rural households and farmers, we
suggest launching pilot projects in two or three
key specific water resources management areas with
serious problems, such as water scarcity, drainage,
or water pollution. Possible mechanisms might (or,
perhaps, should) include assistance to poor rural
households/farmers111 by means of:
• direct subsidies through communities;
• targeted additional financial and credit inter-
ventions in irrigation commands for irrigation
equipment;
• assistance mechanisms through water users
groups; and
• additional pro-poor targeted policy interven-
tions such as targeting tail end farmers
7) Irrigation reforms require a clear system of water
rights and entitlements, enforced through legal
service contracts, with flexible provisions for sea-
sonal water use.
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SHIRAK
Grain-crops Potatoes Vegetables Fruit Fodder
% of Irrigation 15.9 4.1 13.0 13.4 41.8
expenditures in total
expenditures
% of Irrigation 27.4 7.8 23.0 23.6 58.9
expenditures intotal
expenditures in the case
of doubling irrigation
tariff
price1kg 90.0 80.0 50.0 115.0 25.0
profit before reform 1ha 68,820.0 337,722.0 415,005.0 128,820.0 61,600.0
profit after reform 50,764.0 311,914.0 370,380.0 89,223.0 18,899.0
1ha(sc.1)
price1kg after reform 99.0 88.0 55.0 149.5 27.5
(sc.2)
profit after reform 78664 425434 465130 284148 46399
1ha(sc.2)
GEGHARKUNIK
Grain-crops Potatoes Vegetables Fruit Fodder
% of Irrigation 25.6 7.1 21.2 21.9 56.3
expenditures in
total expenditures
% of Irrigation 40.8 13.2 35.0 35.9 72.1
expenditures in total
expenditures in the case
of doubling irrigation
tariff
price1kg 90.0 80.0 50.0 115.0 25.0
profit before reform 1ha 53,320.0 214,472.0 360,064.0 94,021.0 22,680.0
profit after reform 20,127.0 168,393.0 277,066.0 22574.0 –55,739.0
1ha(sc.1)
price1kg after reform 99.0 88.0 55.0 149.5 27.5
(sc.2)
profit after reform 48,027 271,753 369,866 216,809 –28,739
1ha(sc.2)
ANNEX
Irrigation Data
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TAVOUSH
Grain-crops Potatoes Vegetables Fruit Fodder
% of Irrigation 33.9 10.3 28.7 37.0 29.8 39.1 66.3
expenditures in total
expenditures
% of Irrigation 50.6 18.6 44.5 54.0 45.9 56.2 79.7
expenditures in total
expenditures in the case
of doubling irrigation
tariff
price1kg 90.0 80.0 50.0 60.0 115.0 100.0 25.0
profit before reform 1ha 29,400.0 –265,311.0 –147,520.0 –105,364.0 –331,968.0 –119,808.0 –19,260.0
profit after reform –19,650.0 –333,840.0 –269,642.0 –242,422.0 –439,819.0 –225,997.0 –13,6814.0
1ha (sc.1)
price1kg after (sc.2) 99.0 88.0 55.0 72.0 126.5 130.0 27.5
profit after reform 7,350 –276,320 –223,542 –153,382 –414,059 –85,597 –110,064
1ha (sc.2)
VAJOC DJOR
 Grain-crops Potatoes Vegetables Courds Fruit Grapes Fodder
% of Irrigation 58.0 23.8 52.0 61.3 53.3 63.4 84.1
expenditures in total
expenditures
% of Irrigation 73.4 38.4 68.4 76.0 69.6 77.6 91.4
expenditures in total
expenditures in the case
of doubling irrigation
tariff
price1kg 90.0 80.0 50.0 60.0 115.0 100.0 25.0
profit before reform 1ha –44,950.0 330,255.0 100,815.0 469,88.0 –341,250.0 –204,932.0 –221,540
profit after reform –177,180.0 143,370.0 –229,102.0 –322,522.0 –631,989.0 –491,357.0 –537,894
1ha (sc.1)
price1kg after reform 99.0 88.0 55.0 72.0 126.5 130.0 27.5
(sc.2)
profit after reform –149,280.0 272,250.0 –137,452.0 –156,682.0 –588,864.0 –322,457.0 –511,394
1ha (sc.2)
75
E C O N O M I C  A N D  S O C I A L  A S P E C T S  O F  R E F O R M I N G  W AT E R  R E S O U R C E  M A N A G E M E N T:  C A S E  O F  A R M E N I A
SIUNIK
Grain-crops Potatoes Vegetables Courds Fruit Grapes Fodder
% of Irrigation 33.4 10.1 28.0 36.6 29.0 38.6 65.5
expenditures in total
expenditures
% of Irrigation 50.0 18.3 43.7 53.6 45.0 55.7 79.2
expenditures in total
expenditures in the case
of doubling irrigation
tariff
price1kg 90.0 80.0 50.0 60.0 115.0 100.0 25.0
profit before reform 1ha 30,600.0 195,394.0 113,444.0 89,208.0 –208,608.0 –144,648.0 4,600
profit after reform –17,440.0 128,610.0 –4,722.0 –45,522.0 –312,479.0 –248,477.0 –108,954
1ha (sc.1)
price1kg after reform 99.0 88.0 55.0 72.0 126.5 130.0 27.5
(sc.2)
profit after reform 9,560.0 232,130.0 67,078.0 81,918.0 –274,759.0 –116,177.0 –80,204
1ha (sc.2)
LORI
Grain-crops Potatoes Vegetables Fruit Grapes Fodder
% of Irrigation 23.6 6.4 19.4 20.3 27.8 53.8
expenditures in total
expenditures
% of Irrigation 38.2 12.0 32.5 33.7 43.5 70.0
expenditures in total
expenditures in the case
of doubling irrigation
tariff
price1kg 90.0 80.0 50.0 115.0 100.0 25.0
profit before reform 1ha 66,560 –1,015 –63,488 –336,171 –223,146 30,240
profit after reform 36,962 –42,468 –137,000 –401,027 –286,917 –40,051
1ha (sc.1)
price1kg after reform 99 88 55 126.5 130 27.5
(sc.2)
profit after reform 65,762 38,732 –87,400 –379,982 –190,317 –13,051
1ha (sc.2)
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KOTAIK
Grain-crops Potatoes Potatoes Vegetables Fruit Grapes Fodder
new   
% of Irrigation 24.8 4.9 6.8 20.4 21.2 29.4 55.4
expenditures in total
expenditures
% of Irrigation 39.7 9.3 12.8 33.9 34.9 45.4 71.3
expenditures in total
expenditures in the case
of doubling irrigation
tariff
price1kg 90.0 95.0 80.0 50.0 115.0 100.0 25.0
profit before reform 1ha 26,200.0 247,038.0 130,020.0 99,600.0 –119,250.0 –349,338.0 18,900.0
profit after reform –74,680 212,470 85,690 22,018 –187,406 –418,177 –55,674
1ha (sc.1)
price1kg after reform 99 104.5 88 55 126.5 130 27.5
(sc.2)
profit after reform –56,680 324,760 180,250 88,418 –144,281 –357,877 –29,424
1ha (sc.2)
ARMAVIR
Grain-crops Potatoes Potatoes Vegetables Gourds Fruit Grapes Fodder
new    
% of Irrigation 22.8 4.4 6.1 18.7 25.3 19.3 27.0 53.6
expenditures in total
expenditures
% of Irrigation 37.1 8.4 11.6 31.4 40.3 32.4 42.5 69.8
expenditures in total
expenditures in the case
of doubling irrigation
tariff
price1kg 90.0 95.0 80.0 50.0 60.0 115.0 100.0 25.0
profit before reform 1ha 78,302 653,235 473,475 651,780 563,997 427,401.0 279,140 54,050.0
profit after reform 50,566.0 623,148.0 434,898.0 583,068.0 484,868.0 366,169.0 218,516 53,871.0
1ha (sc.1)
price1kg after reform 99.0 104.5 88.0 55.0 72.0 126.5 130 27.5
(sc.2)
profit after reform 80,176.0 775,623.0 563,298.0 703,768.0 695,708.0 463,114.0 464,816 82,621
1ha (sc.2)
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ARARAT
Grain-crops Potatoes Potatoes Vegetables Gourds Fruit Grapes Fodder
new    
% of Irrigation 34.8 7.6 10.6 29.3 37.9 30.2 40.0 67.6
expenditures in total
expenditures
% of Irrigation 51.6 14.1 19.1 45.3 55.0 46.4 57.2 80.6
expenditures in total
expenditures in the case
of doubling irrigation
tariff
price1kg 90 95 80 50 60 115 100 25
profit before reform 1ha 65,088 719,100 638,250 745,250 808,120 223,020 356,516 0
profit after reform 14,766.0 664,398.0 567,898.0 619,068.0 666,668.0 112,919.0 466,137 –177,453
1ha (sc.1)
price1kg after reform 99.0 104.5 88.0 55.0 72.0 126.5 130 27.5
(sc.2)
profit after reform 45,276.0 825,898.0 715,898.0 754,568.0 939,068.0 194,339.0 673,616 –148,703
1ha (sc.2)
ARAGATHSOTN
Grain-crops Potatoes Potatoes Vegetables Gourds Fruit Grapes Fodde
new    
% of Irrigation 15.6 2.7 3.9 12.5 17.4 9.6 15.2 41.9
expenditures in total
expenditures
% of Irrigation 26.9 5.3 7.5 22.2 29.6 17.6 26.3 59.0
expenditures in total
expenditures in the case
of doubling irrigation
tariff
price1kg 90 120 90 50 60 115 100 25
profit before reform 1ha 23,040 424,790 421,200 63,990 -93,789 110,290 -194,670 61,560
profit after reform 5765 406,248 396,318 21,213 -142,317 83,369 -224,167 19,611
1ha (sc.1)
price1kg after reform 99 132 99 55 72 126.5 130 27.5
(sc.2)
profit after reform 28,805 534,648 517,818 80,463 -68,757 145,239 -129,667 46,611
1ha (sc.2)
78 L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  A N D  P U B L I C  S E R V I C E  R E F O R M  I N I T I A T I V E
D R O P  BY  D R O P :  W AT E R  M A N A G E M E N T  I N  T H E  S O U T H E R N  C AU C A S U S  A N D  C E N T R A L  A S I A
Figure A1
Map of Armenia
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1 2001 Household Living Standards Survey, National Statistics Service of GoA.
2 Independent expert estimates suggest a higher figure—around two billion USD. For more concrete estimates for each of these sectors, see relevant
sections.
3 The World Bank, Armenia: Towards Integrated Water Resource Management ECSSD Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development, Working
Paper No. 35 (2002).
4 2001 Survey.
5 Independent expert estimates suggest a higher figure—around two billion USD. For more concrete estimates on each of these sectors, see relevant
chapters of the paper.
6 GoA Decree No. 440.
7 In Western Europe and Best Practice emerging countries, collections are about 0.7–0.8% GDP.
8 GoA Decree No. 440.
9 WB Working Paper No. 35, 11.
10 WB Working Paper No. 35, 13.
11 Lampietti, J. Utility Pricing and the Poor (2001).
12 see GoA Decree No. 440 and WB Working Paper No. 35, 12
13 The bulk of non-payers, including the non-poor, justify their behavior by the discrepancy between the amount and quality of the delivered commodity
and its price. This result was obtained during discussion groups held in the framework of the Plot Study on Poverty and Social Impact Assessment of
water Sector Reform in Armenia, ERI/DFID, 2002.
14 The World Bank, Armenia Irrigation Development Project Appraisal Document (2001).
15 Often farmers located even at minimal distance from the existing outlets have no way of directly receiving water and no dependable scheduling
technique is used to benefit all farms. In some areas, water distribution is erratic and many irrigators have broken concrete canals and pipes at points
closer than the originally installed outlets to have access to irrigation water. The World Bank, Armenia Irrigation Development Project Appraisal
Document (2001).
16 FAO/Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Armenia, Strategy for the Development of Agriculture in Armenia (2002).
17 The World Bank, Armenia Irrigation Development Project Appraisal Document (2001)
18 Working Paper No 35, 6.
19 The World Bank.  Armenia’s Private Agriculture: 1998 Survey of Family Farms. ECSSD Working Paper No.17 (1999).
20 Working Paper No 35, 8.
21 GoA Decree No. 440.
22 Is proposed that the existing Energy Regulatory Commission is reformed into a Tariff Regulatory Commission covering both the energy and water
sectors. A Draft Law in the National Assembly is scheduled for hearings in mid-2003.
23 Armenia is divided into ten marzes, including Yerevan.  Marz leaders (marzpets) are appointed and not elected.
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24 YWSC was transferred under SCWR (from the Yerevan Municipality) control only by the end of 2001.
25 Not particularly successful, as admitted by GoA (see Goa Decree 690A).  Reasons include the inadequate contract, legislative drawbacks, failure to
meet obligations on behalf of the Armenian and the Italian sides.
26 In addition, four cities and about 600 villages, totaling about 0.6 million inhabitants, directly operate their water systems.
27 KfW/MACS GmbH project Document on the establishment of Nor Akunq JSC (2000).
28 The new Law on Condominiums define those as “non-commercial cooperative union of physical and juridical bodies’ membership, established based
on membership fees, with the aim of management of joint ownership parts in apartment building/buildings.”  In contrast with the western experience
these are not form of ownership but rather a form of management. We had doubts about the merits of using the term condominium in this paper, but
finally were inclined to do so, since it is the term most widely used in Armenia. The official term is hamatirutiun, which means “Joint ownership”.
29 Condominiums, licensed or entrusted management bodies are specified as forms of management of multi-apartment buildings by the Law on the
Management of Multi-apartment buildings.
30 For example, the contracts between the water operators and condominiums specify that, a proportion from the collected amounts for water use—
gradually decreasing within 19 months—would go to the condominium’s budget. What the source of funding the maintenance and repair costs (even
if only for the poor) for the intra-building pipelines would be after the 19th month is not clear.
31 According to GoA Decision No.55 (01/2002), almost 247,000 customers in Yerevan will be serviced by the existing condominiums
32 For example: (a) the limitation of joint ownership to commonly used spaces that could not be used for income generation, depriving condominiums
from collateral that could have been used for access to capital; (b) the fact that unlike other transition countries neither the land underneath the
buildings nor retail and commercial spaces attached to the buildings have been added to the assets of the association: and so on.
33 IFAD has supported the establishment and further development of water user consumer cooperatives - to operate as independent, self-managing
tertiary-level management entities, capable of maintaining the tertiary system and, eventually, participating in the management of higher-level
sections of the irrigation conveyance system.
34 GoA pursued this direction raises some concerns however. According to GoA Decision No. 232 (2001), internal irrigation channels in those hamainqs
where water user groups did not perform efficiently (criteria being collection rates below 60%), are to be re-delegated to Irrigation JSC. It also
stipulated that where water user groups do not exist, branches of Irrigation JSC could be opened to substitute them. This is done with good
intentions—to increase the efficiency of the system.  Regardless, the requirements under the new law stipulate re-registration. Ultimately, the manner
of dissolving self-regulating entities could jeopardize the emerging trust in water user groups.
35 The issue of arrears deserves closer attention, but is not feasible in this paper.
36 See Perry et al. (1997).
37 e.g. clarification of the legislation governing ownership issues on underground waters will be necessary in Armenia.
38 If property rights in water formally recognize rights to diversions while denying historical rights to return flows, as has been done in Mexico and Chile
(Gazmuri and Rosegrant 1994), they institutionalize theft. The same problem can occur at the level of entire water basins, as in Pakistan and Egypt.
As development proceeds upstream, down-stream users receive progressively less, and more polluted, water.
39 Perry (2001) disagrees, arguing that irrigation releases from a dam could be reduced due to the considerations of achieving maximum economic value,
and allocated to domestic use. If inter-sectoral benefits of market transfers are to be realized, then the entire agriculture sector must be covered by
infrastructure and bureaucracy required for the measurement, billing, and transfer of water from the least-productive parts of agriculture to the more-
productive areas.
40 The introduction of Water Users Federations’ water right system will be piloted under the proposed IDA funded Irrigation Development Project.
41 Perry et al. (1997).
42 Water basin (scheme) based management is a widely accepted form of WRM worldwide, since it captures the cyclic flow of water in a water basin thus
forming a rather closed system. In the Armenian context the water basin/scheme based management will: (a) eliminate the negative effects (cross-
subsidization; reduced incentives foe commercial efficiency) of putting units within AWSC and Irrigation, which do not form a technological unity,
in the same agency; (b) create conditions for a wider use of zone tariffs’ for each unit—based on economic and technological considerations; (b) foster
more active stakeholder participation in decision making, e.g. in choosing the public/private O&M agency; and so on. Taking a decision on water
basin based management idea does however raise questions about its efficiency given the very small size of the country, and needs a careful cost-benefit
analysis.
43 In Spring 2003 the Energy Regulatory Commission of the Republic of Armenia was transformed into a small-sector regulator to cover water issues
(both municipal and irrigation) as well. ECA “Armenia: Development of an institutional framework for regulation of pubic utilities,” 2001.
44 Household Survey (2001).
45 Gleick (1996); Postel (1996); Seckler et al. (1998).
46 Perry et al. (1997).
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47 Briscoe J. Water as an Economic Good: the Idea and what it means in practice. Paper presented at the World Congress of ICID, Cairo, Egypt (1996).
48 Economic rent or alternative value: when a unit of a certain resource is used for a particular project or goal, it cannot be used for another project or goal.
Thus, it cannot create benefits for another project. The alternative value of a resource is comprised from benefits which it could have brought had it
been used for another program or project. Hence, the notion of the alternative value is a very important one when taking decisions about resource
allocation and pricing. It is also no doubt that we have to allocate the resources in a way that we achieve the highest possible well being of the society.
49 Although it is preferable to define it as a percent of net revenue, it may take the form of a fee per cubic meter as there of a problem informing
regulators of cost structures.
50 The World Bank, while supporting this effort through a series of direct investments, has also conditioned loans and credits, e.g Structural adjustment
credits (SAC) IV and V on GoA’s passage of tariff increases, improved collections and strengthening of governance and regulation in the sector. “Zero
subsidies” by 2005 is a conditionality of SAC IV and SAC V.
51 Since the resource fee from Sevan US cents 0.4 per cubic meter, and surface water is free (in terms of resource fee), often a situation arises when the
hamainq wants and is able to receive surface water, and is forced by the operator to buy the water—a situation that should be changed.
52 GoA Decree No. 33 (01/1999) states that until new tariffs are set by the Government, the old ones, set by GoA Decrees No 368 (09/1997) for the
wholesale tariffs and No. 256 (07/1997) specifying the rules for calculating retail tariffs, are in force.
53 Compare to water fees in: Germany 181, Belgium 121, Italy 73, US 50 (US cents/m3)
54 More precise estimates are complicated since it a lot depends on the accounting for the accumulated debts.
55 Project Document on Nor Akunq JSC, KfW/ MACS, 2000
56 It has been recommended to charge a full cost rate already in the midlevel of the tariff structure to avoid financial dependence on high consumption
patterns and to preview a negative income effect related to price/demand elasticity.
57 “Utility Pricing and the Poor” study also recommended to introduce an affordable fixed tariff to encourage a consumption of the socially optimal level
of water plus a marginal tariff to cover water consumption above this level. USAID/PADCO AST (Armenian Social Transition) Project, Report No.
18 recommended introduction of a “lifeline” tariff.
58 Whether it is indeed possible to deliver reliable water service to households at a price below the full cost-recovery price (which is currently) the case
remains to be determined. As far as prospects for 2005 are concerned, GoA expects to increase the collection rate at more than 80% for AWSC and
88% for YWSC, envisioning increases in current revenues by 3.2. or 3.3. times. The questions are (a) whether it will be indeed possible to more than
80% collection rate and (b) how dramatic will the reduction in consumption. Our calculations show that it is realistic to increase water utilities
revenues 2.4 to 3 times. It will be more difficult to achieve a higher level of revenue; this will require the implementation of efficient measures to
increase the solvency of the vulnerable.
59 They include depreciation of assets and provision for arrears.
60 Household Survey (2001).
61 One-time survey of 2000 households in July-August 1999.
62 While the attempts in 1998 to address the link between poverty and payment for electricity were discontinued rather shortly, this should not be
discouraging for the idea as some argue: in our view the success of the proposed program will largely depend on its design and finding the necessary
financial means for that—which is again a matter of design to a large extent.
63 In 01/1999, a targeted poverty family cash benefit replaced the old system of social assistance with many different schemes. The benefit is awarded to
eligible households (not individuals)—3,000 AMD  per month and an additional 1,300 dram per month for each family member. The average
benefit per month is 8,000 AMD. The system employs a means-tested targeting mechanism, where households are ranked based on a single-index
formula that includes individual and household indicators and uses such filters as telephone bills, real estate transactions, customs transactions and
private entrepreneurialism.
64 In Central Europe, the availability of these funds, often disbursed through publicly owned banks or municipalities, allows for reducing both the costs
of capital and liquidity problems associated with housing rehabilitation. A cap was put on amount of rehabilitation costs. This is not advised by the
authors for Armenia
65 In the case of repayment of the water meter price and installation cost over a 5-year period, the monthly amount liable to payment will be 0.43 to 0.56
USD, which is equal to 3.4 to 4.5% of the minimum food basket. Particularly, we shall not discount the fact that the water meter over 5 years will
need numerous repairs and even may break down, and create desperate situations for its financially poor owners.
66 Ukraine for example, has suspended penalties and other financial sanctions for untimely payment for services. This is the case for both legal and
technical reasons CSEs are not able to disconnect provision of services to residential customers and budget organizations which are in debt.
67 Perry (2001).
68 Probably the most important benefit of irrigation is the overall reduction in food prices resulting from increased production. Thus the indirect
beneficiaries of irrigation, the consumers of cheaper food, should be happy to subsidize irrigation development through taxes. Care is needed however
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to be exercised, since this objective discriminates the farmer who does not receive irrigation water - a service charge may be appropriate to recover a
proportion of the benefits or to cover the costs of the service.
69 Perry (1995) and (1996).
70 Perry (2001).
71 Analysis from other countries (see Perry, 2001) suggests that the likely charge needed to cover O&M costs would be 0.3–0.5 cents/m3 (having
minimal efficiency impact), while the charge required to substantially affect demand would be much higher—perhaps 2–5 cents/m3.  Impact on
demand (for example, by a factor of 5–10) would be politically very difficult to enforce, resulting in substantial profits to the supplying agency, with
further potential political costs.
72 Perry (2001).
73 For a critique of applying volumetric pricing in irrigation in developing countries, see also Fraiture and Perry (2002).
74 Including: volume-based and two-part tariffs; fixed charges; and so on.  Mostly they are designed to cover the O&M costs and a percentage of capital
replacement. Supply characteristics differ: wholesale; wholesale plus minimum charge to retail; and so on.
75 Perry (2001).
76 In India, the long-tested warabandi irrigation system (Malhotra 1982) is based entirely on ensuring an equitable distribution (over the land) of
limited water resources. Water charges are not high, and not volumetric, but because all farmers are water-short, they experiences directly the true
value of their water ration, and strive to save every drop and maximize its productivity.
77 The planned tariff for 2002 was 4.93 but it met with significant resistance within GoA, and the rate at 4.21 was adopted.
78 The World Bank, Irrigation Development Project Appraisal Document, 2001.
79 The only documents available are economic, social and ecological impact assessments within the Project appraisal Document of the Irrigation
Development Project. Assessments, however, look at the impacts of the Irrigation Development Project.
80 An important objective of agricultural development is to ensure appropriate levels of food security of urban and rural population. It is estimated that
food expenditure amounts to between 60–70% of the total consumption of households. This figure is as high as 85% for the poorest quintile, while
it is 57% for the richest quintile.
81 Economic Research Institute of the Ministry of Economy and Finance of the RoA.   The PSIA on water sector reform in Armenia was funded though
DFID. The author of this paper was part of the team. The publication is expected in 2003
82 The results obtained result from a joint work by L. Melikyan, A. Kakossyan, A. Darbinyan, and Alan Roe within framework of ERI/DFID PSIA.
83 National Statistics Service.
84 Strategy for Sustainable Development of Agriculture in Armenia FAO/Ministry of Agriculture of Armenia (2002).
85 There are other estimates regarding farm productivity, costs, and expenses at the farm level. For example, there are unofficial estimates by the
National Statistics Service. These “productivity” figures are much lower than those we used, thus implying even lower estimates for profits.
86 Economic Research Institute of the Ministry of Finance and Economy of the Republic of Armenia: Pilot Study on Poverty and Social Impact
Assessment of the Water Sector Reform in Armenia. Forthcoming (2003).
87 Strategy for the Development of Agriculture in Armenia FAO/Ministry of Agriculture (2002).
88 Of course, the development of exports, not only of food products, is conditional on an array of factors that can facilitate or impede it. This includes
exchange rates and other macro-economic policies, transport infrastructure, diplomatic efforts aimed at the conclusion of trade agreements to facilitate
access to foreign markets. “Trade diplomacy” should also focus on addressing trade facilitation with countries in the region (combating corruption,
diminishing non-tariff barriers, harmonizing standards, abandoning transit taxes, etc.). Finally, the trade embargo is an important impediment to the
development of international trade of Armenia.
89 The World Bank, Armenia’s Private Agriculture: Working Paper No. 17 (1999)
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Developing Water Management
in South Kazakhstan
L a d a  Z i m i n a
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper provides a critical assessment of the recent
policy decisions related to water management in
Kazakhstan, with a focus on irrigation management
transfer in the South of the country. Current difficulties
in the water sector stem largely from the dependence
of southern areas on transnational watercourses—that
of the Syrdarya river and, in turn, on upstream countries
(Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan). The core
problem, meanwhile, concerns the lack of consistent
national policy within the country itself.
To address this issue, the paper begins with a de-
scription of the current state of water management re-
form in Kazakhstan and the difficulties involved by
examining the Makhtaaral southernmost in the coun-
try.
The paper continues by assessing the recent legis-
lative and administrative measures in irrigation water
management and its implications for the district. Re-
cent steps that can be categorized as part of a larger
irrigation management transfer strategy have involved:
upgrading the water management legislation; admin-
istrative reforms to redistribute responsibilities among
the state water management bodies; and empowering
farmers and Water Users’ Organizations (WUOs).
Current achievements are analyzed, as are the gaps
which require more attention.
Further steps needed include: adopting a new Water
Code and Law on Water Users’ Organizations; reorga-
nizing the governmental water management institu-
tional makeup; increasing Government and interna-
tional donor investment; and improving access to in-
formation and transparency. The paper concludes with
recommendations to stakeholders.
1. INTRODUCTION
At first glance, the water situation in southern
Kazakhstan might resemble an unsolvable knot. Several
decades of over-use of the Syrdarya river (as well as the
Amudarya, flowing through neighboring Uzbekistan
and Turkmenistan), which is the major source of water
in the region, has lead to desiccation and increased
salinity of the Aral Sea. The emergence in 1991 of the
five independent Central Asian States in the Sea basin
led the formerly unified system of water management
to fragment, causing numerous disputes between
Kazakhstan and its upper-stream countries, Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Due to chronic under-
investment in the water sector in the 1990s—resulting
from on-going economic decline—the condition of the
water system considerably deteriorated. Up to 45% of
irrigation water is assessed to have been lost due to
depreciated canals.1   The dissolution in 1996 of the
collective farms and the formation of private farms left
the water system largely neglected.
The overall scarcity of water in Central Asia pre-
sents a dilemma in itself; however, the management
deficiencies both within the country and regionally
exacerbate the situation even further. Though river
basin management (that is, when a river is considered
to be one unit regardless of its path through multiple
states, provinces or districts) is officially proclaimed to
be the underlying principle of water management in
Kazakhstan, it is rarely observed in practice. Current
irrigation management transfer processes are somewhat
hectic and incoherent. State water management insti-
tutions are endowed with both controlling and regula-
tory functions on the one hand, and water delivery
service functions on the other, thus causing conflicts
of interests.  Moreover, the governmental institutions
responsible for water management have thus far failed
to develop a coherent policy for addressing the above
mentioned issues.
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The lack or misdistribution of water for irrigation
primarily affects farmers, as well as the crop process-
ing industry and the consumers of agricultural pro-
duction. Even more detrimental consequences are
brought about by poor quality of drinking water which
impacts the population at large. The continuing over-
use of water further deteriorates the condition of the
Aral Sea, resulting in one of the most appalling man-
made environmental disasters in history. Undeniably,
environmental degradation is detrimental to future gen-
erations inhabiting the area.
Water management involves stakeholders at dif-
ferent levels. At the international level, the Interstate
Commission for Water Coordination holds the pri-
mary position. Nationally, the Committee for Water
Resources (which has recently been transferred from
the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection to the Ministry of Agriculture) dominates.
Republican State Enterprises and Basin Water Author-
ities (BWAs), the territorial and basin units within the
Committee for Water Resources, as well as local aki-
mats (executive bodies) and maslikhats (legislative bod-
ies) are significant players at the province level. The
district level involves Administrations of Water Struc-
tures (AWS) and district akimats; as well as Water Us-
ers’ Organizations (WUOs) and individual farmers.
There are several problems associated with water
management in South Kazakhstan, ranging from eco-
nomic to social and from domestic to international.
The major difficulties indicated unanimously by ex-
perts include: pollution and overuse of water resulting
from supply-driven water consumption and the lack
of crop rotation; lack of coordination among relevant
governmental bodies leading to mismanagement and
conflicts of interest between the BWAs and Republi-
can State Enterprises; weakening of WUOs; lack of
investment into irrigation sector; and finally, poor co-
operation with upstream countries.
This paper contends that the Government of Ka-
zakhstan should implement a comprehensive reform
program in irrigation water management. The irriga-
tion management transfer should consist of such com-
ponents as legislative reform, redistributing responsi-
bilities among state water management bodies, and
empowering farmers and WUOs. While technical up-
grades present an important task for increasing water
productivity, the focus should be shifted to institu-
tional rather than technological solutions.
The focus of the paper is limited to irrigation as
the main consumer of surface water; though the im-
portance of safe drinking water is fully recognized, its
discussion is not within the scope of current study.
State policies relating to irrigation management are
country-wide; a case study of the Makhtaaral district
of the South Kazakhstan province was selected in or-
der to demonstrate practical application of these poli-
cies. This is the southernmost district of Kazakhstan,
dependent on upstream countries for its water supply,
with cotton serving as the predominant crop. Thus, it
reveals in a concentrated form the water management
problems of the entire country.
In the course of the study, more than 40 inter-
views were conducted in Astana, Almaty, Shymkent,
Zhetysai and Tashkent. The interviewees included rep-
resentatives of the Committee for Water Resources; its
province and district affiliations; province and district
akimats; interregional organizations; farmers and mem-
bers of Water User Organizations; international orga-
nizations; and non-governmental organizations and
journalists. Semi-structured interviews were employed,
as well as previous research performed by internation-
al organizations, government reports, and analyses of
the portrayals of the issue in the media.
2. WATER IN KAZAKHSTAN:
A VICTIM OF GEOGRAPHY
OR GOVERNANCE?
2.1 Background Situation
Surface water resources of Kazakhstan comprise on
average 100.5 km3 per year, out of which only 56.5
km3 (57%) originates on Kazakh territory. The largest
basin area is that of the Syrdarya river; others include
the Ural and Irtysh rivers, Lake Balkhash, as well as a
multitude of smaller rivers and lakes in Central and
North Kazakhstan.
Kazakhstan’s relative diversity of available water
resources allows for favorable conditions when compared
to other Central Asian counterparts, which depend
largely on the waters of the Syrdarya and Amudarya
rivers. In Kazakhstan however, southern areas also de-
pend heavily on Syrdarya resources. Around 2.5 mil-
lion people (17% of the country’s population) live in
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the Kazakh part of the Syrdarya basin, 1998.6 and 601.2
thousand people in South Kazakhstan and Kyzylorda
provinces respectively.2   This makes the area a very
important factor to the country politically and eco-
nomically.
Compared to the Amudarya, the Syrdarya ranks
second in volume but first in length. It stretches over
2337 km, out of which 2219 km flows through the
territory of Kazakhstan; the basin area on Kazakh ter-
ritory is 219,000 km3. Though the majority of the Syrd-
arya flow exists outside Kazakhstan, a number of its
tributaries are formed within its territory, such as Arys,
Keles, and Kuruk-Keles.
It is important to note that the basin areas of the
Syrdarya and Amudarya have been cultivated for cen-
turies, but the ecological balance has been preserved
by the use of traditional cultivation techniques. The
roots of the current shortage date back to the 1960s,
when extensive land reclamation campaigns began in
Central Asia. A complex water system was constructed
in order to divert waters from the Amudarya and Syrd-
arya to enlarged irrigated areas for cultivation. The
project was established with the hope to ensure the
food self-sufficiency of the rapidly growing Central
Asian republics and, moreover, to provide the entire
Soviet Union with rice and cotton.
For the past 40 years, the rivers’ flow to the Aral
Sea has drastically decreased, from 67,000 km2 to
30,000 square kilometers.  The sea level, meanwhile,
has dropped by 16 meters. From 1974 to 1986, the
Syrdarya never reached the Sea at all. In fact, the Sea
has now split into two smaller lakes—the Northern
Aral (fed by Syrdarya) and the Larger Southern Aral
(fed by Amudarya).
In 1960, Kazakhstan was consuming 9750 mil-
lion m3 of the Syrdarya’s volume, out of which 9495
million m3 was used for irrigation. These figures con-
tinued to rise through the 1970s (12,850 and 12,275
respectively) and 1980s (14,200 and 12,830 respec-
tively), but decreased somewhat in 1990 (11,320 and
10,136 respectively). This can be attributed, in part,
to the economic crisis following the disintegration of
the Soviet Union that adversely affected agriculture.
The overall water intake in 1999 was 8235 million
cubic meters, out of which 7959 million m3 were used
for irrigation.3
At present, the total intake of water resources in
the Syrdarya basin reaches 130–150% through repeat-
ed use of the drainage water.4  Due to large volumes of
sewage water from both agricultural and industrial pro-
duction, the amount pollution contaminating the riv-
er has rose dramatically; mineralization now reaches
up to 1.7–2.5 grams per liter. The deficit of water re-
sources in the Syrdarya’s lower areas hovers around 1.2-
3.5 cubic kilometers per year. Ulitmately, the surface
resources of the Syrdarya been nearly completely ex-
hausted.
For the past 20 years, pasturelands in South Kaza-
khstan and Kzylorda provinces have decreased from
45 million ha to 41.5 million hectares. Erosion affects
around eight mln ha of agricultural land, while deser-
tification has destroyed over two mln hectares. In the
Kyzylorda province alone, 104,000 ha of 278,000 ha
of irrigated land—approximately 37%—cannot be
used, either because of the high salinity level, or due to
deficiencies in the drainage system.
The Syrdarya river is regulated through the Naryn-
Syrdarya Reservoir Cascade, which incorporates five
major reservoirs: Toktogul (Kyrgyzstan), Charvak
(Uzbekistan), Andijan (Uzbekistan), Kairakum (Tajiki-
stan) and Shardara (Kazakhstan). The total volume of
these reservoirs adds to 24.1 cubic kilometers; the vol-
ume of the Shardara reservoir alone amounts to 4.2
cubic kilometers. Most of these reservoirs were con-
structed more than 25 years ago (for example, the Shar-
dara reservoir was built in 1965) and their operational
volume has decreased due to silting. Many of the res-
ervoirs operate a hydropower station which further
affects the annual water discharge schedule.
Though not a focus of this study, it is important
to mention the role of the Toktogul reservoir and hy-
dropower station. In the past decade, issues surround-
ing Toktogul have sparked fiery disputes among the
riparian countries. The reservoir started functioning
in 1988, initially meant to facilitate irrigation by accu-
mulating water in high-water years and compensating
for deficit in low-water years. Hydropower was gener-
ated when water was needed for irrigation or when it
could be stored in a downstream reservoir. However,
in 1992, the Toktogul reservoir was switched to an
energy regime, producing electric power for both do-
mestic consumption in Kyrgyzstan and for export to
other countries. As a result, more water passes in win-
ter months, thus flooding downstream areas in Uzbeki-
stan and Kazakhstan. The average annual discharge of
the Syrdarya water from the Shardara reservoir into
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the Arnasai depression (a swamped area on the Uzbek
territory) is approximately four cubic kilometers. Be-
cause of this, the volume of water reaching the lower
parts of Syrdarya has decreased from ten km3 in 1994
to 5.4 km3 in 2000. Moreover, this has significantly
depleted the amount of water available for irrigation
in the vegetation season, July and August.
This predicament of winter floods and summer
droughts exacerbates the existing problems. Meanwhile,
it is also perilous in that it offers an “easy way out” by
attributing all problems related to water management
to external factors. Many domestic shortcomings are
thus overlooked.
2.2 Imperatives for Reform
The principles of the current water management system
have been inherited by the Central Asian states from
the Soviet command economy; water supply norms
have been driven by the demand considerations with
no regard for environmental implications.  In the pre-
vious system, water was available for free resulting in
mass overuse.
The issue began to attract public attention in the
1980s, when the disastrous effects of the Aral Sea situ-
ation on the environment, economy, and public health
came to light. However, it was only in 1987 that the
first attempt was made to introduce a more integrated
approach to managing the water resources of the area:
BWAs were established for both the Syrdarya and
Amudarya rivers.
The issue also became of immediate concern to
the governments of the newly independent Central
Asian states. In February 1992, within a few months
of independence, the heads of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan created the
Interstate Commission for Water Coordination
(ICWC) which was intended to serve as the forum for
coordinating water management among the countries
and resolving conflicting interests within the region.
Transition to market economy and the ensuing
economic crisis also fostered change. As the Asian De-
velopment Bank affirms, “In Kazakhstan, concepts such
as: i) water pricing; ii) water user fees; iii) financially
viable irrigation investment; iv) recovery of investment
cost; and v) the transfer of irrigation system manage-
ment to farmer organizations have all become, at least
in principle, part of the evolving water management
regime.”5
Because no centralized authority to make decisions
on water allocation existed after the disintegration of
the Soviet Union, competition between downstream
and upstream countries increased. The creation of the
ICWC has advanced little in addressing the issue; the
agreements on water allocation in the past decade tend
to be bilateral rather than multilateral, concluded on a
yearly basis rather than long-term, and often fail to be
implemented by one or more sides. Moreover, as ex-
emplified by the Toktogul reservoir case, competition
has also increased among different sectors within na-
tional economies, particularly energy (hydropower) and
irrigated agriculture.
Finally, one of the elements central to economic
reform was the privatization of land in 1996, whereby
large collective farms were divided into a multitude of
small- and medium-size private farms. In turn, a con-
siderable proportion of secondary level (inter-farm)
canals remained unattended.
2.3 Transition Steps in the 1990s
In Kazakhstan, the agricultural sector is the main
consumer of water, using up to 80% of the country’s
overall water volume. In South Kazakhstan, this
proportion increases to 90%.6
In March 1992, the Government introduced a sys-
tem of water pricing. In 1997, tariffs were introduced
to specify charges for different sub-sectors in each riv-
er basin. Since that time, irrigation water users in the
Aralo-Syrdarya Basin Water Authority are charged 3.02
tyin (0.0002 USD) per cubic meter; the cost has not
changed for the past five years. The present water tar-
iff comprises only five to eight percent of crop pro-
duction costs. Upon confirmation of water volume
used, which is provided by the BWA, the water user
makes monthly payments to local fiscal authorities.
However, the overall water price payable by farm-
ers augmented by the addition of service charges from
the AWS and WUOs. AWS tariffs are subject to ap-
proval by the State Anti-monopoly Committee. Tariff
levels are based upon evidence of actual and agreed-
upon depreciation costs. Therefore, they reflect the
minimal level of actual maintenance expenditure by
the Administration.
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Table 1.
Water Tariff Collection in 2000–2001,
South Kazakhstan Province [Thousand USD]
2000 2001
Cost of services 11,521.84 9,937.76
provided
Amount collected 9,395.85 7,775.09
Percentage 82% 79%
Average tariff 0.69 0.73
per 1,000 m3
Source:  Yugvodkhoz
According to the Water Code, the tariff is to be
spent on reconstruction, construction and maintenance
of water management structures.  Yet the low collec-
tion rates prevent the completion of these activities on
an adequate level.
Ultimately, the water tariff does not adequately
reflect the real value of water supply and management.
Though water charges have been introduced as a mat-
ter of principle in the reform process, thus far they
have failed to serve as a legitimate incentive for saving
water.
2.4 Current Legal Framework
Water management is regulated by a number of laws,
decrees and resolutions. The current Water Code was
adopted in May 1993 and amended twice, in December
1996 and May 1999. Article 4 of the Code affirms
that all water in the Republic is State property; the
uses of water by natural and legal persons are affected
on a contractual basis.
The Code describes management principles and
responsibilities with regard to water management. Ar-
ticle 6.1 maintains that “water management is based
on a combination of basin water and administrative-
territorial principles, providing for conservation and
regeneration of water resources, optimal water man-
agement conditions and preservation of environmen-
tal sustainability.”
This piece of legislation, however, arouses a great
deal criticism in that it fails to adequately reflect the
needs of the sector. Proposals for a new Water Code
were proposed in 2002, when the first draft was devel-
oped by the Kazgiprovodkhoz research institute. Cur-
rently, the country is obliged to amend the code; Ka-
zakhstan signed the Helsinki Convention on the Pro-
tection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and
International Lakes in 2001, and in turn is bound bring
its national legislation up to the stipulated standards.
The need for a new Code has furthermore been re-
flected by the Government in its proposal for the De-
velopment of the Water Sector of Economy of the Re-
public of Kazakhstan till the year 2010 (adopted Janu-
ary 21, 2002) and by the Agriculture and Food Pro-
gram for 2003–2005 (adopted June 5, 2002).
Other relevant documents shaping the legal frame-
work for water management include: the Law on Farms
of March 31, 1998 (amended December 2001); the
Law on Rural Consumer Cooperation of July 21, 1999;
and the Decree of June 25, 1996 “On Distribution of
Functions between the BWAs and Province Commit-
tees of the Committee for Water Resources of the Re-
public of Kazakhstan”.
The Agriculture and Food Program aims to en-
sure food security in the country through the develop-
ment of an efficient agro-industrial complex with
competitive products. The following objectives are in-
cluded:
• to ensure the food security of the country;
• to establish an efficient agro-industrial system;
• to increase sales of farm products and processed
farm products in both domestic and foreign
markets; and
• to optimize the state support to the agricultural
production.
The Program envisages increased state support to
farmers and irrigation water users; moreover, it com-
mits an additional 24.5 billin tenge (160 million USD)
to the agricultural sector, thereby doubling current ex-
penditures (1.8% of the GDP).
2.5 Current Institutional Makeup
The Committee of Water Resources, the main body
dealing with water management issues, has an overall
responsibility to develop policies and plans for the
national water resources. The responsibilities of the
Committee were originally held by the Soviet Ministry
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of Water Resources, which was subsequently trans-
formed into the State Committee for Water Resources
under the Cabinet of the Republic of Kazakhstan after
independence, and later to the Committee for Water
Resources within the Ministry for Natural Resources
and Environmental Protection. In 1997, the Com-
mittee was transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture,
which aimed at raising the profile of the irrigation water
consumption. However, having failed to address the
water issue comprehensively, it was moved back to the
Ministry for Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection in early 2000, then moved to its present
position, again with the Ministry of Agriculture, in
August 2002. This current status encourages more
attention to be focused on irrigation issues (as part of
the overall process of agricultural production), but
simultaneously risks overlooking the complexity of
managing different types of water sources—and in
different sectors or industries.
The river basin offices of the Committee for
Water Resources are Basin Water Authorities. Accord-
ing to the 1993 Water Code, BWAs are the primary
water management agencies in Kazakhstan. The 1996
Decree on the Differentiation of Functions between
Basin Water Authorities and Province Water Resource
Committees stipulates that the former are responsible,
among other things, for: water resource management
based on the basin-territorial principle; State control
over the water consumption and conservation; issuing
permits for special water use; controlling inter-state and
inter-province water reservoirs; overseeing water qual-
ity and pollution levels; and managing State metering
of water consumption. The province Water Resource
Committees are responsible for: dispatcher and execu-
tive regulation of the water system units (in coordina-
tion with BWAs); operation of the water system units;
primary metering of water use; maintenance and im-
provement of technical infrastructure conditions and
related activities; and prevention of and reconstruc-
tion after the emergencies.
This distribution of responsibilities is, however,
not reflected in reality. Territorial units have been trans-
ferred to the Republican State Enterprises.  In turn,
they function on a self-financing basis, competing for
government funds to maintain their primary systems.
The basin units, meanwhile, have yet to be managed
on a budgetary basis. For the last several years they
have been considerably under-funded, due to the fi-
nancial constraints resulting from the economic crisis
of the 1990s. Thus, they have weakened dramatically
and are now largely incapable of fulfilling their func-
tions. A paradoxical situation ensues, as the executive/
technical body possesses more technical and human
capacity than the actual controlling body. This results
in a conflict of interest between the territorial and ba-
sin authorities, whereby the management/control body
is unable to fulfill its functions.
At the district level, some Administrations of Wa-
ter Structures have been absorbed by local administra-
tions. In the South Kazakhstan province, five of the
nine district administrations have been transferred to
local akimats, receiving up to 80% of their funding.
AWS is the custodian of secondary irrigation systems.
The lack of transparency of the local akimat oper-
ations makes this arrangement particularly uncontrol-
lable. Cases have been reported when local akims (gov-
ernors) withdraw the secondary irrigation system from
the State cadastre, thus enabling their sale to private
entrepreneurs.
2.6   Water Management at the Local Level
The Makhtaaral AWS (based in Zhetysai, capital of
the Makhtaaral district) is a branch office of the
Republican State Enterprise Yugvodkhoz. It possesses
overall executive responsibilities for the operation and
management of all irrigation and drainage infrastruc-
ture registered on its cadastre. These include the
secondary (former inter-farm) canals of the irrigation
system. Currently, the government does not provide
funds for the operation of AWS.  As such, it must
support itself financially through the provision of
services to water users.
In the Makhtaaral district in particular, the situa-
tion is complicated by its dependency on interstate
watercourses. The major source of irrigation water is
the Dostyk canal, which diverts water from the Syrd-
arya at the Farkhadski hydro-unit in Uzbekistan.  In
total, it flows 79 km on Uzbek territory and then 49
km more on Kazakh territory. The Dostyk Canal Or-
ganization, with headquarters in Gulistan, Uzbekistan,
possesses overall managerial responsibilities for the
operation and management of the canal along its en-
tire length. This creates a complex interdependency
structure reflected in the chart below.
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Figure 1.
Institutional Linkages for Water and Irrigation Management in South Kazakhstan,
as of September 2002
Source: ADB 2001, adapted.
2.7 Water user organizations
On-farm system operation and maintenance is now
the individual responsibility of each farm. Previously,
it was generally organized on a brigade basis under the
direction of a hydraulic technician, who worked in close
collaboration with other members of his or her brigade
technical team. Operation and maintenance funds were
provided by the State. Because these funds are no longer
available after the privatization of farms in 1996,
maintenance of the relevant facilities has been largely
neglected.
D E V E LO P I N G  W AT E R  M A N A G E M E N T  I N  S O U T H  K A Z A K H S TAN
98 L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  A N D  P U B L I C  S E R V I C E  R E F O R M  I N I T I A T I V E
D R O P  BY  D R O P :  W AT E R  M A N A G E M E N T  I N  T H E  S O U T H E R N  C AU C A S U S  A N D  C E N T R A L  A S I A
Many of the privatized farms, however, have basi-
cally retained their original management structure and
continued basic operations—including irrigation prac-
tices.  Such operations are performed  according to
given rotation programs, using accumulated experience
and expertise. Some privatized farms comprise of a
number of small units. Where restructuring has in-
volved the creation of such small groups or small inde-
pendent units, the members who leave the larger unit
are generally allocated land at the end of a watercourse.
This inevitably marginalizes them from the larger unit,
thus limiting their access to services and subjecting them
to decisions and actions taken upstream. Such farms
would benefit from the establishment of a Water Us-
ers’ Organization which could serve the purpose of
providing an institutional bond between all water us-
ers, transcending the remnants of the previous man-
agement structure, and allowing for continuity in the
case of further restructuring.
The establishment of the first WUOs in the South
Kazakhstan province dates back to 1993. Presently,
there are 82 organizations in the province; the Ma-
khtaaral district houses 64 of these. The extensive de-
velopment of WUOs in Makhtaaral can be attributed
to the district’s large number of international donor
projects, such as the World Bank Irrigation and Drain-
age Improvement Project (1996–2003) and the Asian
Development Bank Water Resources Management and
Land Improvement Project (1999–2004).
However, in many cases, authorities have essen-
tially enforced the establishment of  WUOs; evidence
points that several Organization chairmen were actu-
ally appointed by local akims, or that elections were
rigged.  Certainly, this reflects the salience of Soviet
practices, whereby free competition was imitated, but
not actually pursued. In turn, not only are the demo-
cratic principles of the Organizations undermined, but
also these practices have contributed to farmers’ rather
wary attitude toward new institutions. A rather fre-
quent opinion among farmers thus far holds that
WUOs are just another structure to extort money from
the populace.
Similar to the tensions between farmers and Orga-
nization chairmen, several clashes have been reported
between the downstream and upstream landowners,
regarding, in particular, the timeliness and quality of
water delivery. Luckily, these clashes have never reached
a violent level, and have yet to warrant any formal re-
action on behalf of authorities.
In regions lacking the relevant support of interna-
tional programs or agencies, WUOs appear unable to
perform their functions independently. As a result,
other mechanisms are sought to address water repay-
ment. For example, in the Shardara district of the South
Kazakhstan province, local Organizations initially suc-
ceeded in allocating water to water users; however,
tariff collection ratio was low. The Kyzylkum AWS
which managed the local irrigation system preferred
to collect money from individual farmers, yet this tactic
proved cumbersome. Later, AWS began concluding
agreements with local ginneries on pre-paying for water
at the cost of the cotton yield. Ultimately, the Organi-
zations disintegrated or became redundant. This cur-
rent arrangement, however, fails to address the issues of
technical maintenance and reconstruction of the
irrigation infrastructure. WUOs remain the structure
capable of addressing the widest spectrum of problems.
One of the major factors impeding the develop-
ment of WUOs is the general absence of adequate leg-
islation. The Water Users’ Organization Law has yet
to be adopted (though it has advanced through a num-
ber of parliamentary hearings); meanwhile, the term
“association” as described in the Law on Not-for-profit
Organizations can actually be applied to a group of
WUOs and thus is not entirely relevant. To date, the
Organizations have been registering as Rural Consumer
Cooperatives of Water Users or Limited Partnerships.
Cases have been reported of farmers mandating a col-
league to deal with water issues, without registration
as a legal entity.
Following land reforms, farmers lost their sense of
organization and cohesion; attempts at coordinating
efforts are immediately endowed with additional con-
tent. In some cases, WUOs have taken on non-tradi-
tional or atypical functions with respect to their pro-
fessional background, working in machinery repair
services, negotiating on behalf of other farmers with
the ginneries, or purchasing seeds.
Overall, the absence of a comprehensive and well-
funded State program impedes the development of
WUOs. Farmers and local offices of the Committee
for Water Resources alike complain about the Minis-
try of Agriculture’s remarkable lack of involvement in
developing the Organizations.
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2.8 Weaknesses of Current Water
Management Arrangements
The current distribution of responsibilities for water ma-
nagement has been identified with weaknesses at virtu-
ally every level, from national agencies to local WUOs.
The Committee for Water Resources under the
Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for overall poli-
cy formulation. However, it represents only one of sev-
eral subcommittees of the Ministry, and stands rela-
tively low in the Government hierarchy. Moreover, its
affiliation with the Ministry of Agriculture essentially
ignores other types of water and water uses (ground
water, industrial water, and so on), thereby reducing
prospects for the development of an integrated man-
agement scheme. As well, secondary canal ownership
within a State agency or WUO is not secure.
At the basin level, BWAs are responsible for water
allocation and overall basin management. However,
financial constraints and conflicts within and among
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Kazakhstan
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territorial units prevent hinder the fulfillment of such
tasks. The situation is further exacerbated by the du-
plication of functions between BWAs and Republican
State Enterprises. As such, at the province level, Repub-
lican State Enterprises are not accountable to the very
water users who provide most of their funding.  This
partly explains the high institutional costs of opera-
tional management of irrigation systems. By filling the
gap resulting from the  financial deficiencies of BWAs,
the Republican State Enterprises have acquired regu-
latory authority over water users.  Conflicts of interest
with respect to service provision and need thus ensue.
Water Users’ Organizations serve as the bodies re-
sponsible for delivering water to members.  Character-
istically, they fail to perform this function due to lack
of technical, financial and management support. They
are further weakened by the wary participation of and
lack of trust among the farmers.
3. POLICY OPTIONS
3.1 Challenges in Policy Formulation
The Helsinki Convention on the Protection and Use
of Transboundary Watercourses and International
Lakes stipulates that one of the main principles behind
any policy formulation should include the preservation
of water resources for future generations (article 5c).
Having ratified the Convention, Kazakhstan is obliged
to establish a clear, long-term vision of the management
and conservation of its water resources.
While there is a general agreement that short-term
technical solutions are insufficient, the present pro-
gram for institutional reform is multifaceted and com-
plex. It involves political, legislative, economic, social
as well as educational measures. The political measures
(on national and interstate levels) include drafting of
interstate agreements, as well as pursuing overall dem-
ocratic reform and increasing the transparency of State
structures. Legislative measures involve the adoption
of legislation to regulate rights to and ownership of
land, water, and irrigation infrastructure, with clear
explanations of the responsibilities of each stakeholder
and possible sanctions in case of violation—as well as
implementation mechanisms. Proposed economic re-
forms, in turn, must amend water pricing mechanisms,
agricultural produce price regulation, subsidies and
loans, and bonuses through grants and prizes. As agri-
culture represents the main consumer of water, farm-
ers need to be financially stable in order to pay for
what they use. As such, economic incentives must be
designed to encourage farmers to invest in land fertil-
ity and sustainable water use. Educational incentives
should therefore focus on awareness-raising efforts and
providing access to information for all stakeholders.
Together, this package of measures and reforms
presents a multi-part challenge that requires a balanced
and comprehensive approach. For example, changes
aimed at market reforms (such as water pricing) must
consider the financial burden on farmers, who are oth-
erwise unable to bear the cost of the water they use—
at least at the current stage. Rehabilitation investment
is crucial for the adequate functioning of the infra-
structure, but technical advancement must be support-
ed by administrative measures. Relations with upstream
countries regarding the water allocations also must be
stabilized, in addition to  domestic policies.
3.2 Better Technology?
Technical solutions, in terms of both agricultural tech-
nology and water infrastructure, aim at improving the
productive and resourceful—or efficient—use of water,
without affecting the institutional makeup of water
management. While it is important to maintain satisfac-
tory conditions with respect to infrastructure, measures
such as the construction of new reservoirs and canals
and the diversion of water is simply inappropriate at
this stage, economically. Yet such measures continue
to remain high on the national agenda.
One project which was recently proposed as a
means of overcoming existing water shortages involves
the construction of a pump station for automated wa-
ter delivery from the Shardara reservoir to the Dostyk
canal.  This would ultimately make the water supply
of the Makhtaaral district less dependent on the up-
stream allocations in Uzbekistan. This project has not
been approved for government funding at present,
neither has it been out-rightly rejected.
Another recent suggestion concerns the construc-
tion of the Koksarai reservoir and hydropower station
on the Syrdarya river beyond the Shardara reservoir, in
order to avoid discharges to the Arnasai depression.
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The major justification for this project refers to antic-
ipated disruptions of the water supply from Kyrgyzstan
and Uzbekistan—thus the need to secure additional
water storage. The payoffs of the reservoir would de-
pend on development of a fishery and hydropower sta-
tion; the reservoir would be able increase the area of
irrigated land only slightly (by ten thousand hectares).
This project was recently abandoned due to its nega-
tive environmental impact and low economic expedi-
ency. While the pessimistic predictions of project pro-
tagonists often come true (the Shardara, for example,
once again hit a critical level in winter 2003), it is un-
likely that the project will be implemented in the fore-
seeable future.
With respect to enhancing agriculture, there have
been several cases concerning the installment of ad-
vanced irrigation equipment without an area-specific
feasibility study or training opportunities for local farm-
ers. Inevitably, the equipment is later abandoned, as
farmers either have no personal interest in or under-
standing of proper maintenance.
Regardless, such technical approaches retain their
attractiveness. As Altyev (2002) contends, “the most
successful of the international aid projects [in the
region] have been those targeted at ‘technical’ aid, in
particular the development of the regional hydro-
meteorological services and automation of the recla-
mation systems.”
Moreover, the need for rehabilitating or upgrad-
ing equipment can be argued in terms of ecological
interest.  According to Duhovny (2002), “…land pro-
ductivity can be increased by 1.7 times and water pro-
ductivity by 2.5 times without any major investment,
through the strict adherence to the technology.”
One particularly successful innovation involves the
selection of new cotton grades in the Makhtaaral test-
ing station. These brands are reported to be less water-
consuming and more productive. According to the South
Kazakhstan news site of September 9, 2002, in 2003
the new brand is expected be planted on 80 thousand
ha in the Makhtaaral district (65% of the irrigated area).
Undoubtedly, rehabilitation and restoration of ir-
rigation infrastructure comprise important aspects of
water reform, but if implemented alone they prove to
be either incomplete or temporary fixes to a larger prob-
lem. Meanwhile, simple technological solutions remain
perhaps too attractive—as the recurrent project of
transferring water from Siberian rivers to Central Asia
indicates. All measures must be balanced appropriate-
ly, considering both environmental impacts and polit-
ical consequences.
3.3 New Legislation
Legislative reform should be of the highest priority for
the Kazakh government. Lack of adequate legislation
impedes the implementation of irrigation management
transfer and other relevant policies.
The new Water Code received significant input and
support from the recently adopted Agriculture and
Food Program. Developed by the Kazgiprovodkhoz
research institute in 2002, the Code attempts to bring
domestic water legislation in compliance with the
Helsinki Convention on the Protection and Use of
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes
(1992), ratified by Kazakhstan in January 2001.  Ad-
ditionally, the Code aims at clarifying the issues of ir-
rigation infrastructure ownership and the distribution
of responsibilities among various governmental bod-
ies. The draft code has been submitted to Parliament
in December 2002 and is scheduled for adoption in
spring or early summer of 2003.
The Draft Code consists of a number of notable
modifications, particularly when compared to the pre-
vious Water Code of 1993. It introduces several new
concepts regarding the ownership and management of
water infrastructure, such as water inspectors, hydro-
ameliorative condominiums, basin councils and water
servitude.
One innovation concerns the position of state in-
spector. The deputy head of the Committee for Water
Resources serves as the principal state inspector for
water consumption and preservation; along with the
deputy principal state inspector, senior state inspec-
tors and state inspectors represent heads and special-
ists of the relevant departments of the Committee and
its territorial and basin units.
While this arrangement gives inspectors consider-
able control over water resources, it has two substan-
tial drawbacks: first, it does not clearly differentiate
between the executive and controlling functions of the
Committee and its officials; and second, it further ex-
acerbates the conflict of interest between the Commit-
tee territorial and basin units and the Republican State
Enterprises and BWAs.
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Hydro-ameliorative condominiums are defined as
“a special form of ownership whereby lands are in pri-
vate ownership of natural and artificial persons, and
water infrastructure (hydro-ameliorative structure)
belongs to them as a communal share property.”7   This
concept lays the groundwork for the adoption of the
Law on Water Users’ Organizations.
The Basin Council is an advisory and consultative
body lead by a corresponding head of the Basin Au-
thority, but possesses no control or administrative pow-
ers. As such, it  remains doubtful that this body, left
unchanged, will encourage any substantial reforms.
Another concept introduced in the Code is water
servitude—that is, the right to limited exploitation of
a water unit. A differentiation between public and pri-
vate types of servitude is envisaged, with the latter in-
volving (unlicensed) water intake without technical
equipment, watering places, and waterways. Land ser-
vitude is established for land tenants and owners sur-
rounding the water unit. In principle, the water servi-
tude concept might allow clarifying infrastructure
ownership issues; however, further elaboration is needed.
Apart from the Water Code, the second most im-
portant legislative document to be adopted is the Law
on Water Users’ Organizations. The Asian Develop-
ment Bank prepared a draft law in 2000 in the frame-
work of its project on Water Resources Management
and Land Improvement; however, the adoption of the
law to coincide with the new Water Code. Currently,
it is visualized as a draft “On Rural Consumer Coop-
erative of Water Users” (2002). There is a danger that
its adoption will be postponed again, seriously imped-
ing the development of Water Users’ Organizations.
3.4 Government Reform
The Committee for Water Resources, the principal
governmental body responsible for water management,
has endured a turbulent history since its establishment,
characterized by numerous shifts in its management
(from the Ministry of Agriculture to the Ministry of
Natural Resources).  These changes signify attempts to
balance a comprehensive approach to water issues with
an interest in giving sufficient attention to irrigation—
as agriculture represents the major consumer of water.
A number of experts have proposed raising the sta-
tus of the Committee for Water Resources from a sub-
committee to that of a State Agency.8   It was envis-
aged that as an  Agency, it would be able to combine
all water issue.  Furthermore, its elevated status might
promote productive negotiations on water management
among member countries of the ICWC.
However, recent government decrees have slighted
this possibility. In August 2002, the Committee for
Water Resources was transferred back to the Ministry
of Agriculture. Whereas this decision will undoubtedly
increase the profile of irrigation in the Committee, pre-
vious experience casts doubts on whether the Ministry
will manage to address water issues comprehensively.
Within the Committee for Water Resources, one of
the most urgent challenges is the above-mentioned dif-
ferentiation of functions between territorial and basin
units at the province level. Any reform should clearly
state the rights and responsibilities of the territorial water
management units at the district level and the Water User
Associations with respect to maintenance functions.
3.5 Economic Incentives
The severe economic crisis following the collapse of
the Soviet Union pronouncedly affected the water
sector. At present, market reforms conflict with the
inherited state-dependent structure of the agricultural
sector.  Meanwhile, on-going disagreements among
owners of the irrigation structure further impede the
introduction of market economic relations. However,
water management reform is linked not only to issues
of ownership rights, but also to the development of a
credit system and the overall investment climate.
Economic incentives, such as charging a water tar-
iff, comprise important market mechanisms. Water
pricing was introduced in 1997, but the low tariffs
have been largely subsidized by the State; farmers, who
are among the most vulnerable in society, are clearly
unable to bear the full cost of the water.
The State Agriculture and Food Program (adopted
in June 2002) outlines the development of the agro-
industrial complex in Kazakhstan from 2003 to 2005.
As agriculture is the main consumer of water in Kazakh-
stan, the Program involves important implications for the
water management sector. Table 2. represents the fund-
ing allocations to water management sector in 2003–05.
The Agriculture and Food Program stipulates that
subsidies will be offered until at least 2005—that is,
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for the entirety of its duration. While the intention of
the Program is to secure farmers’ economic viability
and survival, the economic incentive for rational wa-
ter management appear somewhat lacking. As Mu-
hametjanov et al. (2002) offer, “the main hindrance to
competition (market relations) in the water sector is
the contradiction among the owners of the irrigation
structure, who would want to charge maximum fee
for their services, and the water network users who are
interested in the minimization of their costs.”  The
Agriculture and Food Program seems to avoid rather
than address this issue.
3.6 Education, Information
and Transparency
Public access to information on transboundary waters
comprises an important component of the Helsinki
Convention on the Protection and Use of Trans-
boundary Watercourses and International Lakes.
Information that should be made available includes
water-quality objectives, required permits and condi-
tions, results of water and effluent sampling tests
performed for monitoring and assessment purposes,
and follow-up reports on compliance with objectives
or conditions (Article 16).
Another important aspect involves establishing
monitoring councils, consisting of respectable public
figures at major water organizations, to address public
opinion and participation.  Presently, this function is
not clearly structured; significant gaps are apparent.
The Basin Councils that are envisaged in the draft
Water Code could, in principle, take up this role, but
their functions are not clearly defined.
Education holds plays a vital role on the agenda, yet
currently it is somewhat overlooked.   Farmers’ attitude
to Water Management Organizations is still rather wary;
in turn, practical seminars could serve to provide in-
formation on the benefits of joint management of water
systems. Such seminars have thus far been organized
in the framework of international projects.  The Asian
Development Bank, for example, incorporated educa-
tion into its Water Resources Management and Land
Improvement project. Here, the role of non-governmen-
tal organizations could prove indispensable in encour-
aging and assisting farmers to organize themselves.
4. CONCLUSIONS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
It is essential that the States work together and
that each of them involves the people at the local
level, using their traditional knowledge of the
region and encouraging their participation in the
reconstruction process.
(Green Cross International 2000, p.80)
Water scarcity presents a significant problem in Central
Asia; the problem is exacerbated by ongoing difficulties
in irrigation which largely stem from inconsistent water
policies and institutions. These difficulties and
inconsistencies hinder the efficacy of irrigation
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Table 2.
Funding Allocated for Water Management in the Agriculture and Food Program [Thousand USD]
Budget Program 2003 2004 2005
Subsidizing costs of supplying water to agricultural producers 6747.6 7189.6 9803.9
Rehabilitation of the most damaged sections of inter-farm 1634.0 8169.9 9803.9
canals and irrigation and drainage facilities
Establishment of the ‘Kazagromeliovodkhoz’ 65.4 65.4 65.4
methodological center (state enterprise)
Equipping the ‘Kazagromeliovodkhoz’ 15.9 7.7 6.5
methodological center (state enterprise)
Loans 19,886.9 13,594.1 6398.0
Total 28,349.8 29,026.7 26,077.7
Source: The State Agriculture and Food Program of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2003–2005.
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management transfer within Kazakhstan and weaken
the country’s position in interstate negotiations.
The establishment of an adequate legal framework
is essential for the development of the water sector.  As
such, the new Water Code, as well as the Water User’
Organization Law must be adopted as soon as possi-
ble. The new Code should clarify the issue of owner-
ship of water systems—secondary level water systems
in particular. It should also clearly describe the divi-
sion of functions between service-providing and con-
trolling bodies and account for their functioning. In
amending its legislation, Kazakhstan should aim at full
compliance with the Helsinki Convention on the Pro-
tection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and
International Lakes, which it adopted in 2001.
Institutional reform should incorporate the devel-
opment of a comprehensive water management policy
for the Committee for Water Resources, raising its pro-
file and status, and clearly distributing responsibilities
between river basin management authorities and terri-
torial-administrative branches. The former should be
granted full authority to control the water manage-
ment systems, while the latter should limit these func-
tions to operation and maintenance of the irrigation
system.
In the past year, agriculture has been allocated left-
over funding, due to the hardships of post-Soviet
change. As major economic indicators improve, agri-
culture (irrigated agriculture, in particular) should be
funded on a more consistent basis. Moreover, a cen-
tral role in developing the agricultural sector belongs
to private banks.  Banks should be encouraged to in-
vest provided there is a consistent government reform
policy. However, state subsidies must be carefully le-
veraged against market imperatives in order to prepare
farmers for financial independence in the future.
The provision of information is another key ele-
ment in the irrigation management transfer strategy.
WUOs are a new concept in the area, and lack rele-
vant experience and information. Effective manage-
ment requires democratic participation of all members.
As such, training in managerial, financial and conflict
resolution skills is important to establish WUOs as
genuine bottom-up institutions. Non-governmental
organizations can play a crucial role with regard to pro-
viding information and education for farmers.
Finally, accountability and transparency are criti-
cal to ensuring the implementation of reforms. In par-
ticular, media access and independence are important
tools in attracting public attention to the process.
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